Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock Co.
Decision Date | 21 March 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 14001,14001 |
Citation | 592 P.2d 485,181 Mont. 87,36 St.Rep. 541 |
Parties | Kathryn B. CREMER, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Cornelius M. Cremer, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CREMER RODEO LAND AND LIVESTOCK COMPANY and Leo J. Cremer, Jr., Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Hutton & Cromley, Rodney T. Hartman (argued), Billings, for plaintiff and appellant.
William R. Morse (argued), Absarokee, for defendants and respondents.
Plaintiff, as special administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, brought this action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweet Grass County, to impose a constructive trust and to compel defendants to deed certain land located in Sweet Grass County to decedent's estate. A trial by jury began on May 9, 1977, and continued through the following day. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court took the case from the jury and granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff's timely motion for a new trial was denied, and she appeals.
Leo J. Cremer, Sr., and Cornelius (Corny) M. Cremer enjoyed close brotherly and business relationships. Their father, John Cremer, who lived in Wisconsin died in 1936; their mother died five years later. After the death of their mother, another brother, Glynn Cremer, informally distributed what remained of their father's estate. Plaintiff, Corny's surviving spouse, claims that Leo, Sr., received Corny's share of the estate and used it to purchase the land subject of this action and which is described as Township 5 North, Range 15 East, M.P.M., Sec. 34: E1/2.
The October 14, 1944, deed from the previous owner of the land, J. Arvid Carlson, named the "Cremer Rodeo, Land and Livestock Company," a Montana corporation owned by Leo Cremer, Sr., as the grantee; it was executed in Merrick County, Nebraska. Plaintiff claims that Leo, Sr., intended to convey this land to Corny but failed to do so prior to his death in 1953. She also contends the Leo, Sr.'s widow, Bertha, delivered a deed to Corny shortly after Leo, Sr.'s, death but that it was subsequently lost.
Corny, his wife Kathryn, and their family occupied, used, and paid taxes on the land from 1947 until approximately 1974 when Leo Cremer, Jr., raised the question of ownership of the land by attempting to grant an oil and gas lease on it. Corny died in 1975, and plaintiff demanded a deed from the corporation and from Leo, Jr. No deed was provided and this action ensued.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the District Court denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict. After defendants had presented their case and plaintiff had testified as a rebuttal witness, defendants repeated their motion for a directed verdict. It was granted by the District Court at that time.
Plaintiff raises three issues for our determination:
1. Whether the District Court erred in directing a verdict in favor of defendants, entering judgment thereon, and denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
2. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to admit plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 3.
3. Whether the District Court erred in not submitting the issue of adverse possession to the jury.
In taking the case from the jury, the trial judge stated his reasons in chambers and further elaborated on those reasons in open court for the benefit of the jury:
Rule 50(a), M.R.Civ.P., addresses the motion for a directed verdict. The basic rule governing granting a motion for a directed verdict is stated in section 93-5205, R.C.M.1947, now section 25-7-302 MCA:
"Where, upon the trial of an issue by a jury, the case presents only questions of law, the judge may direct the jury to render a verdict in favor of the party entitled thereto."
In Sant v. Baril (1977), Mont., 566 P.2d 48, 51, 34 St.Rep. 520, 524, we noted three basic rules which apply in interpreting section 93-5205, R.C.M.1947, now section 25-7-302 MCA:
The Court then went on to say:
Sant, 566 P.2d at 51, 34 St.Rep. at 525.
Before applying these principles to the instant case, we must look more closely at the trial judge's reasons for directing the verdict. Altogether, he stated four reasons laches, estoppel, the statute of frauds, and the "dead man's statute." His final reason, the operation of the "dead man's statute," would have the effect of greatly limiting the amount of evidence the jury could consider. Whether any of these reasons supports the granting of a motion for a directed verdict is the question to which we now turn.
Montana Power Co. v. Park Electric Co-op. (1962), 140 Mont. 293, 301, 371 P.2d 1, 5. "Laches . . . means negligence in the assertion of a right; . . . and it exists when there has been an unexplained delay of such duration or character as to render enforcement of the asserted right inequitable." Montgomery v. Bank of Dillon (1943), 114 Mont. 395, 408, 136 P.2d 760, 766.
Plaintiff alleges in part that a deed to the land was delivered to her husband but subsequently lost. Apparently the first time the true ownership of the land was questioned was when Leo Cremer, Jr., attempted to grant an oil and gas lease in 1974. Prior to that time, Corny and Kathryn occupied, used, and paid taxes on the land for nearly 30 years. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support the proposition that plaintiff or her husband was aware that defendants claimed ownership of the disputed land prior to 1974. Therefore, we find that plaintiff or her husband was not negligent in the assertion of this right. As a result, laches should not have been considered by the District Court in its decision regarding a directed verdict.
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