Crews v. Crews, (SC 18176) (Conn. 3/16/2010)

• Decision Date: 16 March 2010
• Docket Number: (SC 18176).
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MELINDA CREWS, <I>v.</I> STEPHEN CREWS.

Page 1

MELINDA CREWS,

v.STEPHEN CREWS.

(SC 18176).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 22, 2009.

Officially released March 16, 2010.

Charles D. Ray, with whom was Matthew A. Weiner, for the appellant (plaintiff).

George J. Markley, with whom was Michael A. Meyers, for the appellee(defendant).

Jane K. Grossman,Kevin M. Barry and Jyll L. Lyone, certified legal intern, filed a brief for the Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund et al. as amici curiae.

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, Melinda Crews, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court with regard to certain financial orders included in the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant, Stephen Crews.Crews v. Crews,107 Conn. App. 279, 945 A.2d 502(2008).On appeal to this court, the plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court improperly applied a plenary standard of review to the trial court's conclusion that the antenuptial agreement between the parties was unenforceable.Rather, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court should have applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's judgment.The plaintiff further claims that even if the Appellate Court correctly employed a plenary standard, it improperly applied that standard to the facts of the present case.The defendant responds that the Appellate Court correctly applied plenary review in concluding that the parties' antenuptial agreement was enforceable.We agree with the defendant, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court majority opinion summarized the following relevant facts as found by the trial court: "The parties met at a corporate outing when they both were employed by the General Electric Corporation(General Electric).At the time, the defendant was the divorced father of three children.The plaintiff had not been married previously.The defendant holds a bachelor's degree; the plaintiff has bachelor's and master's degrees.The defendant was then residing in the future marital home, a house that he had purchased from his mother in an arm's-length transaction on December 31, 1986.The plaintiff owned a condominium unit in Bridgeport.At the time, each of the parties had bank accounts, pension plans and investments.

"The parties became engaged in January, 1988, and were married on June 25, 1988.About one year prior to their wedding, the defendant raised the subject of an antenuptial agreement.The defendant believed he had been `burned' in his previous divorce and declared: `No agreement; no wedding!'The plaintiff told the defendant that she was `no fan [of an antenuptial agreement], but agreed with him in concept.'The defendant described the agreement as a precondition to the wedding itself and presented the plaintiff with a draft of the agreement on May 31, 1988.The parties signed the agreement on June 24, 1988, one day before they were married.

"Following their marriage, the parties resided in the marital home and had two children, a daughter born in May, 1989, and a learning disabled son born in May, 1992.Both parties were employed during their marriage, and initially each of them traveled extensively in connection with his or her employment.At the time of [the dissolution] trial, the defendant had been employed by General Electric for thirty-nine years, where he earned an annual base salary of $131,000 and regularly received annual bonuses.His annual net income was $98,540 at the time of dissolution.The [trial] court made no finding that the nature of the defendant's employment changed during the marriage from what it had been prior to the marriage.During the marriage, he also acquired General Electric stock and stock options, some of which was encumbered by margin loans.He also participated in two executive compensation plans in the 1990s.

"The plaintiff was fifty-three [years old] at the time of dissolution [in 2005].From 1981 through 1986, she was a technical writer for General Electric, earning $50,000 per year.She left General Electric to join Practice Media and later the NYNEX Corporation.She worked steadily during the marriage, except for a three month maternity leave she took following the birth of each child.After the birth of the parties' children and an automobile accident, the plaintiff decided that corporate travel was too much for her in addition to her responsibilities at home.In 1993, she formed her own business known as M. Crews & Company, LLC, which she operated out of the marital home until just prior to trial.The value of the plaintiff's business then was about $96,000, and she had an annual net income of $69,056."Id., 282-84.

The plaintiff filed her dissolution action in May, 2004.In her complaint, the plaintiff requested alimony, assignment of the marital home, an equitable division of marital assets and attorney's fees.In response, the defendant filed a cross complaint in which he sought enforcement of the antenuptial agreement, which he claimed established the appropriate financial determinations upon dissolution.The antenuptial agreement precluded the trial court from awarding the plaintiff alimony, a share in the marital home, a portion of the defendant's retirement and investment assets and attorney's fees.

Following a trial in June, 2005, the trial court rendered a judgment of dissolution, but refused to enforce the terms of the antenuptial agreement.The trial court determined that the antenuptial agreement was not governed by the provisions of the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act(act),¹General Statutes § 46b-36a et seq., presumably because the act applies only to antenuptial agreements entered into on or after October 1, 1995;General Statutes § 46b-36a; and the parties had entered into their agreement on June 24, 1988.The trial court concluded, instead, that the antenuptial agreement was governed by the equitable rules established in McHugh v. McHugh,181 Conn. 482, 436 A.2d 8(1980).

The trial court concluded that enforcing the antenuptial agreement would be unjust under McHugh.It determined that a dramatic change in the parties' economic circumstances had occurred between the time that the agreement was executed and the time of the dissolution proceedings, which rendered enforcement of the antenuptial agreement inequitable.The trial court therefore ordered the defendant to make the following payments to the plaintiff: monthly alimony of $1000 until the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage, or August 31, 2010, whichever occurs first; $450,000 to compensate the plaintiff for her contribution to the appreciation in value of the marital home and for her share of the defendant's pension and investment accounts; and $25,000 for her attorney's fees.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court, inter alia, improperly had failed to enforce the antenuptial agreement.Crews v. Crews,supra, 107 Conn. App. 281.The Appellate Court majority, applying a plenary standard of review, concluded that the trial court incorrectly had applied the McHugh factors in determining that the antenuptial agreement was unenforceable and "reverse[d] that portion of the judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff time limited alimony, attorney's fees, a lump sum property settlement and a portion of his pension and investments."Id., 299.In his dissent, Judge Gruendel concluded that the Appellate Court majority should have applied an abuse of discretion standard in its review of the trial court's judgment, and, further, that it should have affirmed that judgment.Id., 317.This certified appeal followed.²Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as necessary.

We begin our analysis with a brief overview of our common law governing antenuptial agreements.In McHugh v. McHugh,supra, 181 Conn. 486, this court explicitly determined that "[a]n antenuptial agreement is a type of contract and must, therefore, comply with ordinary principles of contract law."The court specifically noted that "antenuptial agreements are to be construed according to the principles of construction applicable to contracts generally."Id., 491.³Although general contract principles apply to antenuptial agreements, this court additionally determined that "[t]he validity of an antenuptial contract depends upon the circumstances of the particular case."Id., 485.This court then established the seminal, three-prong test governing the enforceability of antenuptial agreements in this state: "[a]ntenuptial agreements relating to the property of the parties, and more specifically, to the rights of the parties to that property upon the dissolution of the marriage, are generally enforceable where three conditions are satisfied: (1) the contract was validly entered into; (2) its terms do not violate statute or public policy; and (3)the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice."(Emphasis added.)Id., 485-86.

On appeal, in both the Appellate Court and this court, the parties have not challenged the trial court's conclusion pursuant to McHugh that the parties validly entered into the agreement and that the terms of the agreement do not violate state or public policy.SeeCrews v. Crews,supra, 107 Conn. App. 288("[t]he [trial] court further found that the agreement contains no provision that either shocks the conscience or violates public policy and that it was enforceable at the time of its execution").Those two issues, therefore, are not in dispute and the present appeal turns on the third prong of the McHugh test.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court...