Crespin v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 19 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 18-15073 |
| Citation | 46 F.4th 803 |
| Parties | Freddie CRESPIN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Charles L. RYAN ; Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Terry M. Crist III (argued), Kristina Reeves, and Joshua C. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General; J.D. Nielsen, Habeas Unit Chief; Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona; for Respondents-Appellants.
Molly Brizgys (argued), Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman PC, Phoenix, Arizona; Karen S. Smith, Arizona Justice Project, Phoenix, Arizona; for Petitioner-Appellee.
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.
In 1995 Freddie Crespin was charged in Arizona with first-degree murder. The crime was committed when Crespin was sixteen years old, but because the Supreme Court had not yet held that the death penalty could not be imposed on defendants younger than eighteen when the crime occurred, see Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), Crespin faced a possible capital sentence if convicted. To avoid that possibility, he entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). After the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), that the imposition of LWOP for those convicted of a crime committed while under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment under some circumstances, Crespin unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief ("PCR") in Arizona state court. He then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition, and the district court granted a conditional writ. We affirm.
Betty Janecke was murdered in Apache Junction, Arizona in 1995. Crespin was promptly arrested with several others and charged with numerous crimes, including first-degree murder. At the time, Arizona law provided three possible sentences for those convicted of first-degree murder: death, LWOP, or life with the possibility of release. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(A) (1998).1 To avoid the possibility of a death sentence, Crespin pleaded guilty to first-degree murder; the plea agreement required an LWOP sentence. The plea agreement waived Crespin's "right to appeal the judgment and sentence to a higher court."
The state trial judge twice accepted the plea agreement, first in March 1998 and again in September 1998.2 At the September hearing the judge stated that "the sentence that's provided, no matter what testimony is presented on your behalf, and I know [your lawyer] wants your family members to talk to me, once I've accepted the plea agreement, you'll receive a life sentence, which is natural life sentence with no possibility of parole, commutation of sentence, et cetera." The court also emphasized that "there is no sentence to be given other than what's called for in the plea agreement."
The court then nonetheless allowed Crespin's mother to speak. She stated that Crespin was a "wonderful son," an "honor roll student," "never a violent person," and that he would have never committed the murder if he had not been "under the influence of Barry and under the influence of drugs." In response, the court told Ms. Crespin that it had read letters that had been submitted on Crespin's behalf, including one from his school principal, but reiterated that "there is no option on the nature of the sentence." After asking counsel and the probation officer whether the imposition of LWOP was "justified," the Court stated:
The court then confirmed that Crespin understood he could not "file a direct appeal to a higher Court," but noted that Crespin had not given up his "right to file a petition for post-conviction relief."
After the Supreme Court decided Miller , Crespin filed a PCR petition in the Superior Court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, arguing that his LWOP sentence was unconstitutionally imposed. The Superior Court denied the petition. Crespin then filed a discretionary petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16. That court granted review but denied relief in an unpublished memorandum. State v. Crespin , No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0254-PR, 2014 WL 7345697, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014). In relevant part, the court held that the LWOP sentence was constitutional because it was "clear from the record the court not only understood there were multiple sentencing options for first-degree murder, but that it considered those options in the context of Crespin's character, age and the nature of the offense before deciding if it would accept the plea agreement." Id. Because the sentencing court "had the discretion to reject the plea agreement if it deemed the stipulated sentence inappropriate," the Court of Appeals perceived no Miller error. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review.
In 2015, Crespin filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court held that the Miller rule was retroactive. Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). The district court then granted a conditional writ. See Crespin v. Ryan , No. CV-15-00992-PHX-SPL (ESW), 2016 WL 10519137, at *9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2016). This timely appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). Because Crespin's habeas corpus petition was filed after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), we may grant relief only if the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Miller held that sentencing schemes requiring LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide violate the Eighth Amendment. See 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court did not outright "foreclose a sentencer's ability to [impose LWOP on juveniles] in homicide cases," but required that the sentencer be able to "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court characterized this as an "individualized consideration" and stated that "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." Id. at 479–80, 132 S.Ct. 2455.
In making the Miller rule retroactive, Montgomery emphasized that it was not only procedural, but also substantive. See 577 U.S. at 209, 136 S.Ct. 718. Reinforcing the language of Miller , the Court stated that LWOP is inappropriate "for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders." Id. Montgomery stressed that a sentencer must not only "consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence," id. at 209–10, 136 S.Ct. 718, but also the offender's capacity for change, and that LWOP should only be imposed on an offender "whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility," id. at 209, 136 S.Ct. 718, not on "a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity," id. at 208, 136 S.Ct. 718 (cleaned up).
However, Jones v. Mississippi , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1321, 209 L.Ed.2d 390 (2021), while expressly disclaiming that it was overruling either Miller or Montgomery , narrowed the potential sweep of those decisions. The Court explained that under Miller , "an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole, but only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment." Id. at 1311. The Court stressed that Miller "mandated only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing" LWOP and did not require a factual finding that a defendant is permanently incorrigible or an "on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible." Id. (cleaned up). The "key assumption of both Miller and Montgomery ," the Court explained, "was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the defendant's youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant's...
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