Craycroft v. Ferrall

Citation408 F.2d 587
Decision Date05 March 1969
Docket Number22895.,No. 22582,22582
PartiesPeter CRAYCROFT, Appellant, v. William E. FERRALL, Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, Robert Strange McNamara, as Secretary of Defense, and Robert H. V. Baldwin, as Acting Secretary of the Navy, or his Successor as Acting Secretary, or as Secretary of the Navy, Appellees. Peter CRAYCROFT, Appellant, v. Clark CLIFFORD, Secretary of Defense, Paul Robert Ignatius, Secretary of the Navy, and H. J. Trum, Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

John Caughlan (argued), Seattle, Wash., for appellant.

Michael J. Swofford (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Eugene G. Cushing, U. S. Atty., Michael Hoff, Asst. U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for appellees.

Before CHAMBERS, HAMLIN and ELY, Circuit Judges.

ELY, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Craycroft appeals from District Court dismissals of his two successive complaints challenging his detention in the United States Navy following the Navy's denials of his applications for discharge from the service as a conscientious objector. Craycroft sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2244. He also asked for a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that he was a conscientious objector and sought mandatory relief to enjoin court-martial proceedings and to compel the Navy to comply with its own regulations which, allegedly, would require that he be discharged. The complaint also asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by charging that Craycroft had been denied due process of law in the Navy's consideration of his application. The District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed Craycroft's first complaint on August 30, 1967. On May 3, 1968, the District Court dismissed Craycroft's second petition for habeas corpus relief in light of the similarity of issues to the first action which was pending our appellate decision. Craycroft brought his second appeal to us under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We have consolidated the two appeals.

The District Court's initial dismissal of Craycroft's complaint was predicated on a finding that Craycroft had not exhausted the opportunities to present his complaints in an appropriate military judicial proceeding. We need not determine whether it was necessary, as the Government contends, for Craycroft to undergo a court-martial and exhaust all available appeals and military remedies therefrom, since it clearly appears that Craycroft has not exhausted all military administrative remedies that are presently available to him.1

On May 26, 1966, Craycroft enlisted in the Navy by taking an oath and signing a contract obliging himself to six years' service unless sooner discharged. On June 16, 1966, he voluntarily entered the Reserve Officer Corps program. He completed eight weeks' training at the Officer Candidate Training School, Newport, Rhode Island, and was assigned to the Naval Reserve Center, Eugene, Oregon. In November, 1966, Craycroft signed a statement of his understanding that he was scheduled to commence two years' active duty in December, 1967. In the District Court, he nevertheless alleged that he shortly thereafter, following the death of his father, became a conscientious objector. On February 17, 1967, he requested, by letter to the commanding officer of the Naval Reserve Center, Eugene, Oregon, Commander L. M. Madden, that he be permitted to resign from the officer program. He indicated that he had always been opposed to war and violence and had from the beginning entertained strong reservations about entering the Naval Reserve Officer program. On February 21st, Commander Madden interviewed Craycroft and then forwarded Craycroft's letter to higher authorities, together with recommendations that Craycroft's Reserve Officer Candidate status be withdrawn and that he be ordered to active duty or studied for possible conscientious objector status. Craycroft was disenrolled from the officer program on March 13, 1967, for failure to maintain the required standard of professional attitude and for failure to maintain satisfactory drill attendance.

The Navy returned to Craycroft application forms required by Bureau of Personnel Manual (BUPERSMAN) Art. C-5210 for consideration for conscientious objector discharge under Department of Defense Directive (DD) 1300.6 (Aug. 21, 1962). This Directive provided, in Part III, the following explanation:

"No vested right exists for any individual to be discharged from military service at his own request before the expiration of his term of service, whether he is serving voluntarily or involuntarily. * * *
"The fact of conscientious objection does not exempt men from the draft; however, the Congress has deemed it more essential to respect a man\'s religious beliefs than to force him to serve in the Armed Forces * * *. Consistent with this national policy, bona fide conscientious objection by persons who are members of the Armed Forces will be recognized to the extent practicable and equitable.
"* * * request for discharge after entering military service, based solely on conscientious objection which existed but was not claimed prior to induction or enlistment, cannot be entertained."

Craycroft returned the submitted forms on April 5, 1967, and in them explained his beliefs and submitted other required information. For supplement to the application, BUPERSMAN Art. C-5210 (2) (b) added the following requirement:

"The commanding officer and a chaplain, if available, shall interview the member, review the information contained in his request, and insure that all information required * * * has been included. A statement from the chaplain shall be included giving comments on the sincerity of the applicant in his belief and an opinion as to the source of the belief, i. e., whether or not it is based on belief in a Divine Being. * * * The commanding officer\'s endorsement shall in all cases express his opinion as to the sincerity of the man. * * * If a chaplain is not reasonably available because of essential operations or the remoteness of the applicant\'s unit, a statement will be included to this effect."

Craycroft complains that no chaplain's statement was included in his first application and that the endorsement was supplied not by his commanding officer, but by Commander Madden, who allegedly was convinced that Craycroft insincerely presented his claimed beliefs. Commander Madden explained in the endorsement:

"In order that the reviewing authority may have as many facts as possible in the final determination of this case, my relationship to this man is hereby stated. I am not his commanding officer as such. However, I am the only active duty officer here at the Training Center. In this capacity CRAYCROFT was interviewed by me in MAY of 1965, as a prospective Officer Candidate. His Commanding Officer * * * is an inactive reserve officer and has had very little personal contact with subject man. In this light I have taken the prerogative of writing this endorsement as it is believed that my knowledge of the case transcends that of his commanding officer. * * * CRAYCROFT\'S Commanding Officer * * * was contacted. This endorsement was read to him over the phone and he interposed no objection to it in any respect."

On April 11, 1967, Commander Madden forwarded Craycroft's request for discharge through the proper channels to the Chief of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C. It was provided in DD 1300.6, III(E) (Aug. 21, 1962), that claims of conscientious objection should be judged by the same standards used by the Selective Service, and, accordingly, Craycroft's application was referred, under the procedure outlined in BUPERSMAN Art. C-5210(2) (c), to the Director of the Selective Service System, General Hershey, for an advisory opinion on the validity of the conscientious objector claim. On June 1, 1967, General Hershey issued his advisory opinion that if Craycroft were being considered for induction at that time he would not receive a classification as a conscientious objector. After receiving additional materials concerning Craycroft's case, General Hershey reaffirmed his opinion on June 14, 1967. Craycroft filed a second application for discharge on June 26, 1967. Both applications were reviewed, according to Department of Defense procedures, by a Board of Officers and Enlisted Personnel. On July 21, 1967, The Chief of Naval Personnel reaffirmed his recommendation concerning the first application, which was that Craycroft's request be denied.

Although no formal hearing was given Craycroft beyond his interview with Commander Madden, Naval authorities evaluated the applications for discharge on the basis of the documentary evidence supplied by Craycroft, including his own statements and letters from his friends and relatives. Two letters from clergymen were also submitted on Craycroft's behalf. The Chief of Naval Personnel noted that Craycroft's enlistment and prior inconsistent acts cast doubt on the sincerity of his professed beliefs and that these beliefs appeared to be based on philosophical, rather than religious, concepts. Additionally, his beliefs were determined to amount to no more than an extension of certain attitudes that he already harbored prior to his enlistment. DD 1300.6 precludes the issuance of conscientious objector discharges in such cases. At this point, Craycroft brought his complaints to the District Court. He alleged that the procedures directed by BUPERSMAN Art. C-5210 failed to provide a method whereby his application could receive fair consideration at any level. He also argued that the Navy failed to follow its own procedures in its failure to require endorsements of his application by his commanding officer and a chaplain. Moreover, Craycroft asserted that the Navy's failure to find that he was a conscientious objector constituted error as a matter of law.

The Navy ordered Craycroft to report for active duty on November 1, 1967, following the...

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