Creedon v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., Civil Action No. 25073.
| Decision Date | 20 November 1947 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 25073. |
| Citation | 74 F. Supp. 546 |
| Parties | CREEDON, Housing Expediter, v. CLOYD W. MILLER CO. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Paul Marshall, of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Paul S. Knight, of Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.
In this action the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1881 et seq., has been challenged as unconstitutional because it undertakes to fix and regulate local rentals and interferes with local affairs and rights not subject to congressional power. The defendants, against whom a permanent injunction is sought, announced to their tenants that on August 1, 1947, the rentals in suites of the defendants' apartment in the City of Cleveland, Ohio, would be increased by percentages or sums and methods contrary to the express provisions of the Housing Act of 1947 and regulations authorized thereunder.
A preliminary injunction was granted on July 21, 1947, without contest and without a hearing on the questions now raised by the answer of the defendants, posing the constitutional question. The matter, therefore, is before me for final determination on the pleadings there being no factual controversy. See stipulation dated July 21, 1947.
The Housing and Rent Act of 1947 consists of two titles: Title 1 deals with amendments concerning housing loans, priorities, etc.; Title 2 sets forth the policy of and authority for the control of rents and evictions by the Housing Expediter.
In Section 201 of Title 2, Congress reaffirms the declaration in the Price Control Extension Act of 1946 concerning the undesirability of unduly prolonged controls in peace time. However, "Congress recognizes that an emergency exists" and that further controls are desirable.
Under Sections 201 and 202 of Title 2, it is not possible for the Housing Expediter to extend rent control to any area which had not been designated a "defense-rental area" prior to March 1, 1947, and in which rents were not regulated under the Emergency Price Control Act on March 1, 1947.
Section 203(a) provides:
"After the effective date of this title, no maximum rents shall be established or maintained under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, with respect to any housing accommodations."
Under Section 204(c) the Housing Expediter is authorized and directed to remove any or all maximum rents before this Title ceases to be in effect if, in his judgment, the need for such controls no longer exists. The remainder of Title 2 consists of enforcement and eviction provisions.
Section 206(b) authorizes the Housing Expediter to apply for an injunction whenever in his judgment any person has engaged or is about to engage in an act in violation of subsection (a) of Section 206 which prohibits the demand or receipt of rent in excess of the prescribed maximum rent.
The power of Congress to enact legislative measures is not lightly to be questioned. Only if some substantial constitutional right of the citizen has been infringed or impaired should the courts strike down an act of the Congress. What the court thinks about the law is of no consequence if the congressional measure does not infringe the constitutional rights of the defendants.
It is contended that the continuance of rent regulation stems from the war powers earlier exercised by the Congress and that there has not yet been any official termination of the war; but the President's proclamation of the termination of hostilities was issued on December 31, 1946 and although this may not have been an official termination of the war, nevertheless it inaugurated peace-in-fact.
In the absence of any words or provisions to that effect in the new rent control Act there is no basis for a conclusion that the Congress was intending to act under its war powers. The Act is not by any express words or implied provisions tied up with any war powers of the Congress. It gives, as one might say, the kiss of death to rent regulation but hangs on for a few months with an impotent embrace. The Act speaks of the existence of an emergency without any statement of what the emergency is. If Congress was intending to continue the exercise of war powers residing within its...
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Woods v. Cloyd Miller Co
...preliminary injunction issued. After a hearing it was dissolved and a permanent injunction denied. The District Court, Creedon v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., D.C., 74 F.Supp. 546, was of the view that the authority of Congress to regulate rents by virtue of the war power (see Bowles v. Willingham,......
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Woods v. Benson Hotel Corporation, Civ. A. No. 2628.
...of Congress is presumed to be constitutional and may not be lightly struck down by the courts. As Judge Jones said in Creedon v. Miller, D.C.Ohio, 1947, 74 F.Supp. 546, 547, "only if some substantial constitutional right of the citizen has been infringed or impaired should the courts strike......
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Creedon v. Bowman, Civ. A. No. 6765.
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