Creekside Rural Invs., Inc. v. Hicks

Decision Date28 April 2022
Docket Number11-20-00254-CV
Citation644 S.W.3d 896
Parties CREEKSIDE RURAL INVESTMENTS, INC.; Manor Ranches, Ltd.; and Jay Dickens, Appellants v. Dan HICKS and Pam Browning, Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Jon Mark Hogg, Amanda Crouch, San Antonio, for Appellee.

Brad Odell, for Appellee.

Kent E. Wymore IV, Brian J. O'Toole, Austin, for Appellant.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS, JUSTICE

On appeal, Creekside Rural Investments, Inc.; Manor Ranches, LTD.; and Jay Dickens (collectively, Appellants) present eight issues in which they challenge rulings made by the 132nd District Court of Scurry County, Texas. Named defendants in the case are Pam Browning and Scurry County Judge Dan Hicks. Appellants unsuccessfully attempted to add Judge Ernie Armstrong of the 132nd District Court as a defendant. Appellants filed a motion to recuse Judge Armstrong. After another judge sitting by assignment denied the recusal motion, Judge Armstrong presided over the trial court matters.

The trial court granted Judge Hicks's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed him from the lawsuit. The trial court additionally granted Browning's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed her from the lawsuit. In addition to her plea to the jurisdiction, Browning submitted a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which the trial court granted as an alternative basis for dismissing her from the lawsuit. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

This case has a unique factual and procedural history, but because our opinion in Cause No. 11-20-00044-CV carefully recounts many of the facts of this case, we limit the factual recitation here to relevant events occurring after those detailed in this court's opinion in Cause No. 11-20-00044-CV.1

Briefly, Appellants purchased a tract of land in Williamson County in 2017 that lies to the north of guardianship-estate property over which Browning's husband and, upon his death, Browning were the court-appointed guardians. A gun range was operated on a portion of the land owned by the guardianship estate; that portion of land adjoined Appellants’ subsequently purchased tract of land. Appellants filed a lawsuit in Williamson County against the gun range, its company operator and owner, as well as the ward, Stacy James Browning, Browning's disabled son.

In May 2019, Appellants sent an electronic letter to Judge Hicks in Scurry County, highlighting what they alleged to be "problems." Judge Hicks responded that he would look into things, and when Appellants received no further communication, they reached out again by e-mail. Judge Hicks did not respond to this e-mail. On August 8, 2019, Appellants filed a motion to intervene in the guardianship, and the case was transferred to the district court in Scurry County. The district court denied the intervention, and those rulings were then appealed to this court in Cause No. 11-20-00044-CV.

Shortly after the district court denied Appellantsmotion to intervene in the guardianship proceeding, Appellants filed a new lawsuit in district court and named Judge Hicks and Pam Browning as the defendants. On June 2, 2020, Appellants filed a motion to recuse, requesting that Judge Armstrong recuse himself from the lawsuit against Judge Hicks and Pam Browning. This motion was duly referred by assignment from the presiding judge of the Seventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas to the Honorable John B. Board on June 6, and following a hearing, the motion to recuse was denied on August 17, 2020.

Appellants later filed "PlaintiffsFirst Amended Petition" on September 28, 2020, attempting to add Judge Armstrong as a defendant in the case. On October 1, 2020, the district clerk sent Appellantscounsel a letter indicating that she was required to sever claims against the district judge into a new case, with a different cause number, pursuant to Section 30.017(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.2 Appellants did not refile the petition against Judge Armstrong under the new cause number, and instead continued their attempts to file their petition under the original matter. The clerk did not issue a citation for Judge Armstrong. Appellants filed a petition for writ of mandamus on October 9, 2020, asking the trial court to order the district clerk to accept the original filings under the original cause number and to issue a citation in the original matter so that Judge Armstrong could be served in the lawsuit. The record does not indicate that the trial court issued a ruling on Appellant's petition for mandamus.

Following a hearing on October 21, 2020, the trial court issued a final judgment. The trial court granted Judge Hicks's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed him from the lawsuit. The trial court also granted Browning's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed her from the lawsuit. The trial court alternatively granted Browning's Rule 91a motion to dismiss Appellants’ cause of action and dismissed her from the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 91a. The trial court denied Appellantsmotion to dismiss the motion for sanctions filed by Browning, which it later denied.

Following the final judgment, Appellants filed this appeal, alleging eight issues.

Discussion
I. Appellee Browning

Appellants’ issues one, two, and three are related to Appellee Pam Browning. In their first issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Browning's plea to the jurisdiction. In their second issue, Appellants allege that the trial court erred in granting Browning's Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Issues one and two can be addressed together because, in affirming the trial court's ruling on issue one, issue two becomes moot. Appellants assert in their third issue that the trial court erred when it denied AppellantsAnti-SLAPP motion to dismiss Browning's motion for sanctions under the Texas Citizens Participation Act.

A. Plea to the Jurisdiction and Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss

In their first issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Browning's plea to the jurisdiction. In her plea to the jurisdiction, Browning asserted that Appellants’ petition demonstrated on its face that Appellants lack standing. Appellants contend that they have standing to sue under Section 1151.105 of the Texas Estates Code. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.105 (West 2020).

Standard of Review

"A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit." Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). This is a proper method by which to challenge a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004) ; Garms v. Comanche Cty. , No. 11-19-00015-CV, 2020 WL 7413991, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bland , 34 S.W.3d at 554 ) Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, and we apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226. We construe pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleader's intent. Id.

A plea to the jurisdiction can raise two different challenges: (1) a challenge to the plaintiff's pleadings regarding his allegation of jurisdictional facts or (2) an evidentiary challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia , 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012) ; Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. The plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark , 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018) ; City of Merkel v. Copeland , 561 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. denied). Here, Browning only challenged the sufficiency of Appellants’ pleadings.

When there is a challenge to the pleadings, "we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction." Alamo Heights , 544 S.W.3d at 770.

Analysis
1. Strict statutory construction in determining the existence of a private cause of action

Standing to sue may be predicated upon either statutory or common law authority. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara , 52 S.W.3d 171, 178-79 (Tex. 2001). When a party alleges that its private cause of action is provided for under a particular statutory provision, our duty is to ascertain the drafters’ intent using the plain language of the statute and its context. Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc. , 438 S.W.3d 556, 562–68 (Tex. 2014). "[T]he analysis is a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon whom the Texas Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category."

In re Sullivan , 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding).

Applying a "strict rule of construction" to statutory enforcement schemes, we may not imply causes of action except when the drafters’ intent is clearly expressed from the language as written. Brown v. Arturo De La Cruz , 156 S.W.3d 560, 567 (Tex. 2004). When a statute explicitly provides certain rights of enforcement but is silent as to the right sought to be enforced, we may presume that the legislature intended for that right to not be included. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington , 442 U.S. 560, 571–72, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979) (stating that "implying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best"). Furthermore, a right of enforcement should not be implied simply because the statute "fails to adequately protect intended beneficiaries." Brown , 156 S.W.3d at 567. The fact that a person has suffered harm from the violation of a statute does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677, 688, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The law...

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