Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey

• Citation: 102 N.E. 282,55 Ind.App. 40
• Decision Date: 26 June 1913
• Docket Number: No. 7,922.,7,922.
• Parties: CRAWFORDSVILLE TRUST CO. v. RAMSEY.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

55 Ind.App. 40

102 N.E. 282

CRAWFORDSVILLE TRUST CO.

v.RAMSEY.

No. 7,922.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

June 26, 1913.

On petition for rehearing. Petition denied.

For former opinion, see 100 N. E. 1049.

HOTTEL, P. J.

Appellant has filed a petition for a rehearing in this case, and in their brief in support thereof counsel very earnestly and ably press upon the court their reasons therefor.

Our attention is first called to our manner of disposing of the first and second of the five propositions insisted on by appellee and set out in the opinion. The opinion expressly stated that the conclusion reached by this court on the fifth proposition rendered unnecessary a discussion of the other propositions, but in that connection we made some observations with reference to the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Crawfordsville, etc., Co. v. Ramsey (Sup.) 98 N. E. 177, upon said first and second propositions and appellant's contention in relation thereto, which upon investigation we have concluded are in apparent conflict with some of the decisions to which our attention is called by appellant's counsel in their brief on this petition. We have therefore eliminated from the original opinion such observations, they being entirely independent of and unnecessary to the support of the final conclusion reached on the fifth proposition, which presented the controlling question upon which the opinion rests.

It is also insisted by appellant that “in the opinion” this court erroneously assumed that the trial court found that the gift was conditioned on Ramsey's death, and incorrectly quoted appellant as contending that there was no evidence to support “that part of said finding which states that the gift was conditioned on that event.” We inadvertently used the word “gift” where strict accuracy required the use of the word “assignments.” Appellant's contention, made in its original brief, was that there was “no evidence in the record to sustain that part of finding 25 *** which is that each and all of the assignments made by Ramsey, were conditioned on the event of his death. ***”

Appellant's counsel in their original brief contended that the assignments were set out in the finding, and that they show that they were not conditioned on any event. The assignments in this case were the instruments through which the gift claimed by appellant was conveyed; and, while such assignments did not in fact constitute the gift, if by the word “gift” the property given is meant, yet they did constitute the evidence of the gift here relied on, and when the finding referred to is read in its entirety, it is manifest that by the word “assignments,” as there used, the court intended to convey the same meaning that would have been conveyed by the use of the word “gift.” In this connection counsel in their original brief said: “Just what the court meant by the words ‘conditioned on that event’ we are unable to say. If the court meant that the assignments were executed by Mr. Ramsey because he thought he was going to die, that might very well bring the gift within the definition of a gift inter vivos and at least would not take it out of the terms of a gift causa mortis.” We do not think there can be any doubt about the meaning of this finding or the meaning of the words therein, “conditioned on that event.” Such finding not only means what appellant thinks it might mean, viz., that “the assignments were executed by Mr. Ramsey because he thought he was going to die, but it means more, as clearly appears from the words which immediately follow the words “conditioned on that event,” viz., “ and would not have been made had not the said Ramsey been suffering from said disease...