Crayton v. Alabama Dept. of Agric. & Industries
| Decision Date | 18 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:07-cv-1111-MEF.,Case No. 2:07-cv-626-MEF. |
| Citation | 589 F.Supp.2d 1266 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
| Parties | John L. CRAYTON, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & INDUSTRIES, Defendant. John L. Crayton, Plaintiff, v. Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries, Defendant. |
Juraldine Battle-Hodge, Law Office of Juraldine Battle-Hodge, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Edward Hamilton Wilson, Jr., Emily Coody Marks, Ball Ball Matthews & Novak PA, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
John L. Crayton ("Crayton"), an African-American employee of the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries ("the Department"), brings these two lawsuits against his employer pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.1 Pointing to a variety of incidents and events, Crayton contends that he was subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of his race. He also contends that the Department retaliated against him for making complaints about what he perceived to be race discrimination directed toward him or toward other African-American employees. This cause is now before the Court on the Department's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 16). The Court has carefully considered all proper and timely submissions in support of and in opposition to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the motion is due to be GRANTED.
The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction and venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations in support of personal jurisdiction and venue.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The Court has carefully considered all deposition excerpts and documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following relevant facts:
Crayton, an African-American male, has been employed by the Department since May of 1976. Initially, Crayton worked as a Seed Analyst. After approximately twenty-five years of service as a Seed Analyst, Crayton became Program Director for the Seed Program. In September of 2006, Crayton was transferred out of this position into another Program Director position, which put him in charge of the Genetically Modified Plant and Plant Products Program.2
For a short period of time, Crayton had a state-owned vehicle provided to him because his job sometimes required him to travel. As Program Director for the Seed Program he had to travel to Auburn approximately twice a year to attend meetings. Additionally, his job duties as Director of the Seed Program included visits to seed outlets and to visit with inspectors, but he admits he never performed those parts of his job duties. Primarily, he used the State-owned vehicle issued to him to travel to and from work in Montgomery.
Because of statewide budget problems, the Governor of the State of Alabama gave a directive in April of 2005, by which all state-owned vehicles assigned to employees were recalled. Crayton admits that all Department employees, regardless of race, had to surrender their state-owned vehicles after the Governor's directive. At some point, however, Crayton contends that he noticed that some Caucasian employees had received their vehicles back. He further contends that some of these Caucasian employees only used their state-owned vehicles to travel to and from work. In September of 2006, Crayton was once again assigned a State-owned vehicle. He had earlier complained to Alabama State Employees Association ("ASEA") about the failure of the Department to assign a state-owned vehicle to him and another African-American employee of the Department.
On September 27, 2006, Crayton filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In this Charge, he complained of race discrimination and retaliation between July 28, 2006 and September 26, 2006. Specifically, Crayton complained that his supervisor constantly challenged Crayton's decisions. Additionally, Crayton complained that after taking complaints about the treatment of African-American employees at the Department to the Alabama State Employees Association ("ASEA") in June of 2006, he was subjected to race discrimination and retaliation when the Department reassigned him from his position as the Program Director for the Seed Program to a recently created position of Program Director for the Genetically Modified Plant and Plant Products Program.
On May 3, 2007, Crayton filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. He once again complained of race discrimination and retaliation against him, this time between December 5, 2006 and May 2, 2007. Specifically, Crayton again complained about what he considered to be the demotion from his position as the Program Director for the Seed Program to a recently created position of Program Director for the Genetically Modified Plant and Plant Products Program. Additionally, he complained that he had been required to enroll in an Employee Assistance Program ("EAP") in November of 2006. Finally, he complained about a delay in the completion of his performance appraisal.
On July 9, 2007, Crayton filed a Complaint (Doc. # 1 in 2:07cv626) against the Department. In this Complaint, he alleged race discrimination dating back to January of 2002 and retaliation against him beginning in June of 2006, when he complained to the ASEA about race discrimination. Crayton's claims of discrimination and retaliation were brought solely pursuant to Title VII. On December 21, 2007, Crayton filed a motion seeking to amend the complaint to strip out the retaliation claims and he filed a second lawsuit (2:07cv1111) in which he set forth those retaliation claims. Crayton's motion for leave to amend his original complaint was granted and he filed the amended complaint (Doc. # 13 in 2:07cv626). The Court granted the Department's motion to consolidate these two cases for all pretrial matters and for trial.
On August 28, 2008, the parties appeared before the Court for a final pretrial conference. Having been apprised that the Order on Pretrial Hearing would supplant the pleadings and frame the issues in the case, the parties submitted their contentions. Crayton's claims are consequently limited by these submissions to the following: (1) he was discriminated against on the basis of his race when he was not selected for the position of Division Director in April of 2003;(2) he was discriminated against on the basis of his race when he was transferred from the position of Seed Director to the Genetically Modified Plant and Plants Product Director, which transfer was a constructive demotion; (3) he was discriminated against on the basis of his race when his state issued vehicle was not returned to him after it was taken away in April of 2005; (4) he was retaliated against after he made a complaint to the ASEA in June of 2006, in that he was...
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