Crawley v. Alameda Cnty. Waste Mgmt. Auth.

• Decision Date: 01 December 2015
• Docket Number: A143650
• Citation: Crawley v. Alameda Cnty. Waste Mgmt. Auth., 243 Cal.App.4th 396, 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 365 (Cal. App. 2015)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Marcus CRAWLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY WASTE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, Defendant and Respondent; Gary Wolff, As Executive Director, etc., et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

243 Cal.App.4th 396

196 Cal.Rptr.3d 365

Marcus CRAWLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.ALAMEDA COUNTY WASTE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, Defendant and Respondent;

Gary Wolff, As Executive Director, etc., et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

A143650

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Filed December 1, 2015

Rehearing Denied December 23, 2015

Marcus Crawley, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, San Francisco, Ellison Folk and Joseph D. Petta for Defendant and Respondent, and Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

BRUINIERS, J.

The Alameda County Waste Management Authority (Authority) imposed a $9.55 annual charge on all households within Alameda County for disposal of household hazardous waste by enactment of ordinance No. 2014–1, entitled "An Ordinance Establishing a Household Hazardous Waste Collection and Disposal Fee" (the Ordinance). Plaintiff Marcus Crawley, proceeding in propria persona, challenged the Ordinance via a petition for a writ of mandate or administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1094.5 ). Crawley argued that the fee constituted an assessment under article XIII D of the California Constitution (article XIII D), requiring approval by a majority of the electorate pursuant to section 4. In the alternative, Crawley contended the fee was not imposed in compliance with the requirements of article XIII D, section 6. The trial court sustained the Authority's demurrer without leave to amend. On appeal, Crawley renews some of the above arguments and raises new ones. The trial court properly concluded Crawley's petition failed to state a cause of action and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¹

The Authority is a joint powers authority formed under California law (Gov. Code, § 6500 et seq. ). On December 18, 2013, the Authority proposed "a fee for collection and disposal at the four [household hazardous waste] facilities in Alameda County of the [household hazardous waste] component of garbage and refuse generated by Alameda County Households." The proposed annual fee of $9.55 on each county household, beginning July 1, 2014, and ending June 30, 2024, would fund the facilities operating as part of the county's sanitation system. The Authority set a public hearing for February 26, 2014, to consider the proposed fee. The Authority's executive director was directed to prepare a report describing each parcel of real property with one or more households that would be subject to the Ordinance, the number of households on each parcel, and the amount of the proposed charge for each parcel.

In advance of February 26, 2014, the Authority's executive director mailed to each record owner of the subject properties a written notice of the proposed annual fee, its purpose, and the opportunity to protest the fee.² Specifically, the notice reads: "This letter is to inform you that the [Authority] will consider adopting a fee of $9.55 per year per residential unit, collected through the property tax roll, at its meeting on February 26, 2014.... [¶] Revenue from the fee will be used to support the countywide household hazardous waste program, which provides safe, legal, environmentally sound collection and disposal services for residential household hazardous waste such as paint, solvents and pesticides. The fee will support expanded services to all residents of Alameda County. Without these services, most household hazardous waste will be illegally and improperly disposed of (e.g., abandoned on streets, poured down drains, placed in garbage or recycling carts). Improper disposal is often dangerous, litters our streets and sidewalks, and can detract from residential property values."

On January 22, 2014, the Authority extended the protest hearing date to March 26, 2014, and mailed notice of the extended protest hearing date to each record owner. The extension provided 45 days' notice to certain property owners to whom the original mailing had inadvertently been delayed. The resolution also provided that the Authority would not adopt the Ordinance if "written protests ... are presented by either (i) a majority of the owners of the identified parcels subject to the ordinance or (ii) the owners of a majority of the residential units subject to the ordinance."

On March 26, 2014, the Authority held its hearing and considered protests of the Ordinance. Neither a majority of the owners of affected parcels nor the owners of a majority of the affected households protested the Ordinance. On May 28, 2014, the Authority adopted the Ordinance by a two-thirds vote of its governing body.

Thereafter, Crawley—an Alameda County homeowner and taxpayer—filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5 ), as well as an ex parte petition for alternative writ of mandate. He argued that the Authority abused its discretion by failing to adopt the Ordinance pursuant to a majority vote of the electorate, as allegedly required by article XIII D. The trial court denied the ex parte application for an alternative writ of mandate and ordered the Authority to answer Crawley's petition. Respondents—the Authority and real parties in interest Gary Wolff, Don Biddle, and Richard Taylor (the Authority's executive director, president, and general counsel, respectively)—instead demurred to Crawley's petition, asserting the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because article XIII D, section 6, exempts refuse collection fees from a voter ratification requirement. Crawley filed a motion to strike the demurrer, which was considered as an opposition.

The trial court granted respondents' demurrer and dismissed Crawley's action. The trial court's order states: "[T]he court finds that Section 4 [of Article XIII D] does not apply to the adoption of the household hazardous waste fee at issue here because the fee is a ‘property related fee’ subject to the requirements of Article XIII D, section 6. (See, e.g., Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 642–645, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 91.) [Crawley] has not alleged any facts or presented any legal argument demonstrating that the Ordinance imposed a ‘special benefit assessment’ that would be subject to Article XIII D, section 4.... [¶] [Crawley] also alleges that [the Authority's] adoption of the Ordinance violated Section 4 because the agency did not require a public vote by ballot. However, the household hazardous waste fee imposed by the Ordinance is a fee for refuse collection. (See [Health & Saf. Code, §§ ] 4740 [defining ‘refuse,’ in part, as ‘anything thrown away as worthless']; 25218.1(e) [defining household hazardous waste as ‘waste generated incidental to owning or maintaining a place of residence’].) ^{[3 ]} Article XIII D, section 6(c) specifically exempts fees for refuse collection services from the requirement that a new fee or charge be submitted and approved by a majority of property owners." Crawley filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Crawley contends that the trial court erred in sustaining respondents' demurrer. Specifically, he disputes the trial court's determination that the Ordinance involved imposition of "a property-related fee or charge" and the protest procedure was in compliance with article XIII D, section 6.⁴

A petitioner can obtain writ relief, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, upon a showing of " ‘(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent ...; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty....’ " (Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 539–540, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142.) In contrast, "[t]he inquiry for the issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus [ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5 ) ] is whether the agency in question prejudicially abused its discretion.... [Citations.] A prejudicial abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law...." (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 673–674, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 745.) Crawley has not shown he can state a viable claim for mandamus under any theory.

A. Standard of Review

We review questions of law and constitutional construction de novo. (Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 836, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 719, 14 P.3d 930 ; California Chamber of Commerce v. Brown (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 233, 248–249, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 214.) Similarly, "[o]n appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] First, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. Next, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Then we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citations.] [¶] We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law." (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439–440, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 330.) If the allegations in the complaint conflict with the facts included in exhibits attached to or referenced in the complaint, "we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits. However, in doing so, if the exhibits are ambiguous and can be construed in the manner suggested by plaintiff, then we must accept the construction offered by plaintiff." (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Liebert (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 68, 83, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 73 ; accord, Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365, 375, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 234.)

We are "not bound by the trial court's construction of the complaint." (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958, ...