Crehan v. Davis

Citation713 F.Supp.2d 688
Decision Date18 May 2010
Docket NumberCase No. 1:09-cv-280.
PartiesMatthew Joseph CREHAN, Plaintiff,v.James DAVIS, individually and in his representative capacity as a Police Officer for the City of Norton Shores, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District Michigan)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Matthew J. Crehan, Ojibway, Marenisco, MI, pro se.

Michael S. Bogren, Plunkett Cooney, Kalamazoo, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

Granting in Part and Denying without Prejudice in Part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment:

Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant on the Federal Claim due to Qualified Immunity

Declining Supplemental Jurisdiction over State-Law Claims Dismissing State-Law Claims without Prejudice
Terminating and Closing the Case

PAUL L. MALONEY, Chief Judge.

Matthew Joseph Crehan (Crehan) has asserted a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim against City of Norton Shores, Michigan police officer James Davis (Davis), as well as claims arising under Michigan state law. Davis has moved for summary judgment on the federal claim on the basis of qualified official immunity, and he has moved to dismiss the state-law claims on different grounds. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant summary judgment to Officer Davis on the federal claim due to qualified immunity and will decline supplemental jurisdiction over Crehan's state-law claims.

BACKGROUND

On April 13, 2007, a police patrol car activated its overhead lights while driving behind plaintiff Crehan after Crehan had turned from westbound Norton Street onto northbound Davis Street. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def's MSJ”) Exhibit A (“Ex A”) (Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 1 (“Admission 1”)). After the vehicles turned westbound on Kloap Street, the police car shined a spotlight on Crehan's vehicle. Id. at Admission 2. Then, after the vehicles turned northbound onto Glenside Street, the police car activated its siren. Id. at Admission 3. Crehan acknowledges that he was aware that a police vehicle was behind him at that time with its lights and siren activated while he was driving northbound on Glenside, and that nonetheless he did not pull over and stop the car. Id. at Admissions 4 and 5. Instead, Crehan turned westbound on Summit, while the police car still had its overhead lights and siren activated. Id. at Admission 6.

At the time of the incident, Crehan was driving with a suspended driver's license, he knew that there was an outstanding civil bench warrant for his arrest, and the license plate on the car he was driving (588D32) was not registered to that car. See Def's MSJ Ex A at Admissions 7-9. But Crehan states, without contradiction from Officer Davis, that when Davis employed force against him, Davis did not yet know Crehan's identity and so did not know about the suspended license or the outstanding warrant. See P's Opp. at 4. Crehan also points out, again without contradiction from Officer Davis, that the vehicle he was driving had not been reported lost, missing, or stolen as of April 13, 2007. See P's Opp. at 6.

In any event, Crehan continued driving with knowledge that there was a police car running its overhead lights and blaring its siren behind him, not stopping until he reached his home at 1519 West Summit Road. See Def's MSJ Ex A at Admission 10. According to Crehan, when he stopped in his driveway, he put his vehicle in “park”, shut it off, opened the door, exited the car, and put his hands up in the air. Crehan heard shouts of “get on the ground”, then felt his arm twisted behind his back and his body jammed into the cement driveway, inflicting chest contusions and a broken kneecap. See Def's MSJ Ex A at Admission 11 and Comp ¶¶ 16-18.

Crehan has submitted an affidavit which provides additional allegations “fleshing out” the incident from his perspective. Namely, Crehan attests that “as [he] was getting on the ground, while [already] in the ‘push-up’ position, defendant twisted affiant's arm behind his back, then forcefully slammed his body into the cement driveway.” Notarized Affidavit of Plaintiff Matthew Joseph Crehan executed April 6, 2010 (“P's Aff”) ¶ 5. Significantly, Crehan also attests that Davis “never gave [him] the chance to completely ‘get on the ground’ before he inflicted chest contusions and a broken kneecap on [him]....” P's Aff. ¶ 6.

Crehan was convicted of Fleeing and Eluding-Third Degree in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479a(3). Section 750.479a, which is entitled Failure to Obey Directions of Police or Conservation Officer [and] Other Offenses, provides as follows, in pertinent part:

(1) A driver of a motor vehicle who is given by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren a visual or audible signal, by a police or conservation officer, acting in the lawful performance of his or her duty, directing the driver to bring his or her motor vehicle to a stop[,] shall not willfully fail to obey that direction by increasing the speed of the vehicle, extinguishing the lights of the vehicle, or otherwise attempting to flee or elude the police or conservation officer. This subsection does not apply unless the police or conservation officer giving the signal is in uniform and the officer's vehicle is identified as an official police or department of natural resources vehicle.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), (4) or (5), an individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (3), (4) or (5), an individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of third-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both, if 1 or more of the following circumstances apply:
(a) The violation results in a collision or accident.
(b) A portion of the violation occurred in an area where the speed limit is 35 miles an hour or less, whether that speed limit is posted or imposed as a matter of law.
(c) The individual has a prior conviction for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479a(1)-(3).1 By contrast, Crehan notes, he was not prosecuted, let alone convicted, for resisting arrest or the like. Crehan seems to imply that if he had actually posed a threat to Officer Davis at the time Davis forcefully pushed him down to the ground, he would have been charged with such an offense, not merely fleeing and eluding from continuing to drive the car to his home.

LEGAL STANDARD: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“Summary judgment is proper if the ‘pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.’ Portinga v. Taylor, 2009 WL 910800, *5 (W.D.Mich. Apr. 2, 2009) (Maloney, C.J.) (quoting Patterson v. Hudson Area Schools, 551 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 299, 175 L.Ed.2d 136 (2009)); see also Schreiber v. Philips Display Components Co., 580 F.3d 355, 363 (6th Cir.2009).2Accord Alderman v. JC Dev. Communities, LLC, 2009 WL 2607084, *1 (Mich.App. Aug. 25, 2009) (p.c.) (P.J. Owens, Servitto, Gleicher) (“Summary disposition is proper when, upon examining the pleadings, admissions and other evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (citing Brown v. Brown, 478 Mich. 545, 739 N.W.2d 313, 316 (2007)).

The movant has the burden of proving the absence of genuine issues of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. ARS, 602 F.Supp.2d at 845 (citing Conley, 266 Fed.Appx. at 404 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986))). However, if the moving party seeks summary judgment on an issue for which it does not bear the burden of proof at trial-e.g., if the movant is defending against a claim-“it may meet its burden merely by showing ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the moving party's case.’ Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548) reh'g & reh'g en banc denied (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009). See also Wilson v. Continental Dev. Co., 112 F.Supp.2d 648, 654 (W.D.Mich.1999) (Bell, J.) (movant “need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials ‘negating’ the opponent's claim”; rather, its initial burden is only to “point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case ....”) (citing Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir.1993)) aff'd o.b., No. 99-2113, 234 F.3d 1271, 2000 WL 1679477 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2000). Accord Claspell v. Denso Mfg. Michigan, Inc., 2001 WL 1545864, *2 (Mich.App. Dec. 4, 2001) (p.c.) (P.J. O'Connell, Sawyer, Smolenski) (“That standard is exactly the same as the standard for summary disposition used under Michigan law ....”).

Once the movant has met its burden, the non-movant must present ‘significant probative evidence’ to demonstrate that there is more than ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ ARS, 602 F.Supp.2d at 845 (citing Conley, 266 Fed.Appx. at 404 (quoting Moore, 8 F.3d at 339-40)). The non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings. See Griffin v. Reznick, 609 F.Supp.2d 695, 698 (W.D.Mich.2008) (Maloney, C.J.) (citing inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Transition Healthcare Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-State Health Investors, LLC, 306 Fed.Appx. 273, 278 (6th Cir.2009); acc...

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