Crawford v. Wheeler
| Decision Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action 18-1735(FLW) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
| Parties | THOMAS CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. SCO B. WHEELER et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Thomas Crawford (“Crawford” or “Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison, in Trenton, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with this civil rights action filed, inter alia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by defendants SCO B. Wheeler (“Wheeler”), Lt. Bundy, SCO E. Perez (“Perez”), SCO G. Christmas, COR J. Leek (“Leek”), COR Patrick Jenson (“Jenson”), Sgt. S. Patterson (“Patterson”), Sgt. DeFazio (“DeFazio”), the State of New Jersey, and the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”) (collectively, “Movants”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to the federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court dismisses the remaining claims as to the State of New Jersey, the NJDOC, and the unserved defendants pursuant to its screening authority, declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims, and remands this matter to state court.
Plaintiff Thomas Crawford, AKA Thomas Cross, is currently confined at New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”) pursuant to a 1996 conviction in state court for murder and related offenses.[1] Exhibit A, Transcript of Plaintiff's Deposition, T10:8-20; see ECF No. 21, Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's civil rights action arises from the alleged confiscation and destruction of his legal materials, which were located in the cell of Michael Martin, an inmate paralegal who is not a Plaintiff in this matter.
It is undisputed that Martin works as a paralegal in the NJSP law library and assists inmates with their legal challenges to their criminal convictions, among other duties. See Martin Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Prior to November 25, 2016, NJSP law library staff directed Martin to assist with Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in connection with a postconviction relief petition (“PCR”) Plaintiff filed in state court. See Plaintiff's Dep., T11-12; T28:11-12; Martin Decl. ¶ 6. According to Plaintiff, his motion for reconsideration related to the denial of a PCR in the New Jersey Superior Court, Essex County, before the Honorable Judge Kamil.[2] See T12:6-9; T24:1- 5; T36:24-37:2; T41-44. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that the planned reconsideration motion was based on the fact that his third PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to address issues after the Appellate Division's remand, and for relying on a brief that Plaintiff had prepared. T19:7-12; T20:13-17; T44:22-46:16.
In order to assist Plaintiff with his motion for reconsideration, Martin had Plaintiff's personal legal materials and legal file in his cell. See Martin Decl. ¶ 7. These legal material included transcripts and a brief. T27:22-28:10. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was given a scheduling order on the motion for reconsideration, and his deadline to file his papers was in September 2016, but he received several enlargements of time. See T37:3-12.
On November 25, 2016, Defendant DeFazio directed Defendants Leek and Jenson to conduct a search of Martin's cell.[3] Exhibit D; See ECF No. 21, Amended Complaint; T13:17-19. The motive for the cell search, however, is disputed. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that the cell search was conducted to retaliate against Martin for Martin's filing grievances against Defendant Wheeler.[4] T13:15-19; see ECF No. 21, Amended Complaint ¶¶ 9-18. In a Declaration submitted with Plaintiff's opposition papers, Martin contends that his cell was searched because he acts as a prison paralegal assisting inmates and files grievances against rouge correctional officers.[5] Martin Decl. ¶ 8. Moving Defendants concede that Defendants Leek and Jenson conducted the search of Martin's cell, but they deny that the search was retaliatory, and they also deny that the officers confiscated or destroyed legal materials. See Defendants' SOMF ¶¶ 10-12. In their moving papers, Defendants rely on the Special Custody Reports, which were prepared by Defendants Leek and Jensen, and contend that Martin's cell was a routine search based on having items that were potentially prohibited. See Exhibit D.
After the search, Plaintiff filed grievances with the prison attempting to locate and have any legal material found in Martin's cell during the search returned to him. T14 to 15; Exhibits B and C. In response to Plaintiff's grievances, prison officials responded that all materials confiscated in Martin's possession were returned to Martin, and that if Plaintiff believed his property was lost or stolen, Plaintiff should submit a property claim. Exhibit C. Subsequently, on January 19, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate property claim form to the prison, which was denied on February 27, 2017. Prison Officials determined that there was no neglect by the prison and further found and that the prison was not responsible for paperwork given to another inmate. See Exhibits E and F.
On January 18, 2017, Plaintiff wrote to the Superior Court requesting the price for the lost transcripts in his criminal matter. Exhibit G; T27:25-28:2. On January 23, 2017, the Superior Court responded that it no longer had those transcripts in its records.[6] Exhibit H; T28:2-3.
On September 19, 2017, Crawford filed his original complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County. Moving Defendants removed the action to this Court on February 7, 2018, and subsequently filed an Answer to the original complaint. See ECF Nos. 1 & 2. The Magistrate Judge granted Moving Defendants leave to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF Nos. 9, and they thereafter filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). ECF No. 10.
This Court construed the original complaint to assert civil rights claims for retaliation, denial of access to the courts, and supervisory liability, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as tort claims under state law. The Court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 9, 2019, as to the federal claims, declined supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims, and provided Plaintiff with leave to submit an Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 19-20.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 3, 2019. ECF No. 21. Defendants answered the Amended Complaint on or about February 20, 2020, ECF No. 25, and discovery commenced. Plaintiff was deposed on April 28, 2021, and the Magistrate Judge directed Movants to file their dispositive motions by August 27, 2021. See ECF No. 37.
Defendants subsequently filed the instant summary judgment motion. Plaintiff submitted his opposition brief and supporting exhibits, and Defendants submitted their reply brief. See ECF Nos. 38, 41, 42. The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is “a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, ” and it is material only if it has the ability to “affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 447 U.S. at 255)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002).
The burden of establishing that no “genuine issue” exists is on the party moving for summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. “A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial.” Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001).
The non-moving party must present “more than a scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Thus, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact, ” if a party fails “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323; Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992).
A document filed pro se is to be “liberally construed” and “a pro se complaint however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In addition, when considering a...
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