Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. State ex rel. Collins

• Decision Date: 09 March 1920
• Docket Number: 20890
• Citation: 83 So. 680,121 Miss. 615
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: CRESCENT COTTON OIL CO. v. STATE EX REL. COLLINS, ATTORNEY GENERAL

83 So. 680

121 Miss. 615

CRESCENT COTTON OIL CO. v. STATE EX REL. COLLINS, ATTORNEY GENERAL

No. 20890

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 9, 1920

March 1920

1 COMMERCE. Operation of cotton gin as incident to purchase of cotton seed for interstate shipment not interstate commerce.

Where a cotton oil mill operated a gin as an incident of its purchase of cotton seed for shipment to its oil mill in another state and to enable it to purchase the seed more advantageously, in such case the ginning was a separate and distinct transaction from its purchase or shipment and was not interstate commerce and Laws 1914, chapter 162 (Hemingway's Code, sections 4752--4756), prohibiting corporations manufacturing cotton seed oil products from operating cotton gins except in the town where their cotton oil plant is located is not invalid as a burden and interference with interstate commerce.

2. MONOPOLIES. Attempting to destroy competition in cotton ginning by putting down price not unlawful.

An attempt to destroy competition by putting down the price of ginning cotton below its actual cost does not violate subdivisions (M), (N), or (O), of the anti-trust Laws 1908, chapter 119 (Hemingway's Code, section 3283), as to destroying competition in the manufacturing or sale of commodities.

Hon. E. N. THOMAS, Chancellor.

APPEAL from the chancery court of Sunflower county, HON. E. N. THOMAS, Chancellor.

Suit by the state on the relation of Ross A. Collins, Attorney-General, against the Crescent Cotton Oil Company. From a judgment for relator, defendant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Decree affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

A. W. Shands, and J. B. Harris, for appellant.

(1) Conceding for the purpose of this argument, that a state has absolute right to exclude a foreign corporation from its borders or to expel it solely upon the ground that it is a foreign corporation, we assume that it will not be questioned at this day, that a state cannot exclude from its borders or expel therefrom and annex conditions or impose any burden either under guise of taxation, license fees, police regulations or otherwise, a corporation engaged strictly in business of interstate commerce. Pullman Palace Car Company v. Kansas 216 U.S. 68, 54 L. Ed., 386; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519, 10 L.Ed. 274; Pensacola Telegraph Company v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 96 U.S. 1, 24 L.Ed. 708; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 34, 54 L.Ed. 369; McCall v. California, 156 U.S. , 34 L.Ed. 394.

This court, of course, is well aware of the fact that the supreme court of the United State never expressly overrules a case, and its last decision upon any question must be taken as the law regardless of the fact, the decision may be in apparent conflict with some former decision, but it must be remembered, however, that the supreme court of the United States deals with facts presented in the case before it, and what may be apparent conflicts are found not to be such when the facts in the particular case are analyzed and understood. There are, however, four recent decisions by the supreme court of the United States which taken together cover every phase of the branch of the case we are now considering, so complete and exhaustive are the decisions in these cases that we do not feel it necessary to burden the court with the great array of cases in which the questions have been repeatedly considered.

We refer to the following cases: Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, supra; Pullman Palace Car Company v. Kansas, supra; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 215 U.S. , 54 L.Ed. 435, and Harrison v. Railroad Company, 232 U.S. , 58 L.Ed. 621.

In addition to the propositions already set forth the following propositions are established by the cases last cited.

(A) A burden imposed by a state on interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to all of the people of all of the states, including the people of the state enacting the statute. Minn. v. Barber, 136, U.S. 313-319, 34 L.Ed. 455-457; 3rd Inters. Com. Rep. 185; Robins v. Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489-497, 30 L.Ed. 694-697; 1st Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Crew Levick Company v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. , 62 L.Ed. 264.

(B) That a corporation engaged in interstate commerce cannot be deprived of the right to do a local or intrastate business in connection with said commerce as to do so would be to regulate and burden such commerce. The language of the court in the case of the Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, 54 L.Ed. 336, is as follows: "But it is said that none of the authorities cited are pertinent to the present case, because the state expressly disclaims any purpose by the statute in question to obstruct or embarrass interstate commerce, but seeks only to prevent the Telegraph Company from entering the fields or domestic business in Kansas without its consent and without conforming with the requirements of its statute, but the disavowal by the state of any purpose to burden interstate commerce cannot exclude the question as to the fact of such a burden being imposed, or as to the unconstitutionality of the statute as shown by its necessary operation upon interstate commerce. If the statute reasonably interpreted, either directly or by its necessary operation burdens interstate commerce, it must be adjudged to be invalid whatever may have been the purpose for which it was enacted, although the company may do both interstate and local business. This court has repeatedly adjudged that in all such matters the judiciary will not regard mere forms, but will look through the forms to the substances of things, such is an established rule of constitutional construction, as the adjudged cases abundantly show." The court then proceeds to discuss numerous cases bearing on that point.

The court further said at page 363: "To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession of mere corporate facilities as a matter of convenience of carrying on their business cannot have the effect of depriving them of such rights, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some legislation on the subject. The rule on this subject is thus laid down in a note to the Western Union Telegraph Company v. Taggart, 60 Lawyer's Reporter Annotated at page 691.

If the business is actually a part of interstate commerce and assists in any degree in increasing or aiding in carrying on such commerce, it is beyond the power of the state to tax, citing McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 47, 35 L.Ed. 649.

The cases of the Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, Pullman Palace Car Company v. Kansas, and Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Company, have been expressly reaffirmed by the supreme court of the United States in the case of the International Text Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. , 54 L.Ed. 687; Railroad Company v. Conner, 223 U.S. , 56 L.Ed. 438; Looney v. Crain Company, 245 U.S. , 62 L.Ed. 335.

In the case of the International Text Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. , 54 L.Ed. 687, the court said: "It is the established doctrine of this court that a state may not in any form or under any guise directly burden the prosecution of interstate commerce." This language was used in respect to the operation of the statute upon local matters.

Of course, it necessarily follows from the authorities which we have cited above and which are the last utterances of the supreme court of the United States on the subject, if the state could not impose a tax upon a local business carried on in connection with an interstate commerce, and make the payment of the tax or the filing of the statements a condition to the carrying on of the local business, manifestly the legislature could not under any guise or in any way prevent the carrying on of the local business thus related to and necessary to or in aid of the carrying on of interstate commerce.

(C) "That the police powers reserved to the state are such as incidentally affect interstate commerce and as such are established for the protection, safety and convenience of the people, and are not in themselves in any just sense, an obstruction to, or in conflict with the substantial rights of those engaged in interstate commerce, but are referable to the police powers of the state and to be respected until Congress covers the subject by legislation." Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, 54 L.Ed. 365. This view as to the restricted meaning of the police power as reserved to the state is fully supported in the cases of: Chicago v. Sturgis, 222 U.S. 113, 56, L.Ed. 215; Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489, 53 L.Ed. 285; Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U.S. 336, 53 L.E. 1060; Mutual Loan Company v. Martel, 222 U.S. 225, 56 L.Ed. 175; Austin v. Tennessee. Speaking on the subject the court said: Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 120, 32 L.Ed. 345; Salvage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 56 L.Ed. 1182; Stockfood Company v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 56 L.Ed. 1182; Railroad Company v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 52 L.Ed. 230; Express Company v. Commonwealth, 214 U.S. 218, 53 L.Ed. 972; Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 24 L.Ed. 527.

Bearing on the question before this court it is settled that the supreme court of the United States is not concluded by a state's interpretation of its statute in matters involving constitutional protection, but will decide the question for itself. Crew Levick Company v Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 62 L.Ed. 295; St. Louis Railroad Company v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 363, 59 L.Ed. 271, and cases cited; also, ...