Creel v. Industrial Commission
Decision Date | 04 June 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 45336,45336 |
Citation | 54 Ill.2d 580,301 N.E.2d 275 |
Parties | Alvis CREEL, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Lipsett Steel Co., Appellee.) |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Warren E. Ganz, Peoria, for appellant.
Bayler & Noetzel, Peoria (Henry D. Noetzel, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
Petitioner, Alvis Creel, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County confirming the decision of the Industrial Commission which had affirmed the decision of the arbitrator dismissing petitioner's application for adjustment of claim for the reason that it was not filed within one year of the date of the accident out of which his claim arose.
The record shows that on January 14, 1964, while petitioner was employed by respondent Lipsett Steel Company, a piece of steel fell from a crane and struck him on the head. He was rendered unconscious, and was taken to a hospital where a wound on his head was sutured, and he was released. Approximately six months later he 'blacked out' and continued to have intermittent 'blackouts' until he was hospitalized on December 7, 1967. He had continued to work for respondent until October 1967, was off until July 1968, when he worked for three weeks, and has not worked since. During the period from 1964 to 1968 he had seen various physicians and at the time of the hearing was still suffering the symptoms described in his testimony.
When petitioner received a bill from the hospital where he was confined in December 1967, he took it to respondent's plant superintendent and was told that if he would 'pay up' his half of the premium due under a group insurance policy which covered respondent's employees , the superintendent would attempt to have the insurance company pay the hospital bill. The premiums for the group insurance were paid one half by respondent and one half by the individual employees. The hospital bill was paid by the insurance carrier on January 30, 1968.
It is the petitioner's contention that under the provisions of section 8(j) of the Workmen's Compensation Act ( ), the time for the filing of an application of adjustment of claim was extended to one year from the date of the payment of the hospital bill and that his application was timely filed.
At all times pertinent to this case section 6(c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
'In any case, other than one where the injury was caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment unless application for compensation is filed with the Commission within 1 year after the date of the accident, where no compensation has been paid, or within 1 year after the date of the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, the right to file such application shall be barred.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 48, par. 138.6(c).
At all pertinent times section 8(j) provided:
Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 48, par. 138.8(j).
The parties are in agreement that the group insurance program under which petitioner's hospital bill was paid was a benefit which 'should not have been payable if any rights of recovery existed' under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and there is no question that petitioner's application for adjustment of claim was filed within one year of the date of payment of the hospital bill.
In support of his contention petitioner cites Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Com., 33 Ill.2d 78, 210 N.E.2d 215. In Caterpillar the employee was injured on September 23, 1957, and lost no time from work until four years later, when he developed difficulties. At that time he was off work for approximately four months and 'during that time received payments under a group insurance plan covering nonoccupational disabilities.' (33 Ill.2d 78, 80, 210 N.E.2d 215, 216.) He filed an application for adjustment of claim, the Industrial Commission awarded compensation, and the circuit court confirmed the decision of the Commission.
In rejecting the employer's contention that section 8(j) was not intended to revive claims which had been barred by section 6(c) prior to the payment of benefits, the court in Caterpillar said: 33 Ill.2d 78, 81--82, 210 N.E.2d 215, 217.
Respondent contends that this case is distinguishable from Caterpillar because in that case the group benefits which the employee received included weekly indemnity benefits. Assuming, Arguendo, that the employee in Caterpillar did receive weekly benefits, it is clear from the statute that 'benefits' included payment of hospital bills and the distinction which respondent draws does not improve its position.
Respondent points out that in 1969 (Laws of 1969, pp. 546, 546) the General Assembly amended section 8(j) by adding the following provision:
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 48, par. 138.8(j).)
It argues,
Upon review of the authorities cited, we find more apposite here the following language from Western National Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill.2d 342, 353--354, 167 N.E.2d 169, 175, We note further that in the amendment enacted in 1969, the General Assembly left unchanged the language '* * * benefits including * * * hospital benefits.'
We conclude that petitioner's application for adjustment of claim, having been filed within one year of the payment of hospital benefits was timely filed, and accordingly the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to set aside the decision of the Industrial Commission and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
The crux of the majority opinion is that when the General Assembly amended section 8(j) by the addition of [54 Ill.2d 585] paragraph 3 in 1969, it was admitting the correctness of this court's decision in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Com. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 78, 210 N.E.2d 215, on the theory that 'The addition of a new provision in a statute by amendment is an indication of the absence of its implied or prior existence.' However, when the statute is viewed in its entirety, I believe that the proper interpretation of legislative intent in enacting section 8(j)3 to be that this court had, in the view of the legislature, wrongfully construed section...
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