Creel v. Loy
| Decision Date | 10 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV 20-79-M-DWM |
| Citation | 524 F.Supp.3d 1090 |
| Parties | John Matthew CREEL, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Joshua Matthew Creel, on behalf of the heirs of Joshua Matthew Creel, Plaintiff, v. Mark B. LOY, Active Truck Transport, LLC d/b/a Active USA, LLC and Does 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Jacqueline T. Lenmark, Murry Warhank, Jackson, Murdo & Grant, P.C., Helena, MT, Charles E. Oswald, Pro Hac Vice, Martha T. Starkey, Pro Hac Vice, Harrison & Moberly, LLP, Carmel, IN, for Plaintiff.
Adam M. Shaw, Shane Alexander MacIntyre, Brown Law Firm, P.C., Missoula, MT, for Defendants.
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in June 2017 on Interstate 90 east of Clinton, Montana. At approximately 10:10 a.m., Deborah Alteneder was driving a Chevrolet Impala eastbound on I-90 with Josh Creel, her fiancé, in the passenger seat. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 3(g).) It was raining and Alteneder lost control of the vehicle, sliding through the 38-foot median and onto the westbound lane of the interstate. (Id. at ¶¶ 3(i), (j).) The Impala collided with a 2018 Kenworth T800 truck operated by Defendant Mark Loy and owned by Defendant Active Truck Transport, LLC ("Active") (collectively "Defendants"). (Id. at ¶¶ 3(d), (e), (h), (j).) Both Creel and Alteneder died at the scene. (Id. at ¶ 3(k).)
On June 1, 2020, Plaintiff John Matthew Creel ("Plaintiff") sued Defendants as the personal representative of Josh Creel's estate, alleging negligence, wrongful death, survivorship, and loss of consortium. (Doc. 1.) These allegations focus primarily on Loy's speed at the time of the accident, which was recorded at 67 to 70 miles per hour just prior to the crash. (Doc. 28 at Addt'l ¶ 3.) Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that Loy's alleged negligence did not cause the accident and that Alteneder's conduct severed the chain of causation. (Doc. 24.) That motion is granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
"Negligence is the failure to use the degree of care that an ordinary person would have used under the same circumstance." Barr v. Great Falls Int'l Airport Auth. , 326 Mont. 93, 107 P.3d 471, 477 (2005). "To maintain an action in negligence, a plaintiff must prove four essential elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach was the actual and proximate cause of an injury to the plaintiff, and (4) damages resulted." Peterson v. Eichhorn , 344 Mont. 540, 189 P.3d 615, 620–21 (2008). Summary judgment dismissing a claim of negligence is appropriate if the party advancing the claim fails to establish one of the four elements. Hagen v. Dow Chem. Co. , 261 Mont. 487, 863 P.2d 413, 416 (1993). However, "[n]egligence actions usually involve questions of fact regarding breach of a duty and causation; as a result, they are not ordinarily susceptible to summary judgment and are usually better resolved at trial." Craig v. Schell , 293 Mont. 323, 975 P.2d 820, 822 (1999). "A question of fact in a negligence case may be determined as a matter of law only where reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to whether a duty was breached or whether a breach of a duty caused an accident." Id. at 822–23.
Here, Defendants focus on causation, arguing that Loy's speed was irrelevant because Alteneder lost control and entered Loy's lane, making Alteneder's negligence "the direct and only cause of the crash." (Doc. 25 at 4.) In response, Plaintiff maintains that Loy exceeded the appropriate speed and could have otherwise avoided the accident, relying primarily on the analysis and conclusions of Lew Grill, an expert in commercial trucking. (See Doc. 28-1 (Dec. 23, 2020 Report).) Based on the current record, reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion: Defendants’ alleged negligence did not cause the accident.
The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. (See Docs. 23, 26, 28.) Disputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam). There are three primary sources for the facts here: (1) the Montana Highway Patrol report; (2) the deceleration report from Loy's vehicle; (3) and Grill's expert report. Defendants primarily rely on the Highway Patrol report in seeking summary judgment. (See Doc. 28-3.)1 Because that report supports the argument that Loy's conduct did not contribute to the accident, Plaintiff relies on the deceleration report and Grill. Neither is sufficient, however, to raise a genuine dispute of material fact.
According to the Montana Highway Patrol report, it was 50 degrees Fahrenheit and rainy at the time of the accident. (Id. at 6.) Alteneder and Creel were in Alteneder's Impala headed from Missoula to Butte to visit Alteneder's sister. (Id. at 11.) Loy was headed from Miles City to Spokane, driving a semitruck and hauling another semitruck for his employer, Active. (Id. ) The Impala was headed east on I-90 near mile marker 135.8. (Id. ) It negotiated a left curve before entering a "straight, level portion of Interstate 90." (Id. ) Loy was traveling west and in the left lane as he was attempting to pass a semitruck driven by Carl Booth. (Id. at 7, 11.) Road conditions were wet and there were ruts that allowed for standing water in both the eastbound and westbound lanes. (Id. at 6.)
However, the "road [wa]s straight and level on both the east and west directions of travel" and the eastbound and westbound lanes were separated by a grassy, unprotected median approximately 38-feet wide. (Id. ) The speed limit was 80 miles per hour for vehicles and 65 miles per hour for trucks. (Id. )
Though it is somewhat unclear, the report indicates that "Alteneder lost control of the Impala, overcorrected steering to the left, and began sliding counterclockwise towards the median." (Id. at 11.) She spun through the median and ultimately entered the left, westbound lane into the oncoming traffic. (Id. ) The front of Loy's truck struck the driver's side of the Impala, with the force of the collision pushing Alteneder into the passenger side of the Impala. (Id. ) Alteneder and Creel were both pronounced dead at the scene. (Id. at 8.)
There were only two surviving witnesses to the crash: Loy and Booth. (See id. at 9.) Booth "observed the Impala lose control" and stated that "it appeared they were traveling ‘fast.’ " (Id. ) "Mr. Booth said the sedan started turning when the front tire came off the roadway [and] the tail spun around." (Id. ) He further stated that "[t]he Impala traveled through the center median, was airborne at one point, entered the westbound lane and was struck by [Loy's truck]." (Id. ) Loy said that he (Id. )
The first officer was on the scene within fifteen minutes, (id. at 6), and the crash was cleared five hours later, (id. at 8). Officers observed that "[t]he Impala sustained significant damage to the driver's side of the vehicle." (Id. at 7.) The truck (Id. at 8.) However, the rain made it difficult to mark the scene, (id. at 7), and the officers were only able to complete a portion of the Total Station measurements on the day of the accident, (id. at 8, 22). The Impala was also too damaged to download the vehicle's crash data. (Id. at 8, 23.) A Total Station was completed, however, based on further measurements taken the next day. (See id. at 14, 22.)
Ultimately, the Highway Patrol attributed all fault for the accident to Alteneder. The report states that Loy was not distracted, his vision was not obscured, and he provided "no contributing action." (Id. at 4.) It further states that neither Alteneder nor Loy had any drugs or alcohol in their systems. (Id. at 10.) It then concludes:
The major contributing factors of this crash are driving too fast for conditions, and excessive steering input. The ruts in the eastbound lanes allowed for pooling water. The tread depth on the tires of the Impala were above the wear bar, however three out of the four tires measured just 4/32; the fourth tire was measured at 8/32. The combination of tread depth, water on the roadway and the vehicles [sic] speed exceeded the driver's ability to maintain control. When control was lost, the driver's input caused the sedan to cross the median into the path of oncoming traffic.
(Id. at 12.)
According to the crash data downloaded from Loy's truck, he was traveling approximately 67 to 70 miles per hour at the time of the accident and did not engage his brakes until one second before impact. (Doc. 28-4 at 5.)
Plaintiff retained Grill to review the crash information and present opinions—as an expert in commercial trucking—about industry customs, practices, and standards; the operation of the semitruck in this case; the duties of the motor carrier; and the preventability of this accident "from a commercial trucking industry standpoint." (Doc. 28-1 at 5.) His report is divided into four basic sections. First, Grill outlines the industry regulation and standards applicable to commercial vehicles. (Id. at 10–16.) While he argues commercial vehicle operation requires a higher degree of safe driving performance and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Platt v. Holland Am. Line, Inc.
... ... cases, questions concerning foreseeability and causation ... particularly lend themselves to decision by a jury.”); ... Steinle v. United States , 17 F.4th 819, 822 (9th ... Cir. 2021) (“[C]ausation often presents a question of ... fact for the jury.”); Creel v. Loy , 524 ... F.Supp.3d 1090, 1094 (D. Mont. 2021) (“[N]egligence ... actions usually involve questions of fact regarding breach of ... a duty and causation; as a result, they are not ordinarily ... susceptible to summary judgment and are usually better ... ...