Crawford v. United States

• Decision Date: 16 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 8309.,8309.
• Citation: 369 A.2d 595
• Parties: Marlon J. CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

369 A.2d 595

Marlon J. CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 8309.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 16, 1975.

Decided February 16, 1977.

W. Gary Kohlman, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Bette E. Uhrmacher, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, Stuart M. Gerson, Lawrence H. Wechsler, and Edward C. McGuire, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before YEAGLEY, HARRIS and MACK, Associate Judges.

YEAGLEY, Associate Judge:

Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, of (1) carrying a pistol without a license, D.C. Code 1973, § 22-3204, (2) receiving stolen government property, § 22-2207, and (3) altering identification marks on a weapon, § 22-3212. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the government's evidence or raise any other issues arising from the trial itself. The issues on appeal are (1) whether the police could properly detain the car in which appellant was riding as a passenger in order to check the driver's credentials with the WALES (Washington Area Law Enforcement System) computer and (2) whether the police had probable cause to arrest appellant and order him to exit the car. The gun involved was in plain view after appellant vacated the car. We affirm the convictions.

Appellant was a passenger in the front seat of a two-door, bucket seat 1968 green and black Chevrolet Camaro. At approximately 3:45 p. m. on May 26, 1972, two police officers on scooter patrol saw the car occupied by appellant and three other men make a "fast left turn" and fail to yield the right of way to oncoming traffic.¹ The officers stopped the car and asked to see the driver's license and the car's registration. The driver produced his valid driver's license; the car registration produced was valid, but the name on the registration differed from the name on the driver's license.

Even though the officers believed that the driver had the owner's permission to borrow the car, one of the officers radioed the dispatcher to check both the driver's name and the car owner's name through the WALES computer and to determine whether the car was stolen. Both officers testified that when a car's registration is in a name different than the driver's license, it is "usual procedure"² to check the discrepancy with the WALES computer. Officer McMullen radioed WALES and

received a response that the vehicle was an entered vehicle, which is normally taken to mean stolen — not necessarily stolen. It means that the vehicle is wanted for some reason or other.

The car was wanted in connection with an armed robbery and sodomy offense that had occurred six days earlier.³

It is important to understand exactly what the officers knew after receiving the WALES information for it is on the basis of that knowledge that the officers arrested the car's occupants and ordered them out of the car and upon that knowledge that the propriety of their actions must be tested.⁴

Officer McMullen testified that after receiving the WALES information, he

recalled that [he] had received information in roll call a couple days before — I can't remember the exact amount of days ["I do remember hearing about it in roll call maybe two or three times."] — that the vehicle was wanted for a rape, robbery and sodomy case, and in that case there was supposed to be four or five subjects, I believe.

The officer could not remember the verbatim description of the subjects, but testified that "[t]hey were all supposed to be [N]egro males in their twenties." Based on the WALES response that the car was wanted in the armed robbery and sodomy case, and based upon his recollection of the general description of "four or five" subjects, Officer McMullen concluded that "as a police officer [he] had reason to suspect that these [men] could possibly have been the suspects."

Officer Conway testified that he "had heard the descriptions [of the armed robbery/sodomy suspects] when they were read off the teletype"; he assumed this occurred "the day after the armed robbery took place", or, in other words, "a day or two" before stopping the car in the instant case. The most he could recall knowing about the suspects' description at the time he stopped the car was that he "had seen a picture of [the car's owner]," and that he remembered "very general descriptions." He was certain the description was of Negro males, but could not remember their ages, their approximate ages, or their builds. The only other detail he could remember knowing was that there were "four or five" suspects involved in the armed robbery.

Thus, the sum total of information upon which the officers acted was threefold: (1) this car was wanted in connection with a relatively recent armed robbery and sodomy case; (2) four or five suspects were wanted in connection with that case; and (3) those suspects were Negro males in their twenties. Based on that information, the officers called for a transport wagon and returned the few feet to the car to tell the occupants that they would have to come down to the police station. It was at this point that the limited investigatory stop based on the traffic violation and the nonmatching license and registration turned into an arrest situation as a result of the added information received from WALES⁵ and the two officers' recollections of the suspects in the prior criminal offenses.

The most important information to the officers was the fact that the prior case involved an armed robbery. After receiving that response from WALES the officers chose to tell the car's occupants (when they were ordered to exit the car) that the car was stolen, a fact neither the officers nor the car's occupants believed to be true.⁶

As each occupant left the car, he was "frisked" before being walked the few feet back to the transport wagon where he was "frisked" again. After appellant had exited the car, Officer Conway observed a gun wedged in between the back and the seat portions of the front bucket seat appellant had just vacated. The officer reached inside the car and extracted the gun. Appellant subsequently was charged and convicted in connection with the possession of that gun.

Appellant's first contention on appeal is that once the driver of the car, in which appellant was a passenger, produced a valid driver's license and a valid car registration (but showing the car belonged to someone other than the driver), our decision in Palmore v. United States, D.C. App., 290 A.2d 573 (1972), aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L. Ed.2d 342 (1973), required the police officers to let the car and its occupants continue on their way without any further detention. Appellant does not challenge the initial stop (appellant's brief at 16), but relies on the following language in Palmore, supra at 583, to support his contention that continued detention is impermissible:

We say again that when the driver has produced his permit and registration and they are in order he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.

We reject this contention as applied to the facts here.

The legality of a brief detention after a valid initial stop must be analyzed under the general principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The test to be applied in determining the reasonableness of the detention is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment the detention began, when considered in light of the governmental interest which allegedly supports an official intrusion, warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the detention was reasonable. Moreover that detention must be properly limited. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Coleman v. United States, D.C.App., 337 A.2d 767, 769-70 (1975), quoting the pre-Terry case of Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973, 91 S.Ct. 1660, 29 L.Ed.2d 137 (1971), citing Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171-72 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Harris, 404 F.Supp. 1116, 1123 (E.D.Pa.1975).

In Palmore we were concerned about balancing the community's interest in regulating driving by means of licensing and registration laws against the momentary interruption ("spot check") of the motorist to ascertain his compliance with those laws. We held that if a motorist produces his valid driver's license and his car's valid registration, the interests were balanced and the motorist then "must be allowed to proceed on his way". 290 A.2d at 583. The continued detention in Palmore was sustained because the driver in that case was unable to produce a valid registration for the car.

In the instant case, two facts are present that were not present in Palmore. First, the car was validly stopped for a traffic violation and not for a license/registration "spot check". Second, while the license and registration technically were "in order", that is, the license belonged to this driver and the registration was for this car, the two papers were not in the name of the same person — the driver of the car.⁷ Under these circumstances, a brief detention in order for the officers to radio the WALES computer to determine whether the car is stolen is reasonable, properly limited, and thus permissible under Terry. Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 287, 289 & n. 5 (1973); United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hunter, 471 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Madril, 445 F.2d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1010, 92 S.Ct. 692...