Crawley v. Glaze

• Decision Date: 11 March 1915
• Parties: CRAWLEY. v. GLAZE et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

84 S.E. 671

117 Va. 274

CRAWLEY.

v.GLAZE et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 11, 1915.

Appeal from Chancery Court of Richmond.

Action by Elvina E. Glaze and another against V. M. Sutton and K. T. Crawley. From a decree for complainants, defendant Crawley appeals. Affirmed.

S. A. Anderson, Boulware & Wallace, and W. M. Justis, Jr., all of Richmond, for plaintiff.

David Meade White and Daniel Grinnan, both of Richmond, for defendants.

KELLY, J. Elvina E. Glaze and Humphrey Glaze, her husband, instituted this suit in the chancery court of the city of Richmond to cancel and annul two deeds, one thereof made by them to V. M. Sutton, and the other made by V. M. Sutton and her husband, J. M. Sutton, to K. T. Crawley. There was a decree in favor of the complainants, and K. T. Crawley brings this appeal.

The record, owing to the length of the pleadings and the mass of evidence taken in the cause, is very large, but all the questions of law and fact necessary to a correct determination of the controversy, as we see it, will sufficiently appear in the course of this opinion.

The action of the chancery court in overruling the demurrer to the bill is made the basis of the first assignment of error. The record does not disclose the grounds of demurrer relied upon at the hearing of the cause, but from the petition for appeal, adopted as the appellant's brief, it appears that two objections are now urged to the sufficiency of the bill.

The first objection is that the bill shows on its face "that the plaintiffs, at the time they executed the deed to V. M. Sutton, did so with the express intention and design of defrauding certain real estate agents out of commissions which were claimed by said agents, " and that therefore the bill fails to state a case for relief. In support of this contention we are referred to the case of Harris v. Harris, 23 Grat. (64 Va.) 737, and other decisions of this court, ending with Nunnally v. Stokes, 116 Va. 472, 82 S. E. 79, in which this court, in suits to annul conveyances, has recognized and applied the familiar maxim, "Nemo allegans suam turpitudinem audiendus est."

No rule is better settled in our law than the one here invoked, but it cannot be applied to the case in hand, as will clearly appear from the allegations of the bill considered in the light of the following statement by Judge Buchanan in Nunnally v. Stokes, supra:

"While the bill charges that the appellant was mentally inferior to her grantee, Stokes, it is not alleged, nor is it pretended, that she did not have sufficient capacity to make a valid contract. It is well settled that where both parties are legally capable of making contracts, although one may be much superior in mental capacity to the other, that circumstance does not take the case out of the general rule, unless it appears that some advantage was taken or undue influence exerted to obtain the conveyance." (Italics ours.)

See, also, Tatum v. Tatum, 101 Va. 77, 43 S. E. 184; Smith v. Elliott, 1 Pat. & H. 307.

As will conclusively appear in connection with the second ground of demurrer, the complainants in this case substantially allege the existence of the very elements which were wanting to warrant relief in the Nunnally Case, namely, their lack of sufficient capacity to make a contract, and the exercise over them of an undue advantage and influence to obtain the conveyance. Moreover, the bill charges that the false and fraudulent representations of J. M. Sutton as to the danger of suits to collect commissions were part and parcel of the general plan and scheme of fraud by which Sutton himself procured the conveyance.

There is no merit in this objection to the bill, and we pass to a consideration of the second and only remaining ground of demurrer, which is, as stated in the petition for appeal:

"That, according to the allegations of the plaintiffs' bill, the suit could not possibly have been maintained by the parties plaintiff, for the reason that, if the allegations therein set forth are true, the plaintiff Elvina E. Glaze was manifestly incapable of maintaining a suit in her own proper person."

It will be observed, as above stated, that the construction thus placed by appellant upon the charges in the bill completely answers the first ground of demurrer, and renders wholly inapplicable to this case the general rule laid down in Nunnally v. Stokes, supra, and other cases of that type.

It is equally clear, we think, that the demurrer cannot be sustained upon this second ground. The record does not disclose, and counsel for the contending parties are not agreed, whether this defense was made in the lower court. If the question was not raised there, it is of too technical a nature to receive serious consideration when raised for the first time on appeal. Bird's Committee v. Bird, 21 Grat. (62 Va.) 715; Cole's Committee v. Cole, 28 Grat. (69 Va.) 365. See, also, Richmond Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Bowles, 92 Va. 738, 24 S. E. 388; Jackson v. Counts, 106 Va. 7, 54 S. E. 870.

The demurrer, whatever may have been the grounds urged in the lower court, appears not to have been argued until after the taking of the evidence was completed. We cannot say whether the objection for want of proper parties was or was not raised at all, but there is a presumption in favor of the correctness of the decree appealed from, and the burden is on the appellant to satisfy us that the decree contains reversible error. Smith v. Alderson, 116 Va. 986, 83 S. E. 373; Johnson v. Michaux, 110 Va. 595, 66 S. E. 823. This rule of decision would seem to apply with peculiar force to a question involving, as does the one now being considered, the merest matter of form —the intervention of a nominal party as a next friend (there being no committee), who would have been merely "a shadow, " as expressed by the president of this court in Richmond Ry., etc., Co. v. Bowles, supra, and whose nominal presence or absence it is now manifest could not possibly have helped or hurt the rights of any party at any stage of this cause.

Without deciding whether there would have been any merit in the point, if it had been raised at the late stage in the proceedings at which the demurrer was argued, we have no hesitancy in holding that, if the appellant intended to rely upon this objection to the bill as a ground of reversal in this court, he should have made the objection in the lower court in such a manner as that it would specifically and affirmatively appear in the record.

Coming now to a consideration of the remaining assignments of error, which challenge the correctness of the decree complained of in its findings against the appellant on the real merits of the case, we cannot, within the reasonable limits of any written opinion, attempt a complete and detailed discussion of the charges and countercharges of the parties and the evidence respectively introduced in support thereof, set out in a record containing over 700 printed pages, but must, in the main, be content to state merely our conclusions, arrived at after a patient and careful consideration of the entire record. A discussion, even thus limited, will of necessity be rather a lengthy one.

As we see this controversy, a correct solution of it depends upon the view to be taken of the deed dated September 28, 1909, from E. E. Glaze and Humphrey Glaze to V. M. Sutton; for, as we shall see, Crawley occupies no higher position, from a legal and equitable standpoint, than Sutton acquired by this deed.

With reference to this deed, the learned judge who pronounced the decree complained of said in the course of the written opinion which he filed with the record:

"All must admit that, if this suit had for its object the setting aside and canceling of the deed from Glazes to V. M. Sutton, the passing of a decree canceling the said deed would be proper."

In this statement we fully concur. It seems to us impossible to follow the events and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the making of this conveyance, as disclosed by the record, without becoming fully convinced that this conveyance was the result of ignorance and imbecility on the part of the Glazes and of deliberate imposition and fraud on the part of J. M. Sutton. We are further of opinion that K. T. Crawley is, to say the least of it, chargeable with constructive notice of this fraud.

The transaction belongs to that class which is so well described by Judge Staples in Parr v. Saunders, 11 S. E. 981, as follows:

"A transaction may, of itself and by itself, furnish the most satisfactory proof of fraud, so conclusive as to outweigh the answer of the defendants, and even the evidence of witnesses. The circumstances attending and following a transaction are often of such character as to leave not even a shadow of doubt as to the real object and motive of the parties engaged in it. * * * Experience attests that in a majority of cases fraud can only be established by circumstances. The motives and intentions of the parties can only be judged of by their action, and the nature and character of the transaction in which they are engaged. These often furnish more conclusive evidence than the most direct testimony."

See, also, Jones v. McGruder, 87 Va. 360, 12 S. E. 792; Hazlewood v. Forrer, 94 Va. 703, 27 S. E. 507; Fitzgerald v. Frankel, 109 Va. 607, 64 S. E. 941.

As usual in cases of this character, there is much conflict in the evidence; but we are satisfied that the weight of the evidence warrants the following statement: Humphrey Glaze was mentally weak, addicted to drink, and an easy victim in the hands of such a man as J. M. Sutton. Elvina E. Glaze's mind was seriously impaired as the result of illness, and she was not competent to protect or understand her own interests. She was the owner of the farm in question. In August or September, 1909, her husband, acting for her, listed it for sale with the Rudd Realty Company, of Richmond, and J. B. Martin, an associate of that concern, took charge of the...