Crews v. Hollenbach, 1129
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Citation | 126 Md. App. 609,730 A.2d 742 |
Docket Number | No. 1129,1129 |
Parties | Lee James CREWS v. John HOLLENBACH, Sr., et al. |
Decision Date | 02 June 1999 |
Erik D. Frye, Greenbelt, for appellant.
Robert L. Ferguson, Jr., and Ann D. Ware (Ferguson, Schetelich & Heffernan, P.A., on the brief, for appellee, Excalibur Cable), Baltimore (Peter J. McNamara and McNamara & Fizer, on the brief, for appellees, Hollenbach and Honcho & Sons), Baltimore (Thomas J. Davis and Thomas J. Davis & Associates, on the brief, for appellees, Maryland Cable, et al), Rockville (Norton C. Joerg and McBreen, McBreen & Kopko, on the brief, for appellee, Byers Engineering), Upper Marlboro, for appellees.
Argued before DAVIS, HOLLANDER and THIEME, JJ.
This appeal arises from a gas explosion in Bowie, Maryland on March 23, 1996, which severely injured Lee James Crews, appellant, an employee of Washington Gas Company.1 As a result of the occurrence, appellant filed a twenty-count complaint on August 1, 1997, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, against various defendants, who are appellees here.2 They are: John Hollenbach, Sr.; Honcho & Sons, Inc. ("Honcho"); Excalibur Cable Communications, Inc. ("Excalibur"); Maryland Cable Partners L.P. ("Maryland Cable"); and Byers Engineering Company ("Byers").3
After a motions hearing, the court determined that appellees were entitled to summary judgment, based on the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. From that ruling, appellant timely noted his appeal. Crews has posed one question for our consideration, which we have rephrased slightly:
Did appellant assume the risk of a gas explosion based on his occupation?
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellant is barred from recovery under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, because his injury was a foreseeable risk of his occupation. Therefore, we shall affirm the trial court's order granting appellees' motions for summary judgment.
Maryland Cable retained Excalibur to install cable lines in Bowie, Maryland. Excalibur, in turn, hired Honcho to perform the necessary excavation. Hollenbach was an employee of Honcho. Prior to the excavation, Byers was retained to locate and mark the buried utility lines in the area where the digging was scheduled to occur. See Md.Code (1991 Repl.Vol.), Art. 78, § 28A.4 While Hollenbach was using machinery to dig a hole in the vicinity of 11405 Trillum Lane in Bowie, he struck a natural gas line owned by Washington Gas. Apparently, neither the police nor the fire department was promptly notified about what had happened. Eventually, the fire department was notified of the situation by someone a mile and a half away, who smelled gas. More than two hours after the natural gas line was struck, Washington Gas was also notified of the leak. The incident caused the release of a large volume of natural gas that permeated the ground and necessitated the evacuation of the surrounding neighborhood.
Upon notification of the occurrence, Washington Gas dispatched a crew to the site to dissipate a volatile gas leak. Appellant, a veteran gas man with over twenty years of service, was the foreman of the crew in charge of repairing the leak. Unfortunately, while appellant and his crew were attempting to repair the leak, an explosion occurred, severely injuring appellant.
In his complaint, Crews alleged, inter alia, that Hollenbach negligently "shot" a hole through a natural gas line (Count I); Honcho is responsible for the negligent actions of Hollenbach, its employee (Count III); Excalibur negligently hired, selected, and supervised Honcho (Counts V, VI, and VII); Excalibur had the non-delegable duty to lay cable lines in the vicinity of utility lines (Count VIII); Hollenbach, Honcho, Excalibur, and Maryland Cable are strictly liable for injuries caused by the abnormally dangerous activity of digging around public utilities (Counts X and XVI); Maryland Cable is responsible for the negligent actions of its employee-agent, Honcho (Count XI); Maryland Cable negligently selected and supervised Honcho (Counts XII and XIII); Maryland Cable had the non-delegable duty to lay cable lines in the vicinity of utility lines (Count XIV); Byers failed to use due care in marking the utility lines in the vicinity where the digging occurred (Count XVII); and the combined negligence of Hollenbach, Honcho, Excalibur, Maryland Cable, and Byers led to appellant's injuries (Count XIX). Additionally, Byers filed cross-claims against Hollenbach, Honcho, Excalibur, and Maryland Cable; Hollenbach and Honcho filed cross-claims against Byers; and Excalibur filed a cross-claim against Byers. We turn to explore in more detail the events that culminated in appellant's suit.
On November 3, 1997, Excalibur filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that appellant's claims were barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. Maryland Cable moved for summary judgment on December 19, 1997, adopting Excalibur's legal argument. The court denied Excalibur's motion to dismiss on December 17, 1997, although the order was not docketed until February 6, 1998.
Thereafter, on April 21, 1998, appellant was deposed. He acknowledged that there was a pronounced smell of gas in the area when he arrived at the scene. The following colloquy between Maryland Cable's counsel and appellant is pertinent:
And we understand that.
It's a chance you have to—that we go through. Then again, [sic] there's the other exception to the rule, too.
(Emphasis added).
On April 23, 1998, Excalibur filed a "Supplemental Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment." Attached to its motion was a partial transcript of appellant's deposition, which it contended demonstrated that Crews "accepted the risk of fire and explosion as part of his job." A motions hearing was held on April 24, 1998.5 At the hearing, appellant's counsel suggested that the case concerned the issue of primary assumption of risk, in relation to "whether the policemen and firefighter's rule applies to this case." Crews's attorney explained:
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