Credit Thrift of America v. Kittrell, 76--43

• Decision Date: 31 August 1976
• Docket Number: No. 76--43,76--43
• Citation: 354 N.E.2d 59,41 Ill.App.3d 361
• Parties: CREDIT THRIFT OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Waynette KITTRELL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 59

354 N.E.2d 59

41 Ill.App.3d 361

CREDIT THRIFT OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Waynette KITTRELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76--43.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Aug. 31, 1976.

Robert W. Esler, Rock Island, for defendant-appellant.

Marvin Andich, Rock Island, for plaintiff-appellee.

ALLOY, Presiding Justice:

Waynette Kittrell, defendant, appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, entered in the sum of $330.38 in favor of plaintiff Credit Thrift of America, in a wage garnishment action involving defendant's employer, the Franciscan Hospital. Defendant moved to vacate the garnishment on the ground that the wages of defendant are protected from garnishment by the provisions of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 11--3). Defendant's motion to vacate was denied.

On appeal in this case, appellee Credit Thrift of America has not seen fit to file a brief in this court on behalf of the appellee. (See: Witter v. Winter (1975), 25 Ill.App.3d 924, 323 N.E.2d 407). When no brief is filed, a court of review may reverse, without considering the merits of the case. Reversal, however, is not mandatory and the reviewing court may, if it chooses to do so, consider and determine the case on its merits. We have determined to consider the case on its merits.

Defendant Kittrell receives financial aid pursuant to Art. IV of the Illinois Public Aid Code. Defendant also participates in a service and training program pursuant to Art. IX, sec. 9--6 of the Illinois Public Aid Code. Such service and training programs provide employment for and contribute to the training and experience of persons receiving public aid and, also, provide public and non-profit community agencies with personnel whose service could not otherwise be adequately financed. The wages of any person assigned to a service and training program are deducted in full from the financial aid which would otherwise have been provided to a program participant. In the action we now consider, Credit Thrift-plaintiff sought to garnish wages earned by defendant while she was participating in the service and training program. The issue before the court, threrefore, is whether defendant's wages are exempt from garnishment. The argument of defendant is principally dependent upon the interpretation of sec. 11--3 of the Illinois Public Aid Code which provides:

'All the financial aid given under Articles III, IV, V, VI and VII shall be absolutely inalienable by assignment, sale, attachment, garnishment, or otherwise.'

Defendant contends that since she receives financial aid under Article IV of the Illinois Public Aid Code, she comes within the protection of sec. 11--3. It is noted, however, that sec. 11--3, protects by its specific terms, financial aid and not financial aid recipients. We, therefore, believe that under the terms of sec. 11--3, its provisions can only be invoked with respect to financial aid received by a defendant.

Defendant argues that since her financial aid can only be reduced by income actually available to her, the garnishment of her wages would force a correlative increase in defendant's financial aid. This interdependence between defendant's wages and defendant's financial aid, asserts defendant, infuses defenant's wages with the nature and quality of financial aid. Defendant concludes from such analysis that her wages are entitled to the protection of sec. 11--3.

Defendant seeks to support her argument by citing Guardian Loan Company of Plainsfield v. Baylis (1970), 112 N.J.Super. 44, 270 A.2d 304, and Consumer Credit Corp. v. Lewis (1970), 63 Misc.2d 928, 313 N.Y.S.2d 879, which are cases from New Jersey and New York involving statutes similar to sec. 11--3. In both those cases, the creditor of a public aid recipient attempted to reach financial aid funds deposited in the debtor-public aid recipient's bank account. Statutes similar to sec. 11--3 were held to bar the collection of deposited funds. Kauffman v. Hicks (1st Dist. 1974), 17...