Crespin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 10-881 MCA/WDS,Civ. 10-881 MCA/WDS |
| Parties | DENNIS CRESPIN and SHERRY CRESPIN, Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion In Limine To Exclude Opinion Testimony Of Robert B. Dietz [Doc 38]; Defendant's Amended Motion To Bifurcate And Stay [Doc 31]; and Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment Or In the Alternative To Stay Proceedings [Doc 22]. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, the Court denies the Motions.
Plaintiffs, Dennis and Sherry Crespin, have long maintained automobile insurance policies with Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The policyincludes $100,000 per person and $300,000 per incident of underinsured motorist coverage. On August 14, 2008, during the policy period, Mr. Crespin was involved in a car accident with an underinsured driver. Mrs. Crespin reported the accident to Defendant within days of its occurrence. In the months following the accident, Mr. Crespin was treated for a torn rotator cuff, which required surgery. His medical bills and lost wages, as a result of the shoulder surgery, totaled $45,000.
In March 2010, Plaintiffs settled their claims against the other driver for the limits of that driver's policy, $25,000. On March 22, 2010, Plaintiffs provided Defendant with facts regarding the settlement, the underlying claim, the accident report, medical records and bills, and documentation of Mr. Crespin's lost wages. Defendant initiated an investigation on March 29, 2010. Plaintiffs provided another set of medical records on May 11, 2010, and Defendant's agent, Ron DeGeer, then requested "prior records" of Mr. Crespin's previous orthopedic injuries. On July 1, 2010, Plaintiffs submitted documentation from the City of Albuquerque that he had not received medical treatment for any injuries during his years working for the City of Albuquerque.
On July 14, 2010, Defendant offered to settle Plaintiffs' claim for an additional $5,000, above the $5,000 already paid for medical bills and the $25,000 settlement. The settlement offer explained that the figure was based on questions regarding the cause of Mr. Crespin's injury. After this offer, Plaintiffs obtained a letter from Mr. Crespin's surgeon, which stated that the shoulder injury was caused by the car accident, to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Defendant responded on August 31, 2010 byincreasing its offer from an additional $5,000 to an additional $15,000.
Plaintiffs sent Defendant a policy-limits demand on September 1, 2010. Defendant then notified Plaintiffs that it would require that they submit statements under oath and that Mr. Crespin would need to execute blanket medical releases, as well as provide school record releases and documentation from a number of health care providers.
On September 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed this diversity suit for breach of contract, bad faith, violations of the New Mexico Insurance Practices Act, violations of the implied covenant for good faith and fair dealing, and punitive damages. [See Doc 1]
Three motions are currently pending before this Court: Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Opinion Testimony of Robert B. Dietz [Doc 38], Defendant's Amended Motion To Bifurcate and Stay [Doc 31], and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Or in the Alternative to Say Proceedings and Memorandum in Support [Doc 22]. Each motion is addressed in turn.
Rule 702 imposes a special gatekeeping obligation on this Court to ensure that expert testimony is not admitted at trial unless it is both relevant and reliable. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). The relevance of such testimony also must be weighed against "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury" as well as "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needlesspresentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. While the Court is not required to consider any particular set of factors or utilize a particular procedure in making such determinations with respect to expert testimony, the Court must make some kind of determination on the record in order to demonstrate that it has performed its gatekeeping function. See United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000); Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 346 F.3d 987, 991-92 (10th Cir. 2003).
Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to state as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. The first requirement of this rule is that the expert's specialized knowledge must "assist the trier of fact." Id. "Rule 702 thus dictates a common-sense inquiry of whether a juror would be able to understand the evidence without specialized knowledge concerning the subject." United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1338 (10th Cir. 1994). Our Circuit has explained that a qualified expert may testify and provide "brief, crisp answers to the . . . questions" about those "discrete topics"which are "beyond the ken of the average juror." United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1994).
The 2000 amendments to Rule 702 also explicitly state that to be admissible infederal court, expert opinions require not only a reliable methodology but also a sufficient factual basis and a reliable application of the methodology to the facts. See Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 475, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2003). A "sufficient factual basis" under Fed. R. Evid. 702 does not necessarily require the facts or data upon which an expert bases his or her opinion to be independently admissible, so long as they are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Fed. R. Evid. 703.
The rule permitting expert witnesses to consider inadmissible hearsay in forming their opinions does not mean that expert witnesses may simply transmit such inadmissible hearsay to the jury—without any further analysis—under the guise of an expert opinion. See Mejia, 545 F.3d at 197. Rather, the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate that, in order to yield an admissible opinion, expert witnesses must first apply a reliable methodology to the facts or data they have considered. Factors to be considered in assessing the reliability of an expert opinion include, but are not limited to: "(1) whether the opinion has been subjected to testing or is susceptible of such testing; (2) whether the opinion has been subjected to publication and peer review; (3) whether the methodology used has standards controlling its use and known rate of error; (4) whether the theory has been accepted in the scientific community." Truck Ins. Exchange v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). These factors, however, "may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature ofthe issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant moves, in limine, to exclude Plaintiffs' expert, Robert B. Dietz, because it characterizes his expert report is "equivocal and indefinite" and because he did not review Plaintiffs' claim file before preparing his report. [Doc 38 at 3] For these reasons, Defendant contends that Mr. Dietz' opinions are insufficiently reliable to be admissible as expert testimony. [Id. at 5] In addition, Defendant expresses its concern that Mr. Dietz is an attorney who intends to offer opinions that will simply instruct the jury on what result to reach. [Id. at 9-10] In the alternative, Defendant maintains that Mr. Dietz should not be permitted to submit a supplement to his report, but should be limited to the opinions and evaluations expressed in his February 2011 report. [Id. at 11-12] Specifically, Defendant insists that it would be "unfair to allow Mr. Dietz to express his opinions regarding the claims handling and then to 'supplement' his report by attempting to find information and documentation that support his speculative conclusions and conjecture." [Id. at 13]
Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Dietz did not review the claim file because Defendant has refused to produce the entire file and additionally that Mr. Dietz is not an attorney and has no intention of improperly instructing the jury on legal issues. Plaintiffs further argue that Mr. Dietz should be permitted to testify as an expert because he is sufficiently qualified, his methodology is reliable, and his testimony will be helpful to the jury. Defendant responds that the claim file was made available for inspection and thatPlaintiffs failed to retrieve and copy the file.
The Court begins the Rule 702 analysis by considering Mr. Dietz' qualifications. According to Mr. Dietz' curriculum vitae, he worked in the insurance industry between 1987 and 2001, for 25 years. He performed as a large loss adjuster, an attorney/litigation negotiator, a branch claims supervisor, and a liability/auto claims adjuster. He maintains a public adjuster license and an independent adjuster license, in the state of Washington. Between 2000 and 2010, Mr. Dietz...
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