Crenshaw v. State
Decision Date | 27 January 1921 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 474 |
Citation | 87 So. 328,205 Ala. 256 |
Parties | CRENSHAW v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Butler County; A.E. Gamble, Judge.
Jake Crenshaw was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Beddow & Oberdorfer and Roderick Beddow, all of Birmingham, for appellant.
J.Q Smith, Atty. Gen., for the State.
This appellant has been adjudged guilty of the murder (first degree) of Mrs. Laura Gafford. She was killed on Sunday, May 16, 1920, some time after 2 p.m., at her residence on a plantation in Butler county. When found late in the afternoon of that date, she had probably been dead several hours. The body bore evidence of brutal mutilation and of blows on the head and face from a heavy, blunt instrument, and a piece of iron, customarily used as a fire poker, was found near the body in the hallway of the dwelling. Her daughters left Mrs Gafford alone at her home, preparing to bathe, when they departed for church shortly after 2 o'clock p.m. The corpus delicti was conclusively proven. Whether this appellant was the guilty agent or a participant in the brutal murder of Mrs. Gafford was, under the whole evidence, a question for the jury to decide. Aside from incriminatory admissions or statements in the nature of confessions attributed to appellant by witnesses for the prosecution--admissions or statements the appellant denied having made and, also, that he had any connection whatsoever with the homicide--the evidence tending to establish his guilt was purely circumstantial. It may be observed at this point that there was no application for a change of venue, nor a motion for new trial.
Cammie Cheatham, a negro girl six or eight years of age, according to the testimony, was called as a witness for the prosecution. On her voir dire the court found her to be a competent witness. This examination is recited by the record as follows:
In passing initially upon the competency of children as witnesses, much must be left to the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and "it is only in strong cases the ruling of the court admitting them as witnesses should be reversed." White v. State, 136 Ala. 58, 66, 34 So. 177, 180; Beason v. State, 72 Ala. 191, 194; Castleberry v. State, 135 Ala. 24, 28, 33 So. 431; McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, 150, 151, 7 So. 35, 16 Am.St.Rep. 25, where a forceful statement of the wisdom and necessity of taking the testimony of children of tender years, competent as witnesses may be found.
The trial judge had the opportunity to observe this child. The examination on her voir dire does not disclose even an error of judgment in the court's conclusion that she was sufficiently intelligent and realized the duty and obligation of an oath to be allowed to testify before the jury. Wade v. State, 50 Ala. 164, 166; Grimes v. State, 105 Ala. 86, 17 So. 184; White v. State, supra; McGuff v. State, supra; Castleberry v. State, supra; Eatman v. State, 139 Ala. 67, 73, 36 So. 16; Williams v. State, 109 Ala. 64, 19 So. 530. There is, of course, a wide distinction between the issue of competency vel non of a child of tender years to be a witness and inquiries relating to the weight and credibility of testimony given by such a witness. A great deal of the argument for error in allowing this child to testify as a witness, including an extended quotation from the opinion in State v. Michae, 37 W.Va. 565, 16 S.E. 803, 19 L.R.A. 605, is only referable to the reliability of the testimony given by this child--an inquiry very different from that involved in the determination by the trial judge of the child's competency to be a witness. The child was permitted to testify that she saw this appellant leave the premises where Mrs. Gafford was killed immediately after she (the child) had called to Mrs. Gafford from the yard fence, a short distance from the house in which, according to the prosecution's theory, Mrs. Gafford had then been murdered. The appellant denied he was on these premises that day. The credit that might have been otherwise accorded this child's identification of appellant was seriously reflected upon by the fact that the child at first said she did not know who the negro man was she saw leaving the premises on the occasion indicated. As stated, this went to her credibility, not to the determination of her competency to be a witness.
The Jefferson county officers (Tyler and Robbins), who arrested the appellant in that county on Thursday morning following the homicide on Sunday, were examined for the prosecution. They testified, in effect, among other things, that appellant, shortly after his arrest, stated in their presence that he did not participate in the assault upon and murder of Mrs. Gafford, but that he saw another unknown (to him) negro chauffeur, whom he called Walter, commit the crime. While not a confession, this matter was in that nature; and it was only admissible after evidence that these statements, attributed to appellant but denied by him, were voluntarily made. Shelton v. State, 144 Ala. 106, 42 So. 30; McGehee v. State, 171 Ala. 19, 55 So. 159. Whether they were, in fact, made by appellant was a controverted issue, to be decided by the jury; and whether, if made at all, they were voluntarily made, was likewise an inquiry for the jury to determine. There was evidence authorizing the trial court to decide prima facie, on the admission of these matters, that the indicated statements were (if made) voluntary on the part of the appellant. These officers were testifying within a month after the day on which they testify this appellant voluntarily made the very damaging statements summarized above, but, while agreeing in the substance of their respective recitals of what appellant said, it is to be regretted that their testimony touching this vitally important feature of the evidence was otherwise affected with such at least apparent inconsistencies as to cast doubt upon the accuracy of the testimony they gave; but this condition did not go to impair the basis for the trial court's conclusion that a proper predicate had been laid for the admission of the incriminatory statements these witnesses attributed to the appellant. What, according to some of the testimony of the officers, took place when the prisoner was required, en route to the jail, to get out of the automobile and was asked questions under menacing circumstances--to induce a further explanation of what "Walter" he had previously referred to--was after the indicated incriminatory admissions were made, and hence did not serve to impeach or to impair the predicate already efficiently laid to admit...
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Jackson v. State, 4 Div. 968
...to testify. Noble v. State, 253 Ala. 519, 45 So.2d 857 (1950); Puckett v. State, 213 Ala. 383, 105 So. 211 (1925); Crenshaw v. State, 205 Ala. 256, 87 So. 328 (1921); Harville v. State, 386 So.2d 776 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Roberson v. State, 384 So.2d 864 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 384 So.2d ......
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Jelks v. State
...if error, was error without injury, because it appears that it had already been admitted to the jury without objection. Crenshaw v. State, 205 Ala. 256, 87 So. 328; Hayes v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 395 So.2d 127, certiorari denied, Ala., 395 So.2d The third error complained of by the appellant ......
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Hayes v. State, 6 Div. 2
...of evidence is not ground for reversal, if the same evidence has already been admitted to the jury without objection. Crenshaw v. State, 205 Ala. 256, 87 So. 328 (1921). And the admission of evidence which is merely cumulative of an admitted fact is error without injury to the accused. Senn......
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Ware v. State
...of evidence is not ground for reversal, if the same evidence has already been admitted to the jury without objection. Crenshaw v. State, 205 Ala. 256, 87 So. 328 (1921); Hayes, Thus, we find in each instance that the complained of exhibits were properly admitted. Strong circumstantial evide......