Crawford v. State

• Decision Date: 06 April 2012
• Docket Number: CR–09–1883.
• Citation: 92 So.3d 168
• Parties: Kenneth Robert CRAWFORD v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

92 So.3d 168

Kenneth Robert CRAWFORD

v.STATE of Alabama.

CR–09–1883.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

July 8, 2011.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 2011.

Certiorari Denied April 6, 2012

Alabama Supreme Court 1110367.

Douglas H. Scofield, Chelsea, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

JOINER, Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Kenneth Robert Crawford, a convicted sex offender, pleaded guilty to establishing a residence or other living accommodation where a minor resides, a violation of § 15–20–26(c), Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Community Notification Act, § 15–20–20 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the CNA”). The circuit court sentenced Crawford to two years in prison but suspended that sentence and placed him on three years' probation. Additionally, the circuit court ordered Crawford to pay a $100 victims compensation assessment.

The facts are undisputed. In 1998, Crawford was convicted of second-degree sodomy, in which his minor child was the victim; he is therefore subject to the residency requirements of the CNA. § 15–20–26, Ala.Code 1975. In August 2009, Crawford moved in with his son, his son's wife, and his two minor grandchildren.¹ When Crawford attempted to register his new address with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, he was told that he could not live with his son because doing so violated the restrictions of the CNA. Crawford lived with his son's family from August 16, 2009, to October 16, 2009. In April 2010, Crawford was indicted by the Jefferson County Grand Jury for violating the CNA. After he was indicted, Crawford filed a verified motion to dismiss the indictment, which the circuit court denied. After the motion was denied, Crawford expressly reserved his right to appeal the issues raised in his verified motion to dismiss, and he pleaded guilty. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Crawford contends that the residency restrictions in § 15–20–26(c), Ala.Code 1975, are unconstitutional. Specifically, Crawford contends that the CNA violates the protections of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and that the CNA is an ex post facto law that violates Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution.

I.

Crawford argues that § 15–20–26(c) is unconstitutional because, he says, it violates the protections of the Due Process Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Due Process Clause both guarantees fair process and includes a substantive component that “ ‘provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ ” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997)). Here, Crawford challenges the CNA under both the procedural and substantive components of the Due Process Clause.

When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged,

“ ‘[w]e must afford the Legislature the highest degree of deference, and construe its acts as constitutional if their language so permits.’ Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762 So.2d 828, 831 (Ala.2000). ‘[I]n order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality ... the party asserting the unconstitutionality of the [statute], bears the burden “to show that [the statute] is not constitutional.” ’ State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Ala.2006) (quoting Board of Trs. of Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Talley, 291 Ala. 307, 310, 280 So.2d 553, 556 (1973)).”

State v. Adams, 91 So.3d 724, 732 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).

A.

Crawford first argues that § 15–20–26(c), Ala.Code 1975, violates the procedural component of the Due Process Clause because the statute provides no mechanism for a convicted sex offender to petition the court for an exemption from the restrictions imposed by the CNA. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause guarantees that a state will not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without some form of notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). To prevail on a procedural-due-process claim, Crawford must show that the CNA deprives him of a protected liberty interest and that the procedure accompanying the deprivation is constitutionally inadequate. Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989).

Here, Crawford argues that the CNA deprives him of the right of familial association because, he says, as a convicted sex offender it precludes him from living with his son, his minor grandchildren, and his daughter-in-law or with his wife and her daughter. The United States Supreme Court has recognized several different liberty interests implicit in the Due Process Clause. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. These liberty interests include “the right to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held:

“The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)....

“The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, [434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978) ]; childbirth, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, [431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977) ]; the raising and education of children, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, [431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ]; and cohabitation with one's relatives, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, [431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion) ]. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitmentsto the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.”

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20. Thus, the right to enter into and maintain certain familial associations is a protected liberty interest. As such the State cannot impede one's ability to associate with one's family without due process of law.

Because Crawford satisfies the first prong of the procedural due-process analysis, we must now determine whether the procedure accompanying the deprivation of his liberty interest was constitutionally adequate. To support his procedural due-process argument, Crawford cites this Court's ruling in J.L.N. v. State, 894 So.2d 738 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).

In J.L.N. the defendant had been previously convicted of second-degree rape; the victim was his 15–year–old girlfriend. After the defendant was released on probation, his victim and the victim's mother moved into the defendant's house. The defendant was indicted for a violation of the CNA and filed an unverified motion to dismiss the indictment because he intended to marry the victim. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion, and he pleaded guilty. The defendant argued that the CNA was unconstitutional because, he said, it was overbroad and violated both his procedural and substantive due-process rights; specifically, he said, it violated his right to intimate association with family members and the right to marital privacy. In holding that the CNA interfered directly and substantially with the defendant's right to marry, this Court stated that

“the problem with the CNA, at least in the context of this case, is that it contains no exemption—and no procedure by which a convicted sex offender can petition the court for an exemption—from the restrictions imposed by the statute and the corresponding severe punitive consequences for noncompliance. In this respect, the CNA is arbitrarily broad, because its practical effect is to create a conclusive presumption that there are no circumstances under which it might be appropriate for a convicted sex offender to interact with his victim—a presumption belied by the particular facts of this case. Contrary to the Legislature's reference in the last paragraph of § 15–20–20.1 to providing ‘certain discretion to judges for application of these requirements,’ the CNA provides no means for an individualized determination by a court in those rare instances, such as this one, where a convicted sex offender and his victim wish to marry. Such irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974).”

J.L.N., 894 So.2d at 749. Although Crawford recognizes that the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the Court's decision...