Creasy v. Lawler

• Decision Date: 28 June 1957
• Citation: 133 A.2d 178,389 Pa. 635
• Parties: J. K. CREASY, William W. McNamee, Frank Ranallo, A. W. Tuiccillo, Ed Kleeman and R. G. Cummiskey, on Behalf of Themselves and Other Property Owners and Lessees Similarly Situated, Original Plaintiffs, and Charles Sodini, Joseph Sodini, Donald Dawson, Malinda Dawson, Thomas J. Clark, George J. Paulos and Joseph Ranallo, Additional Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Joseph LAWLER, Secretary of Highways of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and George M. Leader, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants, Appellees. Appeal of J. K. CREASY et al.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 178

133 A.2d 178

389 Pa. 635

J. K. CREASY, William W. McNamee, Frank Ranallo, A. W Tuiccillo, Ed Kleeman and R. G. Cummiskey, on Behalf of Themselves and Other Property Owners and Lessees Similarly Situated, Original Plaintiffs, and Charles Sodini, Joseph Sodini, Donald Dawson, Malinda Dawson, Thomas J. Clark George J. Paulos and Joseph Ranallo, Additional Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Joseph LAWLER, Secretary of Highways of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and George M. Leader, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Defendants, Appellees Appeal of J. K. CREASY et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 28, 1957.

Rehearing Denied July 26, 1957.

The opinion of Judge Sohn follows:

Plaintiffs have filed a class complaint in equity asking this Court to decree that the Act of May 29, 1945, P.L. 1108, as amended, 36 P.S. § 2391.1 et seq., contravenes and violates the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States. The act in question is the one more familiarly known as 'The Limited Access Highway Act'. The plaintiffs further request that we restrain the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of Highways of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from declaring the highway extending from the intersection of Routes 22 and 30 to the Greater Pittsburgh Airport in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, known as the 'Airport Parkway' to be a limited access highway and from interfering with direct ingress and egress between plaintiffs' property and the said highway, pending hearing of the issue. They also ask that the defendants be forever enjoined from said declaration and said interference.

The defendants have filed preliminary objections to the plaintiffs' complaint in equity. Specifically, those objections are:

1. The complaint fails to state a cause of action.

2. Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law.

3. This Court (the Dauphin County Court) is without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs.

Exhaustive briefs have been filed by counsel on both sides of the case and detailed argument was held before the Dauphin County Court. The greater part of the argument has been directed to the various constitutional questions raised, and the act itself has been assailed for those reasons. As the complaint indicates, there is at present pending in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania an equity suit between the same parties and involving the same issues. That case is listed as Creasy et al. v. Lawler et al., Civil Action No. 13672. The same relief is asked in this last named case as in the case at bar. The District Court has entered a temporary restraining order against the defendants. The suit now before us was instituted because the Federal Judges have been unwilling to render a decision until the statute under attack has been first interpreted by the State Courts.

The plaintiffs, who claim they are the owners of land and various business properties abutting upon the highway in question, are fearful that their alleged right of ingress and egress will be taken from them without compensating them therefor. They claim that as abutting property owners they have a right of direct access to the presently free-access 'Airport Parkway', and that this right is a property right which cannot be taken from them without the payment of just compensation. They allege that if their direct access to the 'Airport Parkway' is cut off they will not receive any compensation for the loss of their property.

On the other hand the defendants maintain that the plaintiffs are seeking to have the Dauphin County Court, sitting in equity, substitute itself for the board of viewers which is established by the provisions of the very act itself. In effect, plaintiffs ask this Court to determine whether or not a taking of property has occurred and what damages shall be awarded therefor, and that, if the depriving them of access is found to be a taking of a compensable property right, that plaintiffs' legitimate interests will be constitutionally safeguarded by a resort to viewers proceedings and, if necessary, by later appeals to the Courts.

We believe that out of the many questions raised in this case there is only one which this Court is called upon to decide; namely,--Do the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law by which they may litigate their right to recover from the Commonwealth any and all of the rights which they claim to be theirs if the present 'Airport Parkway' is declared to be a limited access highway? Our answer must be in the affirmative.

The plaintiffs herein do not contest the right of the Commonwealth to exercise its power of eminent domain. This power is so well established that it needs no citation of authority to support it. At all times the plaintiffs can rely on the provisions of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article I, Section 10, P.S., that no private property shall be taken or applied to public use 'without just compensation being first made or secured.' Neither do the...