Crawford v. United States, 5156.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1930
• Docket Number: No. 5156.,5156.
• Citation: 59 App. DC 356,41 F.2d 979
• Parties: CRAWFORD v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

59 App. DC 356, 41 F.2d 979 (1930)

CRAWFORD v. UNITED STATES.

No. 5156.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued May 6, 1930.

Decided June 2, 1930.

John H. Wilson and Nathan A. Dobbins, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leo A. Rover and Neil Burkinshaw, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

Appellant, defendant below, was convicted of murder in the first degree in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; and, from the judgment thereon, sentencing him to death, this appeal was taken.

Four men were named in the indictment: Defendant, who was convicted; one Joseph Hardy, who has not been apprehended; one Benjamin Branson, who obtained a severance, testified for the United States, thereafter pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree; and one Carl M. Terry, who was acquitted. The murder was committed in a gasoline station at Sixth street and Rhode Island avenue, in the city of Washington, where the defendant and Hardy had gone with the intention of committing the crime of robbery.

It appears from the evidence that Crawford and Hardy took a car, on the evening the crime was committed, and got the two other defendants and drove across the District line into Maryland with the intention of hijacking whisky runners. After waiting by the roadside for about three-quarters of an hour without meeting any victim, they decided to return to the city. When they reached a point at the intersection of Sixth street and Rhode Island avenue, the suggestion was made that they hold up the gas station at that point. Defendant suggested that he would take a bank bill, and, while the station keeper was making change, he would hold him up and get his money. Defendant and Hardy got out of the car and went into the station, when shortly two shots were heard. When defendant and Hardy came out, defendant admitted that he squeezed the gun and it went off.

A number of witnesses, who accompanied the decedent to a hospital, testified on behalf of the government that he made a dying statement, in which he stated that one of the men said, "Take this, you white s_____ b_____," and then fired the fatal shot. The deceased further stated, in substance, that he did not know why they shot him, because if they had asked for his money he would have given it to them.

It is urged on behalf of defendant that the court erred in instructing the jury to ignore in the cross-examination of the witness Branson an admission that he had pleaded guilty in 1921 to the charge of grand larceny, which it was conceded was later nollied. Counsel for defendant insists that this evidence should have been admitted as affecting the credibility of the witness, on the ground that a plea of guilty is a conviction which, under the statute, might be shown as affecting the credibility of the witness.

We think it is settled law that to constitute a conviction, within the terms of the statute (Code, § 1067), there must not only be a plea of guilty, or the verdict of guilty by a jury, but this must be followed by a judgment and sentence of the court. Singer v. United States (C. C. A.) 278 F. 415; Schooley v. United States (C. C. A.) 4 F.(2d) 767; Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N. E. 407; Martin v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. 49, 234 P. 795; State v. Burnett, 144 Wash. 598, 258 P. 484; State v. Savage, 86 W. Va. 655, 104 S. E. 153; Ford v. State, 106 Neb. 439, 184 N. W. 70.

It is contended that we held in the case of Heim v. United States, 47 App. D. C. 485, L. R. A. 1918E, 87, that a plea of guilty is equivalent to a conviction. In that case it was held that a plea of guilty to an indictment, afterwards withdrawn by permission of court, cannot be proof against a defendant in his trial on a subsequent plea of not guilty. A plea of guilty is equivalent to a verdict of guilty by a jury. In either case, therefore, it takes the judgment of the court on the plea or verdict to constitute a conviction. A careful reading of the opinion in the Heim Case fully sustains this view.

Error is urged on the refusal of the court to ask the prospective jurors in their examination if the fact that the deceased was a white man and the defendants colored would in any way affect their deliberations. To this request the court replied: "I have asked and they have answered that they know of no reason why it would not be fair for them to try the case." We think with this statement the trial court in its discretion was not required to ask the jury the question requested by counsel for defendant. In support of this contention, counsel for defendant rely upon the case of Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837, 838, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75, where it was held error, in a trial where the defendant belonged to the negro race, to refuse to ask the jurors the question, "Could you give the defendant, who is a negro, as fair and impartial a trial as you could a white man, * * * upon the same evidence?"

As affecting the discretion of the trial court, in questioning or permitting the questioning of the jury on voir dire, local conditions may have an important bearing. The social situation in Florida, as between the white and colored races, may be such as to create a feeling of prejudice that would justify such an inquiry, while the conditions in another...