Crenshaw v. State of Arkansas No 127 Gannaway v. State of Arkansas No 128 20 21, 1913 24, 1913
| Citation | 57 L.Ed. 565,33 S.Ct. 294,227 U.S. 389 |
| Decision Date | 01 April 1909 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 127 and 128,s. 127 and 128 |
| Parties | A. C. CRENSHAW, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF ARKANSAS. NO 127. E. L. GANNAWAY, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF ARKANSAS. NO 128. Argued January 20 and 21, 1913. Decided February, 24, 1913. Mr. John Merrick Moore for plaintiffs in error. : The plaintiffs in error were convicted under a law of the state of Arkansas approved |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. John Merrick Moore for plaintiffs in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 390 intentionally omitted] Mr. William H. Rector, Assistant Attorney General of Arkansas, Mr. Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Messrs. T. M. Mehaffy and Charles C. Reid for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 391 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiffs in error were convicted under a law of the state of Arkansas approved April 1, 1909, undertaking to regulate the sale of lightning rods, steel stove ranges, clocks, pumps, and vehicles in the several counties of the state. The judgment of conviction was affirmed (95 Ark. 464, 130 S. W. 569), and the case is here upon questions arising under the Federal Constitution.
The act provides:
The case was considered upon an agreed statement of facts, of which the following is an abridgment:
The Range Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri, with its principal offices and factory at St. Louis, manufactures ranges which are sold by traveling salesmen in the United States, and, among other places, in the counties of Arkansas. The business is conducted in Union and other counties in Arkansas as follows: R. L. Sutton, an employee of the Range Company, and division superintendent, has general supervision of the company's business in that district, with four other employees, two known as sample men or salesmen and two as delivery men, under his direction. The employees are paid stipulated compensation for their services, and none of them have any financial or monetary interest in the property of the company in Union county, or in the sales or proceeds of sales made by them in that county or elsewhere in Arkansas, other than the compensation above referred to. The salesmen are furnished with a sample range and a wagon and team, and are sent into such territory in Union or other counties of Arkansas as may be designated by Sutton, to solicit orders for ranges. Where orders are taken the purchaser signs a note providing for the payment of the purchase price. The note or order contains a stipulation that it shall be void as against the purchaser in the event the company fails to deliver the range ordered within sixty days from date. All orders so taken are forwarded to Sutton, who investigates the credit of the purchasers, and, if found satisfactory, proceeds to have the orders filled within the sixty days' limit. Deliveries are made through or by the employees of the company known as delivery men, each of whom is furnished with a delivery wagon and team by the company for that purpose. The ranges, wagons, and teams are the property of the company. The sample ranges intrusted to the salesmen by the company are not sold by them. Under no circumstances do the salesmen deliver to the purchasers the ranges for which orders are taken; under no circumstances do the delivery men sell or offer to sell or take orders for ranges, or deliver any ranges other than those for which orders have previously been taken by the salesmen. All ranges ordered and manufactured are shipped in carload lots to Union and other counties, each car containing sixty separate ranges, and being consigned by the company to itself, in care of Sutton, its employee. At the end of each month Sutton settles with the company's employees, salesmen and delivery men, and sends their reports and his own report to the company, together with all notes taken by the salesmen during the month, and all cash in hand over $500, which amount is retained as expense money.
A carload of ranges was thus shipped from St. Louis to Eldorado, Arkansas, for the purpose of filling orders previously secured by the soliciting agents or traveling salesmen. Upon the arrival of the car at El Dorado the ranges were taken therefrom, loaded on delivery wagons, and delivered by the delivery men to purchasers in the precise shape, form, condition, and packages in which they were delivered to the common carrier at St. Louis.
It was agreed that Gannaway was a salesman of the Range Company, and had exhibited sample ranges and solicited and taken orders and secured notes for them, and that Crenshaw acted as a delivery man and delivered ranges to parties in Union county, who had previously given orders to salesmen.
This law is attacked, and the conviction of Crenshaw and Gannaway alleged to be unlawful, because, among other reasons, the law imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce, exclusively within Federal control, and therefore beyond the power of the state to regulate. Under the facts which we have stated and upon which the court below decided the case, we think the law applicable to the present situation is well settled by previous decisions of this court.
The leading case is Robbins v. Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592, in which it was undertaken in the state of Tennessee to impose by statute a license tax upon drummers and persons not having a regular, licensed house of business in the taxing district, offering to sell or selling goods, wares, or merchandise by sample. Robbins was a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, ahd was convicted of having offered for sale articles of merchandise belonging to a firm in Cincinnati, to be shipped into Tennessee, without having secured the license required by statute. In that case, while this court recognized the power of the state to pass inspection laws to secure the due quality and measure of products and commodities, and laws to regulate or restrict the sale of articles deemed injurious to the health or morals, the principle was laid down that 'the negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce,' and it was held beyond the power of the state to impose a license tax upon the privilege of conducting such business. That case has been strictly adhered to in this court since its decision, and it is only necessary to notice a few of the many cases in which it has been applied.
In Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829, an ordinance of the state of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cobb v. Department of Public Works
...728, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1193; Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205, 215, 33 S. Ct. 41, 57 L. Ed. 189, 192; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 33 S. Ct. 294, 57 L. Ed. 565; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U. S. 352, 401, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 1542 48 L. R. A. (......
-
Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood
... ... 2 ... COMMERCE ... State ... is without power to tax interstate commerce, ... U.S. 68, 34 S.Ct. 15, 58 L.Ed. 127, as follows: 'So, if ... the tax is, as we hold ... U.S. 646, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 646, 20 L.Ed. 685. In Texas ... v. White, 74 U.S. 700, ... Crenshaw ... v. Ark., 227 U.S. 389, 33 S.Ct. 294, 57 ... ...
-
Morrison v. Guaranty Mortgage & Trust Co
... ... was doing business within the State of Mississippi, without ... having qualified so ... Hardin, 157 Miss ... 229, 127 So. 777; Houston v. Keith et al., 100 Miss ... J. B. Colt Co., 31 S.W.2d 196; ... 20 C. J. S., sec. 1839; Portland Cattle Loan Co. v ... 430, 62 L.Ed. 963, 11 A.L.R. 611; ... Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389, 33 S.Ct. 294, 57 ... ...
-
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass'n v. Thomas
...U.S. 665, 669–670, 34 S.Ct. 476, 58 L.Ed. 786 (1914) (state law requiring a license for catalog sales); Crenshaw v. Arkansas , 227 U.S. 389, 399–401, 33 S.Ct. 294, 57 L.Ed. 565 (1913) (state law requiring a foreign corporation actively soliciting sales in State to obtain a license); Dozier ......