Crepps v. Indus. Comm'n

• Citation: 402 Ill. 606,85 N.E.2d 5
• Decision Date: 24 March 1949
• Docket Number: No. 30671.,30671.
• Parties: CREPPS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

402 Ill. 606

85 N.E.2d 5

CREPPS

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 30671.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1949.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Harry M. Fisher, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lyell Crepps, claimant, opposed by James H. Martin, alleged employer, to recover compensation for a broken leg. To review a judgment of the circuit court reversing a decision of the Industrial Commission setting aside an award of an arbitrator in favor of the claimant, the alleged employer brings error.

Judgment of circuit court reversed, and order of Industrial Commission confirmed.

Angerstein & Angerstein, of Chicago (Lester A. White and Armand Chiappori, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Francis J. Gariepy, of Chicago (Charles E. Mallon. of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Lyell Crepps, an electrician, while installing some light fixtures in the real-estate office of James H. Martin, fell from a ladder, breaking his right leg. On a claim for compensation he received an award from the arbitrator, which, on review by the commission, was set aside on the ground that the relationship of employer and employee did not exist. The circuit court of Cook County reversed the decision of the commission and entered judgment for compensation in accordance with the award of the arbitrator. A writ of error to review this judgment has been allowed on the petition of Martin. Prior to the taking of evidence before the Industrial Commission it was stipulated that the only questions in dispute were whether the relationship of employer and employee existed at the time of the accident, and whether it arose out of and in the course of the employment.

Plaintiff in error makes the following contentions in this court: (1) The finding of the Industrial Commission that the relationship of employer and employee did not exist was not manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence. (2) Defendant in error, at the time of the accident, was not engaged in the usual course of trade, business, profession or occupation of plaintiff in error.

The question whether the relation of employer and employee existed at the time of the accident is, under the evidence in this case, a controverted question of fact. The existence of such relationship is, in every case, primarily a question of fact, and can only become a question of law where there is no conflict in the evidence and but one conclusion can reasonably be drawn therefrom. Lawrence v. Industrial Com., 391 Ill. 80, 62 N.E.2d 686. It is a well-settled rule that courts may not, on review of an award made by the Industrial Commission, disturb factual determinations of that body unless the decisions be manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Schwartz v. Industrial Com., 379 Ill. 139, 39 N.E.2d 980. And this rule is just as applicable to findings and orders denying compensation as to those which support awards allowing it. Moergen v. Industrial Com., 394 Ill. 383, 68 N.E.2d 740. It is not the province of the courts to try disputed questions of fact and to weigh the evidence thereon and set aside the findings of the Industrial Commission on such issues unless the findings of the commission are manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Murrelle v. Industrial Com., 382 Ill. 128, 46 N.E.2d 1007. The conclusion and determination of the Industrial Commission on a question of fact will not be disturbed unless against the manifest weight of the evidence, regardless of how the court might hold were it to hear the evidence. Wilhelm v. Industrial Com., 399 Ill. 80, 77 N.E.2d 174;Allen-Garcia Co. v. Industrial Com. 334 Ill. 390, 166 N.E. 78. Neither this court nor the lower court may substitute its judgment for that of the commission upon a question of fact, unless the finding of the commission is manifestly against the weight of, and has no substantial foundation in, the evidence. Gudeman Co. v. Industrial Com., 399 Ill. 279, 77 N.E.2d 807.

The question before this court for decision, therefore, is not whether the relation of employer and employee existed between the parties to this suit at the time of the accident, but whether the finding that such relationship did not exist is manifestly against the weight of the evidence or has no substantial foundation in the evidence. The record discloses considerable evidence was heard on the question whether such relationship existed, which necessitates a review of same to determine the propriety of the order of the circuit court reviewing the decision of the commission.

Relevant evidence, which is undisputed, is as follows: James H. Martin was a realestate broker engaged in selling and managing real estate for other persons. His regular employees were seven salesmen and four office assistants or clerks. In January, 1946, he changed the lighting system in his office to electric fluorescent lights. He ordered the new fixtures from John Lambert, who owned and operated an electrical appliance business under the name of Acme Electrical Supply Company. Lambert brought the fixtures to Martin's office, together with an electrician who installed them. After they are installed, Lambert billed Martin for the fixtures and the installation of them. This bill, which was paid by Martin, was in the total amount of $192.71, and included a charge of $35 for labor. Afterward, in May, 1946, Martin told Lambert two of the fixtures were too small, that he wanted them replaced with larger ones and also an additional fixture installed, and wanted the new fixtures to correspond with the other fixtures he had in his office. Monday, May 20, 1946, Lambert took the new fixtures and the defendant in error, Crepps, in his car to Martin's office, where Crepps commenced the work of installing the fixtures. He worked until May 22, which was the day the accident occurred. On May 21, the second day he worked, Martin made a trip to Lambert's office and complained to him about the way defendant in error was doing his work. Defendant in error had not completed the job at the time he was injured and Lambert sent over another electrician, one Sleight, who completed the installation.

Lambert testified that sometimes people who want fixtures want them installed, and in such cases he calls defendant in error or some other electrician for that purpose; that defendant in error is generally in and out of his store and that he has used both him and Sleight on jobs; that when Martin told him he wanted some more fixtures for his office he also asked him if he could send a man over to put them up and that he, Lambert, told him at that time he would not be responsible for the electrician, that the electrician was on his own. He also testified that when Martin came to his store complaining about the way Crepps was doing the work he told him to pull him off the job if he wanted to, that it was up to him, that ‘it had nothing to do with me whatsoever,’ but admitted he might have told Martin he was coming over to see Crepps. He testified that he never employed defendant in error to do any work for him, never paid him any money and never gave him any instructions or directions about the work to be done for Martin; that when witness drove defendant in error to Martin's office he, the witness, had no conversation with Martin, but just brought the fixtures in and that Martin told defendant in error where he wanted them hung; that during the time Crepps was doing the work, witness was there twice to bring him the material he needed for the job and that the next day after the accident Martin phoned the witness and asked him for an electrician to finish the job and witness sent over Sleight.

Defendant in error, Crepps, testified that Lambert told him about selling the fixtures to Martin and asked him if he would put them up; that Lambert said, ‘I got a friend over on Halsted Street, I sold him some fixtures. Will you put them up for him?’ And I replied, ‘Sure, I will;’ that Lambert took him and the fixtures to Martin's office in his car where Lambert introduced him to Martin as the electrician who had come over to put up the fixtures for him; that Lambert then left and Martin told him what h...