Creason v. Seaboard Corp.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.02-2158-KHV.,CIV.A.02-2158-KHV. |
| Parties | Janet S. CREASON, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Janet S. Creason brings age discrimination and retaliation claims against Seaboard Corporation ("Seaboard") under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiff also claims that Seaboard breached an implied contract of employment. The matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #50) filed March 21, 2003; Defendant's Motion To Amend Suggestions In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #54) filed March 25, 2003; and Defendant's Motion To Strike (Doc. # 65) filed May 9, 2003. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains all three motions.
On March 25, 2003, defendant filed a motion to amend its suggestions in support of its motion for summary judgment. Defendant's Motion To Amend Suggestions In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 54). The requested amendment, which corrects typographical errors, is unopposed. The Court therefore sustains defendant's motion to amend.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A "genuine" factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir.1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sees., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). The non-moving party may not rest on her pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.
The Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, All U.S. at 251-52,106 S.Ct. 2505.
The Court may only consider evidence whose content or substance is admissible. See Conoco Inc. v. J.M. Huber, 148 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1166 (D.Kan.2001); see also Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1541 (10th Cir.1995). "Hearsay testimony that would be inadmissible at trial may not be included." Conoco, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1166. "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Fed.R.Evid. 602. Statements not based on personal knowledge must be disregarded. "To survive summary judgment, `nonmovant's affidavits must be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient.'" Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir.1995).
The following facts are either undisputed or, where disputed, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.1
From January 4, 1988 to March 30, 2001, plaintiff worked as an executive secretary to Joe Rodrigues, who was an executive vice president at Seaboard. In that capacity, plaintiff managed his correspondence, collected relevant news articles, screened telephone calls, directed social activities, made travel arrangements and acted as a liaison for overseas employees. Rodrigues Deposition at 10-12, Exhibit 13 to Plaintiffs Response To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Response") (Doc. # 63) filed April 18, 2003.
Plaintiff received a copy of Seaboard's employee handbook, which included policies that prohibit unlawful discrimination. The handbook, and plaintiff's signed acknowledgment, state that employment at Seaboard is at will. Plaintiff was 51 years old when Seaboard terminated her employment on March 30, 2001.
Rodrigues worked with Seaboard's international operations in western Africa and oversaw corporate human resources. He had discussed retirement for several years and on January 14, 2001, he formally announced his retirement. His last day of employment was February 23, 2001. Rodrigues remained on the Seaboard board of directors, but Seaboard did not replace him as executive vice president; it merely reassigned his duties to other senior managers. Specifically, Bob Steer, senior vice president, treasurer and chief financial officer, assumed responsibility for human resources and Steve Bresky, senior vice president of international operations, assumed responsibility for western Africa.
Because of and concurrent with its decision to not replace Rodrigues, Seaboard eliminated plaintiff's position.2 Steer and Bresky did not have private secretaries who worked solely for them.3 Steer used Lora Williams and Bresky used Stacy Schmitt—who were departmental administrative assistants—to assist them in performing the duties which Rodrigues had previously performed. When Rodrigues retired and plaintiff's position was eliminated, the positions which supported Steer and Bresky in their additional duties were not open.
Rodrigues had assured plaintiff that her job at Seaboard was secure and on one occasion he told her that she had "earned the right to be considered for a position at Seaboard and to continue [her] employment." Rodrigues Deposition at 24, Exhibit 13 to Plaintiffs Response (Doc.# 63). Around the time that he announced his retirement, Rodrigues asked Steer if he could find a position for plaintiff. Steer, who oversaw the finance department, told Rodrigues that finding a position for plaintiff in the finance department would be "no problem." Because he was going to remain on the board of directors, Rodrigues also talked to Steer about retaining plaintiff's support for a three-month transition period while she worked in the finance department.
Plaintiff and Rodrigues believed that plaintiff would continue to work at Seaboard after Rodrigues retired.4 Rodrigues told plaintiff that Steer had assured him that Seaboard would take care of her. Based on his discussion with Steer, Rodrigues discussed the finance position with plaintiff and told her that she would continue to maintain his business contacts.5 Plaintiff, however, believed that her skills did not fit the finance department. She therefore told Rodrigues that she wanted to keep working in the international area. Rodrigues then asked Bresky to find plaintiff a position in the international area.6
On January 26, 2001, plaintiff met with Pete Mirakian, director of human resources, and expressed her desire to keep working for whoever replaced Rodrigues. At that time, Seaboard had not decided whether to replace Rodrigues. Mirakian and plaintiff discussed alternative job positions, including positions in the finance and pork divisions.
On February 8, 2001, plaintiff again met with Mirakian. Mirakian told plaintiff that Seaboard was not going to replace Rodrigues and that they needed to look at other opportunities for plaintiff. Mirakian discussed current and anticipated job openings, including jobs as executive administrative assistant in the pork division, assistant scheduler in the pork division and executive administrative assistant in the finance department. During this meeting, plaintiff told Mirakian that it was "pretty clear to her they either wanted to get rid of her or keep her in a lower level position at less salary" and that Seaboard was "currently in a mode to reduce overhead." She believed that Seaboard was "only concerned with the bottom line and reducing overhead and number of employees and [saw] this as a good opportunity to do that." Creason Deposition at 240-241, Exhibit B3; Creason Typewritten Notes Exhibit K; and Creason Handwritten Notes Exhibit J to Defendant's Suggestions (Doc. # 51). Mirakian responded by stating Creason Typewritten Notes Exhibit K; Creason Handwritten Notes Exhibit J.
Plaintiff was insulted at Seaboard's suggestion that she would be interested in the three jobs which Mirakian proposed. To her, they had less desirable duties and pay than her current job.7 Plai...
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