Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Thames
Decision Date | 03 August 2017 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV318TSL-RHW |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Parties | CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION PLAINTIFF v. ROSEMARY THAMES & WALTER WHITE DEFENDANTS |
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendants Rosemary Thames and Walter White to set aside the default judgment entered against them by the court on June 26, 2017. Plaintiff Credit Acceptance Corporation (CAC) has responded in opposition to the motion, and the court, having considered the motion, response and the record in the case1, concludes that the motion should be denied.
On May 1, 2017, CAC, a Michigan corporation, asserting diversity subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 13322, filed a complaint for arbitration pursuant to § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., against defendants, Mississippi residents. According to the complaint, under theterms of a purchase and finance agreement executed by White and Thames in connection with their purchase of a car financed by CAC, they agreed both to arbitrate "any controversy or claim between You and US arising out of or in any way related to this Contract," and to provide CAC with written notice of any covered dispute.3
Notwithstanding this agreement, on March 30, 2017, White and Thames filed suit against CAC, Chucks Used Cars, Sharon Seals and Charles Edward Seals in the Hinds County Chancery Court asserting claims for conversion, detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, deceptive trade practices, conspiracy, bad faith tort, trespass, breach of fiduciary obligation and emotional distress based on allegations that even though they made a substantial down payment and timely made all payments pursuant to their Agreement executed in connection with their purchase of the vehicle, defendants wrongfully repossessed the car in December 2016. As relief, among other things, White and Thames sought to be provided a new vehicle valued at $15,000, "general and specific" damages in the amount of $19,429, punitive damages and an award of attorney's fees.
CAC served White and Thames with the summons and complaint in this cause on May 18, 2017. Thereafter, on June 14, 2017, when no answer or other responsive pleading had been filed by White or Thames, CAC sought and received a clerk's entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 18, 2107, CAC filed its motion for default judgment, which the court granted on June 27, 2017. The court's judgment required White and Thames to arbitrate their disputes, stayed the state court litigation and dismissed the action.
On July 5, 2017, defendants filed the present motion seeking to set aside the default judgment, strike the entry of default, lift the stay of the state court proceedings and award $8,000 in attorney's fees. Although it is not altogether clear, White and Thames appear to urge that the judgment should be set aside because (1) it is void as the court lacks diversity jurisdiction; (2) they were not provided proper notice of default under either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or § 4 of the FAA and the conduct of CAC's attorneys lulled them into believing that CAC intended to proceed in state court; and (3) the judgment was obtained through the use of fraudulent documentation.
Rule 60(b) is a "remedial provision intended to prevent injustice by allowing parties their day in court even though some technical error has occurred which would otherwise be grounds for default." Greater Baton Rouge Golf Assoc. v. Recreation and Park Comm'n, 507 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1975). As a general proposition, the decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b) rests within the trial court's discretion and is, at bottom, an equitable one. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 763 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1985)). An exception is Rule 60(b)(4). "Unlike other Rule 60(b) provisions, relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is not discretionary; if the judgment is void, the district court must necessarily set the judgment aside." Borne v. River Parishes Hosp., LLC, 548 Fed. Appx. 954, 957 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2013). A void judgment is "one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit has identified two circumstances in which a judgment may be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4): "1) if the initial court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction; and 2) if the district courtacted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Here, White and Thames argue that the judgment is void because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In this regard, they appear to argue that diversity jurisdiction is lacking for two reasons: (1) CAC failed to join certain indispensable parties as defendants, and specifically, Chucks Used Cars, Sharon Seals and Charles Edward Seals, Mississippi citizens who are defendants in the state court action; and (2) the amount in controversy is below the $75,000 threshold for federal diversity jurisdiction. Neither position is a basis for releif.
Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003). See also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2010) ( )(citations omitted). In the court's opinion, even if the referenced Mississippi defendants were indispensable parties, their nonjoinder would not have resulted in a total absence of jurisdiction so as to render the judgment void. See Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825-26 (8th Cir. 1980) ( ). However, as CAC correctly points out, "[t]he fact that [White and Thames] may have asserted claims in the state court suit against others who had some involvement in the underlying transaction does not make those others necessary parties to this action, in which the sole issue is whether the defendant is to be compelled to arbitrate its claims against [CAC]." Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 822 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
Under the above-cited standard applicable under Rule 60(b)(4), the judgment will not be considered void unless the court had no arguable basis for finding that the amount in controversy exceeded the $75,000 required for diversity jurisdiction. In the court's opinion, it is not only arguable, but rather facially apparent from defendants' state court pleading that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. In a suit to compelarbitration, the amount in controversy "is the amount of the potential award in the underlying arbitration proceeding." Webb. Investacorp, 89 F.3d 252, 256 (5th Cir. 1996). CAC's complaint sought an order compelling White and Thames to arbitrate their state court claims. In the state court action, White and Thames alleged in June 2016, Chucks Used Cars sold them a car, which was financed by CAC. The complaint explicitly demanded compensatory damages in excess of $34,000 together with punitive damages and attorney's fees. On this basis, the court concludes that is facially apparent that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See S&S Pharmacy, Inc. v. Xerox Audit & Compliance Sols., LLC, No. 1:16CV269-LG-RHW, 2016 WL 4536882, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2016) ( ).4
White and Thames further appear to contend that the judgment is void because it was entered without notice as required by Rule 55(b)(2) and/or by 9 U.S.C. § 4. Their position is without merit because they were not entitled to notice of the motion for default judgment under either Rule 55(b) or FAA § 4.
Rule 55(b)(2) states: "If the party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least seven days before the hearing." White and Thames did not appear personally or through their counsel prior to the motion for default judgment or the court's entry of the default judgment. They were litigating, and were represented by counsel, in their state court case. However, they never entered an appearance in this case and thus were not entitled to notice of default in this case.5 See Sellers v. Osyka Permian, LLC, 263...
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