Crebs v. Jones

• Decision Date: 25 September 1884
• Citation: 79 Va. 381
• Parties: CREBS v. JONES.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

79 Va. 381

CREBS v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

September 25, 1884

Appeal from decree of circuit court of Frederick county, dismissing a bill, brought by appellant, to rescind conveyance made by him to appellee, of house and lot in Winchester, which he alleged had been procured from him by the fraud and false representations of the appellee and his confederates. Opinion states the case.

A R. Pendleton, W. R. Alexander, for the appellant.

Richard Parker, for the appellee.

OPINION

LEWIS P.

This is an appeal from the decree of the circuit court of Frederick county. The record in the case is voluminous, but the questions to be determined are few and simple. The appellant who was the plaintiff in the court below, filed his bill to set aside a certain conveyance made by him to the appellee of a house and lot in the town of Winchester, in exchange for certain real estate belonging to the latter in the city of Washington, which, he alleged, had been procured from him by fraud and misrepresentations on the part of the appellee and his confederates. The answer denies the charges of fraud and collusion, and details the circumstances attending the transactions between the parties. Much testimony was taken on both sides, and at the hearing the circuit court dismissed the bill.

The grounds upon which a reversal of this decree is urged are first, mental weakness on the part of the appellant, accompanied by inadequacy of consideration for the conveyance, and fraud on the part of the appellee; and, secondly, the refusal of the circuit court to direct an issue to be tried by a jury.

It is well settled that mere inadequacy of consideration is of itself no ground for the rescission of a contract. But when great weakness of mind, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, concurs with gross inadequacy of consideration, a court of equity will, upon seasonable application, set aside the transaction when these facts are made to appear. For from these circumstances, imposition or undue influence will be inferred. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506; 2 Minor's Inst. (3d ed.), marg. p. 596 et seq. But such is not this case. Here there is no allegation in the bill that the plaintiff was incompetent to contract, or was of weak mind. The most it alleges is that he was young and inexperienced, and of a confiding and credulous disposition; which may all be true, and yet it affords no evidence of incapacity for business or of mental weakness. But if we look beyond the pleadings, we find the testimony vague and indefinite, and wholly insufficient to sustain the contention of counsel. Only three of the many witnesses examined testify as to the plaintiff's mental condition. Of these, the first, Charles F. Whittlesey, testifies that he has known him from his boyhood; but the most he can say is, that he was, in disposition, weak and vacillating, and " his intellectual capacity not of the highest." The second, R. F. Hockney, a former school-mate, testifies that at school he was considered very light, and was called by the boys, " crazy Crebs; " and that in business he is careless and inattentive. W. B. Evans, the third witness, testifies that after he (the plaintiff) removed to Washington, he employed him as a clerk in a drug store, and that while thus employed, he, on one occasion, took from the store certain articles of value, which he afterwards confessed to have stolen, and promised to make restitution, which he did, and that he (the witness) condoned the offense because he believed him to be devoid of understanding and ignorant of the impropriety of his conduct. But the force of this witness' testimony is greatly weakened, if not destroyed, by his apparent animosity towards one of the alleged confederates of the defendant, and by the fact disclosed in his own deposition, that he not only continued the plaintiff in his responsible position, after the discovery of the larceny, but afterwards sold him the entire contents of the store, and offered to lease him the building in which the business was conducted. Manifestly, his opinion that the plaintiff lacked understanding is an afterthought, and entitled to little consideration. Moreover, the plaintiff was himself...