Crawn v. Campo

• Decision Date: 15 April 1992
• Citation: 608 A.2d 465,257 N.J.Super. 374
• Parties: Michael CRAWN, Plaintiff, v. John CAMPO, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 374

257 N.J.Super. 374

608 A.2d 465

Michael CRAWN, Plaintiff, v. John CAMPO, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Morris County.

Decided April 15, 1992.

Albert Fershing, West Orange, for plaintiff (Shurkin & Fershing, attorneys.)

James DeMarzo, Morristown, for defendant (O'Donnell McCord Helfrich & Bangiola, attorneys.)

HARPER, J.S.C.

During the course of trial in the above-captioned matter, the court rendered an opinion on the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case. Because it is important to establish principles of liability in contact sports injury cases, this court has reduced its oral opinion to writing.

On May 1, 1988, the plaintiff, Michael Crawn, and the defendant, John Campo, were participants in a "pick up" softball game. There were no coaches or umpires officiating at this game. The game was not conducted under the auspices of any organized group or league. The rules of the game were acknowledged to be the "general rules of softball" with certain modifications. As a matter of custom, the rules of the game were not put in writing but were simply agreed upon orally by the players.

At one point during this softball game, the plaintiff was playing the position of catcher while the defendant (a base runner) was making his way from third base to home plate. As the defendant approached the plate, he either slid or lowered his shoulder and collided with the plaintiff/catcher who was standing near home plate. As a result of this collision, the plaintiff contends that he was injured and sustained a torn cartilage in his knee.

A dispute exists as to whether a "no sliding rule" was applicable to this game as well as a rule prohibiting intentional contact by a base runner with a fielder. According to the plaintiff, who was playing the position of catcher, sliding and intentional contact with a fielder were against the agreed upon rules of the game. Furthermore, the defendant's actions were allegedly unsportsmanlike, unexpected and done with a reckless lack of concern for the other participants in the softball game. Thus, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was violating the rules of the game when he slid into home plate.

On the other hand, the defendant denies that he breached the rules of the game because he contends there were no rules prohibiting sliding or intentional contact with a fielder. Under these circumstances, the defendant/base runner asserts that the base line belonged to the runner and the plaintiff/catcher assumed the risk of contact by placing himself in a position where a base runner's sliding could result in a collision between these two players. Therefore, the defendant averred that he was not breaching any of the established rules.

On March 9, 1989, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant alleging negligence, recklessness, and intent to harm. On June 1, 1989, the defendant filed an answer denying liability and raising the defenses of assumption of risk and comparative negligence. Once brought to trial, the defendant moved to have the complaint dismissed at the end of the plaintiff's case, claiming that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case proving that the defendant was liable for the plaintiff's injury.

During the oral argument on the motion to dismiss, counsel focused on the issue of the duty of care owed to participants in a sporting event such as a softball game. For the reasons that follow, the court holds that between players in such sporting events, only those injuries caused by intentional conduct or by acting in reckless disregard of the safety of others will give rise to a cause of action. Liability will not be found to exist where ordinary negligence caused the injuries.

There is only one reported case decision in this jurisdiction which discusses the standard of care to be applied in contact sports injury cases. That is the case of Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J.Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (Supreme Court 1947) in which the court applied an intentional tort standard (assault and battery) and reversed a lower court's decision which found a basketball player liable for injuries to another participant arising out of the game. The defendant had allegedly struck the plaintiff in the jaw with his fist thereby fracturing plaintiff's jawbone. The plaintiff claimed it was deliberate, but the proofs rose only to the level of accidental contact according to the Appellate Court's holding which overruled the trial court. This case, though the seminal decision in New Jersey, must be examined against the great weight of case authority in the various states in order to assess its efficacy today and the applicability of its rationale to the case sub judice.

The Supreme Court of Ohio in its recent decision in Marchetti v. Kalish, 53 Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699, 700-01 (1990) discusses the various standards which have been made applicable to recreational and sports activities in determining whether liability will be imposed for injuries:

Legal commentators have identified three distinct standards which are used by some jurisdictions to permit recovery for injuries received during sports and recreational activities: (1) intentional tort, i.e., assault and battery; (2) willful or reckless misconduct; and (3) negligence. See Note, Civil Liability of Athletics--Professional Football Player May Have Tort Claim For Injuries Intentionally Inflicted During Football Game (1980), 84 Dick.L.Rec. 253; Comment, Civil Liability: An Alternative to Violence in Sporting Events (1988), 15 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 243; Note, Participant In Athletic Competition States Cause of Action For Injuries Against Other Participant (1977), 42 Mo.L.Rev. 347. However, courts traditionally have not been inclined to allow a cause of action for injuries received during participation in such activities. In Kuehner v. Green, (Fla.1983), 436 So.2d 78, 81, Justice Boyd, concurring specially, noted that

"[h]istorically, the courts have been reluctant to allow persons to recover money damages for injuries received while participating in a sport, especially a contact sport, unless there was a deliberate attempt to injure. In denying recovery, the courts have often explained that a person who participates in a sport assumes the risk that he or she may be injured. Only recently have some courts allowed a sport participant to recover damages for injuries resulting from unintentional but reckless misconduct. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 275, 62 L.Ed.2d 188 (1979); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill.App.3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975). These courts reasoned that a sport participant does not assume the risk of injuries resulting from bodily contact uncustomary to or prohibited by the rules of the particular sport."

Likewise, while allowing a recovery for a sports injury based on intentional tort, a Michigan court has stated that "[p]articipation in a game involves a manifestation of consent to those bodily contacts which are permitted by the rules of the game. Restatement of Torts, 2d, Sect. 50, comment b. However, there is a general agreement that an intentional act causing injury, which goes beyond what is ordinarily permissible, is an assault and battery for which recovery may be had." Overall v. Kadella, 138 Mich.App. 351, 361 N.W.2d 352, 355 (1984). Thus, courts generally allow a cause of action for injuries sustained in recreational or sports activities only under reckless or intentional tort theories.

The majority of jurisdictions which have considered the standard of care imposed on players in such sporting events have concluded that personal injury claims arising out...