Crego v. Coleman

• Citation: 615 N.W.2d 218,463 Mich. 248
• Decision Date: 31 July 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 113485, Calendar No. 4.
• Parties: Phyllis R. CREGO, also known as Phyllis R. Sock, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kermit L. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

615 N.W.2d 218

463 Mich. 248

Phyllis R. CREGO, also known as Phyllis R. Sock, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kermit L. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 113485, Calendar No. 4.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 8, 2000.

Decided July 31, 2000.

Robes & Kobliska, P.C. (by Mathew Kobliska), Farmington Hills, for plaintiff-appellee.

Steven M. Jentzen, P.C. (by Steven M. Jentzen), Ypsilanti, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

In this case, we are asked to consider the constitutionality of a repealed section of the Paternity Act, M.C.L. § 722.713; MSA 25.493,¹ which permitted a mother of a child born out of wedlock to enter into a nonmodifiable child support agreement with her child's putative father. We conclude that the statute in question did not violate equal protection guarantees.

I. Factual and Procedural History

In October 1978, plaintiff filed a paternity action, alleging that defendant fathered plaintiff's daughter who was born in August 1978. In 1980, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and the complaint was dismissed without having determined the issue of paternity. Through the settlement agreement, defendant agreed to pay weekly child support but did not acknowledge paternity. As required by M.C.L. § 722.713; MSA 25.493, the trial court approved the terms of the settlement and ordered defendant to pay child support of $20 a week, pending a formal recommendation from the friend of the court. A second order was later entered, increasing the support to $35 a week, and providing that the order was "not modifiable." Moreover, this second order provided that the matter "shall stand settled, discontinued, and dismissed" as to defendant. In January 1981, after receiving the friend of the court's support recommendation, the trial court entered a "permanent" order, requiring defendant to pay $50 a week until the child's eighteenth birthday or until further order of the court.²

In the early 1990s, plaintiff filed a motion to modify the support order, but the trial court dismissed the motion on the ground of res judicata. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the nonmodifiable settlement agreement was binding on the parties. 201 Mich.App. 443, 447, 506 N.W.2d 568 (1993) ( Crego). Additionally, the Court rejected plaintiff's claim that M.C.L. § 722.713; MSA 25.493 was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection to illegitimate children. Id. at 446, 506 N.W.2d 568, citing Hisaw v. Hayes, 133 Mich.App. 639, 642, 350 N.W.2d 302 (1984).

In 1995 however, in an unrelated case, the Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion when it held that M.C.L. § 722.713; MSA 25.493 violated the constitutional guarantees of equal protection because the statute authorized nonmodifiable child support awards in paternity actions, while child support awards in divorce actions always remain modifiable. Dones v. Thomas, 210 Mich.App. 674, 534 N.W.2d 221 (1995). The Court did not make reference to its earlier decision in Crego I. In response to Dones, plaintiff renewed her motion for modification of child support, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding that it was required to follow the decision in Dones, even where that decision conflicted with Crego I. The trial court also held that the parties would be afforded an opportunity to resolve any issue regarding paternity through the use of DNA testing if they so desired.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that it would find the statute unconstitutional except that it was barred from doing so by MCR 7.215(H)(1), requiring the Court to follow Crego I, regardless of the Dones decision. 226 Mich.App. 815, 821, 573 N.W.2d 291 (1997) ( Crego II). A conflict panel was convened to resolve the conflict between Crego I and Crego II, MCR 7.215(H)(3),³ and that panel held that M.C.L. § 722.713; MSA 25.493 was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. 232 Mich.App. 284, 591 N.W.2d 277 (1998) (Crego III). We granted leave to appeal. 461 Mich. 895, 603 N.W.2d 780 (1999).

II. Conflicting Statutory Child Support Provisions

The repealed section of the Paternity Act at issue here established a means of enforcing nonmodifiable child support agreements under certain circumstances: (a) An agreement or compromise made by the mother or child or by some authorized person on their behalf with the father concerning the support and education of the child shall be binding upon the mother and the child only when the court having jurisdiction to compel support and education of the child shall have determined that adequate provision is reasonably secured by payment or otherwise and has approved the agreement or compromise.

(b) The performance of the agreement or compromise, when so approved, shall bar other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of the child. [MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493 (emphasis added).]

It is important to recognize that the challenged statute was only relevant to nonmodifiable agreements where all the following elements were present: (1) a paternity action was filed; (2) the child's mother and putative father⁴ voluntarily entered into an agreement regarding child support, in lieu of a judicial determination of paternity; (3) the circuit court made a determination that the agreement secured "adequate provision" for the child's needs; and (4) the agreement failed to include language preserving the right to modify support levels at a later time.

In the instant case, the parties expressly agreed to nonmodifiable support. Specifically, the stipulation provided that, "it is the intent of the parties that the attached order is not modifiable," and further provided that, "this matter shall stand settled, discontinued, and dismissed" against defendant.

Plaintiff bases her constitutional challenge on the interplay between several statutes providing mechanisms for obtaining child support. Child support may be established through one of three categories of support orders: (1) those entered pursuant to a divorce action; (2) those entered pursuant to a paternity action in which paternity has been established (through one of a number of available methods); and (3) those, as here, entered pursuant to a stipulation to dismiss a paternity action before determining paternity.

In the first category, children born or conceived during a marriage are deemed issue of the marriage,⁵ and child support agreements entered in divorce actions always remain modifiable, depending upon changed circumstances. This is made clear through the text of three separate statutory provisions. MCL 552.455(1); MSA 25.222(5)(1) explains the process through which predivorce temporary support orders may be modified; MCL 552.17(1); MSA 25.97(1) explains the process through which support orders entered pursuant to divorce may be modified by motion of the parties; and M.C.L. § 552.517; MSA 25.176(17) provides that postjudgment modifications to support orders may be made pursuant to friend of the court recommendations. These provisions, considered together, allow a circuit court to modify all child support agreements reached pursuant to a divorce action.

In the second category, child support orders remain modifiable where a final paternity determination has been reached by way of a formal paternity action. Such a determination may be made through a variety of methods. In the first of two statutory methods, the Paternity Act, M.C.L. § 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq., allows modification in cases where an order of filiation has entered:

The court has continuing jurisdiction over proceedings brought under this act to increase or decrease the amount fixed by the order of filiation subject to section 7(3) or (4), and to provide for, change, and enforce provisions of the order relating to the custody or support of or parenting time with the child. [MCL 722.720(1); MSA 25.500(1).]

The second statutory category, also found in the Paternity Act, M.C.L. § 722.711 et seq., MSA 25.491 et seq., allows modification in cases where an acknowledgment of paternity has been obtained:

An acknowledgment signed under this act establishes paternity, and the acknowledgment may be the basis for court ordered child support, custody, or parenting time without further adjudication under the paternity act.... The child who is the subject of the acknowledgment shall bear the same relationship to the mother and the man signing as the father as a child born or conceived during a marriage and shall have the identical status, rights, and duties of a child born in lawful wedlock effective from birth. [MCL 722.1004; MSA 25.604.]

Except as otherwise provided by law, a mother and father who sign an acknowledgment that is filed as prescribed in section 5 are consenting to the general, personal jurisdiction of the courts of record of this state regarding the issues of the support, custody, and parenting time of the child. [MCL 722.1010; MSA 25.610.]

It is the third statutory category of establishing child support—through orders entered pursuant to a voluntary stipulation to dismiss a paternity action before determining paternity—that is at issue in the instant case. Only in this statutory category are nonmodifiable support agreements permitted. It is important to note, however, that this third category of child support includes both modifiable and nonmodifiable support agreements. The statute does not require that such orders be nonmodifiable; it merely permits nonmodifiable orders, provided that the court determines that the parties' agreement adequately provides for the child.

III. Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2. This Court has found Michigan's equal protection provision coextensive with...