Crescent Beach Ass'n v. Town of East Lyme

• Citation: 363 A.2d 1045,170 Conn. 66
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 06 January 1976
• Parties: The CRESCENT BEACH ASSOCIATION v. TOWN OF EAST LYME.

Page 1045

363 A.2d 1045

170 Conn. 66

The CRESCENT BEACH ASSOCIATION v. TOWN OF EAST LYME.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 6, 1976.

Donald O'Brien, New London, for appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas F. McGarry, New London, for appellee (defendant).

Before LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO, BARBER and MacDONALD, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, a specially chartered municipal corporation owning several tracts of land which are located in the defendant town and which consist primarily of the beach area known as Crescent Beach, brought an action in two counts against the town under § 12-119 of the General Statutes, claiming the property to have been wrongfully assessed on the town's grand lists of 1971 and 1972. ¹ Section 12-119 provides for an appeal of this nature to the Court of Common Pleas '(w)hen it is claimed that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town . . . in whose tax list such property was set, or that a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive . . ..' ²

The primary relief sought by the plaintiff was a determination by the court that the taxes levied against the plaintiff on the property in question for each year involved were illegal and void on the ground that '(s)aid premises were owned by plaintiff as a municipal corporation on said date and are and were used for a public purpose on the date of said assessment and during the taxable year and were then exempt and continue to be exempt from taxation in the Town of East Lyme.' The basis of this claim for exemption is § 12-81(4) of the General Statutes, which provides for exemption from taxation of 'property belonging to, or held in trust for, a municipal corporation of this state and used for a public purpose . . ..' It was conceded that the plaintiff is a specially chartered municipal association located in the town of East Lyme and that it owns the land which is the subject of this action. Both the plaintiff and the defendant filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits, stipulating that no question of fact was involved and that the only issue was one of law. The Hon. Joseph E. Klau, state referee, to whom the matter previously had been referred upon motion of the plaintiff for reference, acting as the court, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on April 2, 1974, and thereafter, on April 8, 1974, the plaintiff filed an 'Application for Hearing as to the Judgment.'

The principal issue to be determined is whether the court erred in rendering judgment that the tracts of land described in the complaint were not exempt from property tax for the years 1971, 1972 and 1973 under the provisions of § 12-81(4) as property owned by a municipality and used for a public purpose. 'If the plaintiff's properties are not devoted to a public use, they are not exempt from taxation, even though it is admitted that the plaintiff is a municipal corporation. Devotion to a public use is the ground for such an exemption. Hamden v. New Haven, 91 Conn. 589, 592, 101 A. 11. The phrase in the statute 'used for a public purpose' means a use open to the public, generally, as distinguished from a use available only to a restricted group of privileged individuals. Central Veterans' Ass'n v. Stamford, 140 Conn. 451, 456, 101 A.2d 281. Instead of attempting judicially to define what constitutes a public use as distinguished from a private purpose, courts usually have left each case to be determined upon its own peculiar facts.' Laurel Beach Ass'n v. Milford, 148 Conn. 233, 235-36, 169 A.2d 748, 749.

The 'peculiar facts' of the instant case were presented to the court in the form of affidavits submitted by the parties in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. Those submitted by the plaintiff indicated that no restrictions had been imposed in the use of the beach property by anyone who came upon it, which, on the surface, would appear to indicate an unrestricted use by the unorganized public, and thus use 'for a public purpose.' The deeds accompanying the plaintiff's affidavits, however, contained references to easement rights to the beach granted by the plaintiff's predecessors in title to various individuals who previously had purchased lots within the boundaries of the subject property, as did also the affidavit and deeds submitted by the defendant. The release or quitcliam of these rights to the plaintiff by its immediate predecessor in title cannot affect the claims of prior grantees of such rights, and owners of property within the territorial limits of the plaintiff association have an equitable right to prevent obstruction or interference with their enjoyment of such easements. See Waterbury Trust Co. v. G.L.D. Realty Co., 121 Conn. 50, 54, 182 A. 466, 467, where this court stated: 'The appropriate recourse of the owner of an easement against obstruction of or interference with its use and enjoyment is not to ejectment but to equity.' Although it does not appear that the original grantees of the easements have come forward to assert their rights, they still have recourse to equitable action for interference with such rights if these tracts of land are declared to be devoted to a public use and if a resulting increase of users is claimed to interfere with the...