Crawley v. Hill
| Decision Date | 15 December 1948 |
| Citation | 253 Wis. 294,34 N.W.2d 123 |
| Parties | CRAWLEY v. HILL et al. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County; Herman W. Sachtjen, Judge.
Reversed.
Action commenced April 30, 1947 by Isabelle Crawley against Kent Arthur Hill, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., and Junius Jamieson to recover damages for the wrongful death of her husband. Judgment was entered February 7, 1948 in favor of the plaintiff for $7,044.56 against defendants Kent Arthur Hill and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. The complaint against the defendant Junius Jamieson was dismissed. Defendants Kent Arthur Hill and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. appeal.
The accident occurred on December 26, 1946 between 5:00 and 5:30 in the afternoon on highway 51 and 151 just outside the Madison city limits. Crawley, the plaintiff's husband, was running in a northerly direction to cross the highway. He evidently didn't see the car of defendant Hill approaching from the west and ran onto the highway. He was struck by the automobile at a distance of approximately six feet, one inch from the edge of the highway and died of the injuries. Defendant Hill was 16 years old, but had been driving for four years. He was driving a 1941 Pontiac in good condition owned by defendant Jamieson and was accompanied by Jamieson's daughter, Janet. There was a conflict of evidence as to how fast Hill was driving and whether he had the car under control. The jury in a special verdict found Hill negligent as to speed, lookout, and management and control and Crawley negligent as to lookout, yielding the right of way, and in the manner of his crossing. They assessed Hill's negligence at 80% and Crawley's at 20% of the total negligence causing the accident. Thomas W. Pierce and Wilkie, Toebaas, Hart, Kraege & Jackman, all of Madison, for appellants.
Lee & Becker, of Madison, for respondent.
Under the evidence we are primarily concerned upon this appeal with the percentage of negligence each actor contributed to the total result. The jury determined that both the pedestrian and the driver of the automobile failed to exercise ordinary care but in computing the total negligence they apportioned defendant's responsibility at 80% and the deceased's at 20%. In challenging the result defendant contends that as a matter of law Crawley contributed at least 50%. He points out that deceased was by law required to yield the right of way under the circumstances existing at the time of his injury. The apportionment of the various degrees of negligence is generally a matter for the jury. This court is reluctant to interfere with their finding and will do so only when it appears to be absolutely necessary that justice may be done.
Sec. 85.44(4), Stats. requires that a pedestrian crossing a highway at a point other than a crosswalk shall yield the right of way to cars on the highway. Crawley did not do that here. The fact that this was outside the city limits did not lessen his duty of yielding the right of way. See Grohusky v. Ferry, 251 Wis. 569, at page 572, 30 N.W.2d 205. His negligence in that respect is an established fact. He ran onto the highway into the lane of traffic used by defendant. The jury found that at the time and place of the accident he was negligent as to yielding the right of way, as to lookout, and as to the manner of crossing the highway at the place in question. His entrance into the zone of danger was without consideration of Hill's position on the highway, his speed, or manner of driving. There is nothing in the testimony on which there can rest the probability that deceased was misled by the speed. The only conclusion is that there was no effort on his part to calculate distance and the possibility of getting across the road before the car could cross his path or he its.
On the other hand the defendant had a right to rely on the fact that Crawley would observe his statutory duty and yield the right of way. In Grohusky v. Ferry, 251 Wis. 569, 30 N.W.2d 205, 206, we said: ‘It is true that on a country highway a motorist traveling at the higher rate of speed permitted is entitled to entertain a reasonable expectation that pedestrians will not step out into his path and that they will take account of country...
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Lang v. Rogney
...to defendant and his failure to do so would be, under the law of Wisconsin, negligence as a matter of law. In Crawley v. Hill, 253 Wis. 294, 34 N.W.2d 123, 124, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: "Sec. 85.44(4), Stats. requires that a pedestrian crossing a highway at a point other than a cro......
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Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co.
...a comparison of negligence made by a jury and we do not consider the instant case to be such. Defendant's counsel cite Crawley v. Hill, 1948, 253 Wis. 294, 34 N.W.2d 123, and Post v. Thomas, 1942, 240 Wis. 519, 3 N.W.2d 344, which involved the striking of a pedestrian by a motor vehicle whe......
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Sachse v. Mayer
...negligence equaled or exceeded defendant's in the extraordinary situations in which the facts required such a result. Crawley v. Hill (1948), 253 Wis. 294, 34 N.W.2d 123; Quady v. Sickl (1952), 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W.2d 3, 53 N.W.2d 134; Hephner v. Wolf (1952), 261 Wis. 191, 52 N.W.2d 390; Kl......
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Lisowski v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.
...a right to some reliance on the fact he has a right of way and pedestrians will observe their statutory duty to yield. Crawley v. Hill (1948), 253 Wis. 294, 34 N.W.2d 123; Grohusky v. Ferry (1947), 251 Wis. 569, 30 N.W.2d 205. When one having the right of way sees a pedestrian or another ca......