Crescent Beach Ass'n, In re
| Citation | 224 A.2d 915,126 Vt. 140 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 374-375,s. 374-375 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
| Parties | In re CRESCENT BEACH ASSOCIATION. |
Francis R. Peisch, Burlington, for objecting landowners.
Latham & Eastman, Burlington, for the Association.
Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.
The Association's second application for zoning board permission to operate a private beach was successful. The project involved the purchase of two adjoining beachfront lots in a residential development. The Association proposed to operate a private beach in these lots for the benefit of residents of the neighboring Crescent Woods area who became members of the Association.
The ruling of the zoning board of adjustment was appealed to the county court, where, after hearing, the court made findings and issued an order. The findings determined that the second application contained a number of proposed limitations on use not in the first application. Further, the court found that the zoning board elected to hear the new petition to determine whether or not new or changed circumstances would be shown, and found that the board concluded that new or changed circumstances were shown. The court issued an order modifying but confirming the disposition made by the zoning board of adjustment.
The appellants bring but two questions here. The first question seeks to question the jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeal to hearing the second application without a finding that the second appeal differs from the first or that the circumstances and conditions surrounding the appeal have changed.
In order that there be some finality to administrative determinations it is a requirement that successive applications be different in content or show that a change in circumstances has intervened. 58 Am.Jur., 'Zoning' § 227, p. 1060; 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 314, p. 1097. This requirement is not to be technically and narrowly imposed, but yet enforced to the extent that property interests may be settled and stable, and property owners protected from harassment. Thompson v. Smith, 119 Vt. 488, 508, 129 A.2d 638. But it has been determined in this case that the substantive requirements for a second application have been met. The facts support that finding.
The appellant's position would oust jurisdiction in the board only because of the lack of a specific finding on this point in the board's own proceedings. Although the statute, 24 V.S.A. § 3016, directs the...
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Driscoll v. Gheewalla
...would undoubtedly generate. See Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra; Fisher v. City of Dover, supra; In re Crescent Beach Association, 126 Vt. 140, 224 A.2d 915 (1966). Should the ordinance's prohibition against a rehearing or subsequent application for the period of two years from a......
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Ranney v. Board of Appeals of Nantucket
...v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Glastonbury, supra, 157 Conn. at 111-112, 248 A.2d 922 (relocation of access); In re Crescent Beach Assn., 126 Vt. 140, 141, 224 A.2d 915 (1966) (limitations on proposed It has always been supposed that if an application disclosed a project materially different f......
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In re Dunkin Donuts S.P. Approval
...On the other hand, property owners must enjoy some level of certainty in the zoning and use of nearby land. In re Crescent Beach Ass'n, 126 Vt. 140, 141, 224 A.2d 915, 916 (1966) ("[The successive-application doctrine] is not to be technically and narrowly imposed, but yet enforced to the e......
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Carrier, Application of
...when the applicant is willing to comply with conditions the commission or court is empowered to impose. Cf. In re Crescent Beach Ass'n, 126 Vt. 140, 141, 224 A.2d 915, 916 (1966) (successive applications to operate private beach must be different in content and show changed circumstances); ......