Crawford v. Scovell
| Decision Date | 22 March 1880 |
| Citation | 94 Pa. 48 |
| Parties | Crawford v. Scovell. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
March 16, 1880
1. A grantor in a deed may avoid his conveyance by proof that he was non compos mentis at the time of its execution where there is no evidence of ratification after restoration to reason.
2. To avoid his deed, it is not necessary that an insane man should put the grantee in statu quo, for one of the obvious grounds on which the deed of an insane man is held voidable is not merely the incapacity to make a valid sale, but the incapacity prudently to manage and dispose of the proceeds Hence to avoid his conveyance no previous offer of restitution is necessary.
3. A committee cannot be appointed to bring suit for a sane man because at one time he was a lunatic. He must bring suit himself to recover his rights, and may prove insanity to avoid a deed set up against him on the same terms as if he were defendant in the action, and the plaintiff were supporting his case with the same deed.
Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming county: Of January Term 1880, No. 161.
Ejectment by Ira Crawford against John Scovell for an acre of land.
At the trial, before Ingham, P. J., the plaintiff proved possession in himself and in those under whom he claimed, accompanied by proper conveyances, from 1844 to 1875, and rested. The defendant put in evidence a deed for the land in dispute from the plaintiff to him, dated 11th March 1876, and rested.
The plaintiff then offered to prove by one Wandall that he did the business for defendant in arranging for procuring this deed; also to prove what the witness knew about the consideration paid and the whole transaction, for the purpose of showing the insanity of Crawford, as well as Scovell's knowledge of it, and that there was an inadequacy of compensation. Also, that the bargain was unconscionable and unfair.
The defendant objected to the offer as irrelevant, and as introducing a defence that is not admissible as against the plaintiff's deed, viz., the defence of insanity. Also, that the offer is not full enough, in that before the plaintiff can avoid the deed, he must prove that he has offered to restore to the defendant what he paid for the property; and also, that it is not permissible for a party to allege his own insanity in a suit brought by himself against his sealed instrument or his executed contract. Objections sustained.
Plaintiff also offered to prove by this and other witnesses that Crawford was insane at the time he signed the deed, and therefore was incapable of executing such an instrument. Also, that it was procured by fraud, and that Scovell had knowledge of the insanity of Crawford. Objected to, for the reasons assigned in first offer, and objections sustained.
The court instructed the jury: " The deed offered, being a good and sufficient deed from the plaintiff to the defendant, is a sufficient defence in this action of ejectment, and your verdict should be for the defendant."
Verdict accordingly, and after judgment thereon, plaintiff took this writ and alleged that the court erred in refusing to admit the evidence under the above offers.
Sittser & Harding, for plaintiff in error.
In 2 Kent's Com. 451, it is said: The party himself may set up as a defence and in avoidance of his contract that he was non compos mentis when it was alleged to have been made. The principle advanced by Littleton and Coke that a man shall not be heard to stultify himself, has been properly exploded as being manifestly absurd and against natural justice: Warden v. Eichbaum, 2 Harris 121; Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart. 371; Cook v. Parker, 4 Phila. R. 265.
But in rejecting our offer to show the insanity of the plaintiff at the time of signing the deed, with notice of that insanity to the defendant at the time, the court swept away our offer to show that the deed was procured by fraud. The principle upon which the evidence offered was rejected seemed to be, that if a party asserts and offers to prove that he was insane at any particular time prior to the commencement of suit, his evidence on that and every other subject should not be heard. If such a fact, when asserted by a party, is fatal to his case, it should have the same effect when proved against him by the other side.
W. E. & C. A. Little and William M. Piatt & Sons, for defendant in error.
Plaintiff's first offer was to show his own insanity generally; and his second was to show his insanity at the time of the execution of his deed to the defendant. He did not offer to show that he had recovered his reason. By the application of a well-known rule, if we are to believe that he was insane at the time of the execution of his deed, we must presume that he continues insane: Leech v. Leech, 9 Harris 67, 69.
The common-law rule, that " a man shall not be heard to stultify himself," has not been so far changed that a recovered lunatic may, in the action of ejectment, destroy his own indenture. None of the authorities cited by the plaintiff go to this extreme length. If it be that his deed can be disaffirmed, it should only be by bill in equity, whereby the defendant would have notice of the facts and claims against him, and time in which to prepare his evidence.
The committee of the lunatic must be joined as plaintiff: Uberoth v. Bank, 9 Phila. 83. If the lunatic can sue alone, who will be responsible for costs or vouch for it that the lunatic will not afterwards disaffirm his disaffirmance.
It is urged that the plaintiff was not allowed to show that the deed was procured from him by fraud. As an independent offer, it is insufficient in that it stands unconnected with an offer to prove an attempt to restore to the defendant his purchase-money: Pearsoll v. Chapin, 8 Wright 9; see, also, Morrow v. Rees, 19 P. F. Smith 368. This offer as made was also irrelevant. It was to show fraud by the witness, not the specific acts from which the court could decide whether a fraud had been committed.
A formal offer was made to prove that Ira Crawford was insane when he executed the deed to John Scovell, that Scovell knew of the insanity and procured the deed by fraud. This was overruled on the objection that the offer was not full enough, in that, before the plaintiff can avoid the deed he must have offered to restore its consideration; that a plaintiff cannot allege his own insanity against his deed and that the witness was incompetent because of his instrumentality in perpetrating the fraud. No objection was made that the specific acts were not set out in the offer, and it is too late to object now. That the witness was competent is not doubtful. As the case comes it presents these questions: 1. Can a plaintiff, who brings suit himself, prove his insanity to defeat his deed given in evidence by the defendant? 2. Can he prove that the defendant knew of the insanity when he took the deed? 3. May he show the deed was procured by fraud? and 4. Must he restore the consideration...
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