Crevier v. Town of Spencer
| Decision Date | 26 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-40184-FDS. |
| Citation | 600 F.Supp.2d 242 |
| Parties | Anita CREVIER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF SPENCER, Carter Terenzini, and H. Warran Ramsey, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
David E. Ashworth, Worcester, MA, for Plaintiff.
Patricia M. Rapinchuk, Robinson, Donovan, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is an action by a disabled employee alleging failure to accommodate, interference with right to leave, and unlawful retaliation. Plaintiff Anita Crevier suffers from Crohn's disease, a chronic inflammation and ulceration of the lower gastrointestinal tract. She alleges that her former employer, the Town of Spencer, failed to grant her medical leave in accordance with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq., and ultimately discharged her due to her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Massachusetts law.
The complaint contains nine counts and names three defendants: the Town of Spencer, Carter Terenzini, and H. Warran Ramsey. All counts against defendants Terenzini and Ramsey were dismissed in January 2007 for untimely service of process. The Town of Spencer has moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
The facts are described in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Anita Crevier began working for the Town of Spencer Water Department in 1978. She served in a clerical/secretarial position, with duties that included customer service, answering the telephone, typing, preparing water bills, and working on the annual budget.
Crevier was diagnosed with Crohn's disease in 1990.1 She does not dispute that the Town made reasonable accommodations for her illness until 1999. That year, a new Town Administrator, Carter Terenzini, was appointed. In 2000, Warran Ramsey became superintendent of the Water Department.2 Crevier contends that soon thereafter, Terenzini and Ramsey began a pattern of discrimination against her based on her medical condition.
In 2000, Crevier began to be absent from work for substantial periods of time, due primarily to problems related to her disease. From June through September 2000, the Town granted her a medical leave of absence because she required surgery and hospitalization. The Town asserts that she was absent for 30 weeks in 2000. In January 2001, her schedule was reduced to 32 hours per week for budgetary reasons; she was absent for 10 additional weeks that year.3 She used a combination of sick, personal, and vacation time that she had earned over her 22-plus years of employment with the Town to cover all of her absences, at least through 2001. At some point, she requested modification of her work schedule, so that she would only need to work two or three days a week. In May 2001, the Town granted her some scheduling flexibility by allowing her "flextime" to permit her to attend medical appointments.4
Crevier had several conflicts with her supervisors during this period. The Town confronted her in August 2000 about allegations that she was abusing her sick leave by using the time off to earn income from another source.5 Crevier says these allegations were false, and that the Town did not investigate them prior to accusing her of wrongdoing. She was reprimanded in July 2001 for poor job performance related to billing. Crevier contends that "Mary," another employee, was the employee responsible for the problem. She was also reprimanded in September 2001 for using the Water Department fax machine on behalf of a teen support group.
By January 2002, she was running low on accumulated sick, personal, and vacation time.6 She then applied for unpaid absence under FMLA on at least two occasions: January 6 and September 25, 2002.7 She contends that she did not do so sooner because she was told by her supervisors at the Town that she was required to exhaust her paid leave before applying for FMLA leave.8
Her first FMLA request was submitted on January 6, 2002, although she did not submit a physician's certification until February 25. That certification indicated that the duration of the leave was "indefinite"; according to the Town, there was no assurance that she would ever be able to resume her normal duties.9 According to Crevier, the Town denied or ignored her request.
In May 2002, Crevier was transferred from the Water Department to the Developmental Services Department. Her job responsibilities remained primarily clerical, and she maintained the same pay, rank, and hours. The Town contends that the new position was a reasonable accommodation, in that it provided her with more job flexibility; specifically, she was permitted to work evenings to free up time for medical appointments during the day. Crevier, however, disputes the contention that the new position afforded her any additional flexibility and that it was an accommodation.
The Town contends that Crevier never worked a full day at her new position in the Developmental Services Department. According to the Town, she did not attempt to return to work until October 2002, at which point she had medical clearance only to work a two or three days per week.
The Town also contends that there was no one to do her work when she was absent, creating an undue hardship. Crevier, however, asserts that the Town, readily could have, but refused to, let her do certain tasks from home. She also says there were other people in the department capable of covering for her during her absences and that no essential work went unaccomplished.
On September 25, 2002, Crevier again requested FMLA leave, which Terenzini granted.10 On October 3, Terenzini sent Crevier an e-mail, the meaning of which is disputed. The Town contends that it merely confirmed Crevier still had unused paid sick leave; Crevier contends that it also revoked the September 25 FMLA approval as of October 10. According to the Town, Crevier was not eligible for the 12 weeks of FMLA unpaid leave she requested because she had worked only 911.5 hours in the prior 12-month period, less than the 1250 hours that triggers FMLA eligibility.11
In early October 2002, a series of inperson, e-mail, and telephone communications took place between Crevier, Terenzini, and Ramsey about Crevier's attendance at work and her request for FMLA leave.
Crevier contends that on October 16, Terenzini fired her. She was at work that day when she received a telephone call from Terenzini, who was out of the office. He told her to leave the building immediately or he would call the police to escort her out. However, it does not appear that any personnel action paperwork was processed as a direct result of that phone conversation, and that Crevier remained officially on the payroll for at least a few more weeks.
A few days after October 16, Terenzini told Crevier she could receive some specific separation benefits from the Town if she signed a resignation agreement.12 However, when a memorandum of agreement was produced for her signature, the terms were different from those that had been discussed, and included a requirement that Crevier produce a physician's certification that she would be able to return to work full-time by November 25. Crevier refused to sign the agreement, and instead sent a resignation letter to the Town on October 30. She contends that the resignation was involuntary and that she was terminated because of her disability.
The Town disputes that Crevier was fired on October 16 or otherwise. The Town further contends that the October 30 letter from Crevier constituted a voluntary resignation of her employment.
In early November 2002, Crevier sent a letter to the Town in which she amended her October 30 letter and described her separation as "retirement." Although she was a few years short of eligibility for full retirement, she contends that she wrote the letter because she was in dire financial straits and needed the income that an early retirement would provide (resignation would have resulted in a forfeit of all benefits and future income from the Town).
After her separation from the Town, Crevier worked part time as a clown and as a massage therapist. However, a later accident left her with leg and foot injuries that disabled her from working for some period. After treatment for the injuries and further treatment for Crohn's disease, Crevier has been able to return to work full time, needing the cumulative equivalent of approximately one month per year of sick and vacation time.
Crevier filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) in 2003, alleging discrimination and FMLA violations. In March 2005, she withdrew her case from MCAD. She filed the present complaint on October 17, 2005, alleging that the Town (1) violated the ADA, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151 B, and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability (Counts 1, 3, and 8, respectively); (2) violated those statutes by retaliating against her because of her exercise of her rights (Counts 5 and 6); (3) violated the FMLA by failing to grant her leave for which she was eligible, interfering with her FMLA rights, and retaliating against her for attempting to exercise her FMLA rights (Counts 2 and 5); (4) violated her constitutional due process rights (Count 7); and (5) violated Massachusetts common law by wrongfully discharging her (Count 9).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material...
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