Crews v. Horn

• Decision Date: 04 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 99-9008.,99-9008.
• Citation: 360 F.3d 146
• Parties: Paul D. CREWS, Appellant v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Phillip Johnson, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; Joseph Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview; Pennsylvania Attorney General.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

360 F.3d 146

Paul D. CREWS, Appellant v.Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Phillip Johnson, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; Joseph Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview; Pennsylvania Attorney General.

No. 99-9008.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on February 27, 2003.

Opinion filed March 4, 2004.

David W. Wycoff(Argued), Matthew C. Lawry, Anne L. Saunders, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit, Philadelphia, for Appellant.

Daniel Stern(Argued), Assistant District Attorney of Perry County, Harrisburg, for Appellees.

Before: ALITO, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

PetitionerPaul David Crews, who faces a death sentence for a double-murder, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.Crews concedes that the petition is a mixed petition (i.e., it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims), so that the District Court lacks the power to grant relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).However, he argues that, instead of dismissing the petition without prejudice, the District Court should hold it in abeyance while he attempts to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state court.He contends that dismissing the petition without prejudice has created the possibility that he will be time-barred under AEDPA from returning to federal court after his attempt to exhaust his unexhausted claims, even though his initial habeas petition was timely under AEDPA.We agree with Crews and will reverse the District Court's dismissal of the petition and remand it to the District Court.

I.Facts and Procedural History

The following facts, which are not in dispute, are drawn from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Crews,536 Pa. 508, 640 A.2d 395(1994).

On September 13, 1990, two hikers, Geoffrey Hood and Molly LaRue, were killed at an overnight shelter on the Appalachian Trail in Perry County, Pennsylvania.LaRue was bound, raped, and stabbed.She died approximately fifteen minutes after receiving a knife wound to the neck.Hood, her boyfriend, died five to eight minutes after being shot three times with a revolver.A week after the killings, Crews was arrested.

At trial, witnesses testified that two days before the murders, Crews visited a library in East Berlin, Pennsylvania, seeking a map of the Appalachian Trail.Closer to the trail, Crews asked other hikers for directions to the trail.Other witnesses observed him heading south on the trail after the killings, wearing gear that belonged to the victims.When arrested, Crews possessed numerous personal articles that belonged to the victims.The police also found in Crews' possession, a handgun, which a ballistics expert testified was the handgun that killed Hood, and a knife with blood on it.The blood on the knife matched LaRue's blood type.Other witnesses identified objects found at the murder scene and along the trail south of the murder scene as belonging to, or resembling property owned by, Crews.

FBI DNA expert Dr. Deadman testified that Crews' DNA patterns matched the DNA patterns of semen samples obtained from LaRue's vagina in three of four genetic loci.He did not testify as to the statistical probability that such a match could occur by chance.Crews' expert, Dr. Acton, criticized any conclusion reached without a statement of the probability that the match occurred by chance.The jury found Crews guilty on two counts of first degree murder, and the trial proceeded to the capital sentencing phase.

During the capital sentencing phase, a physician for the prosecution testified that LaRue's hands had been tied before she was killed.Crews presented evidence that he had no prior convictions.He also presented his employer, who testified about Crews' work experience and drinking habits.Finally, he presented a psychiatrist, who testified that Crews had a schizoid personality and suffered from an organic aggressive syndrome aggravated on the day of the killings by alcohol and cocaine.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the potential aggravating circumstances pertaining to Hood's murder were that the killing occurred during the perpetration of a robbery, there was a grave risk of death to another, and Crews was convicted of another murder.In the LaRue murder, the aggravating circumstances submitted to the jury were that the killing occurred during the perpetration of a rape, the killing was committed by torture, and Crews was convicted of another murder.The mitigating circumstances submitted to the jury regarding both killings were that Crews did not have any prior convictions, he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, his capacity to appreciate or conform his conduct was substantially impaired, he acted under extreme duress, and any other mitigating evidence concerning petitioner's character and record or the circumstances of his offense that the jury considered relevant.

The jury found two aggravating circumstances in the Hood murder (grave risk of death to another and conviction of another murder) and all three aggravating circumstances in the LaRue murder.In both murders, the jury found that aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating ones and returned verdicts of death.The court immediately sentenced petitioner to two consecutive death sentences.

Following his conviction and sentence, Crews appealed.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on April 21, 1994.Crews,640 A.2d at 395.Crews' motion for reargument was denied on May 31, 1994, and he did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

On January 13, 1997, Crews filed his first petition for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9541, et seq.The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the petition, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on August 20, 1998.Commonwealth v. Crews,552 Pa. 659, 717 A.2d 487(1998).Crews did not seek reargument in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

On September 2, 1998, Crews filed a document entitled "Motion for a Stay of Execution and Request for Appointment of Counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 2251,21 U.S.C. § 848(q), and McFarland v. Scott and request for in Forma Pauperis Status" in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.On September 24, 1998, the District Court granted Crews in forma pauperis status, appointed counsel, denied Crews' motion for a stay of execution based on the Commonwealth's representation that a death warrant would not issue, and ordered Crews to file a habeas petition by March 15, 1999.In compliance with this order, Crews filed a habeas petition on March 15, 1999.On November 17, 1999, the District Court determined that the habeas petition was a mixed petition, dismissed it without prejudice to allow exhaustion, and denied a Certificate of Appealability.Crews appealed the dismissal, and we granted a Certificate of Appealability on April 25, 2002.

On February 18, 1999, while his habeas corpus petition was pending before the District Court, Crews filed a second PCRA petition in the Court of Common Pleas, raising the unexhausted claims.On August 28, 2002, the Court of Common Pleas granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the second PCRA petition as untimely.That ruling is currently on appeal.

II.Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction over this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,2253.We exercise plenary review over statute of limitations issues.SeeNara v. Frank,264 F.3d 310, 314(3d Cir.2001).Whether a district court has the power to stay a habeas petition is a question of law, and thus review is plenary.SeeUnited States v. Higgins,967 F.2d 841, 844(3d Cir.1992).While we have not addressed the standard of review for a district court's decision to dismiss a mixed petition rather than to grant a stay, as we discuss below, we now adopt an abuse of discretion standard.However, for the reasons we state below, in view of the time limitations imposed by the AEDPA, where outright dismissal "could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack,"a district court would abuse that discretion if it were not to offer to the petitioner the opportunity of staying, rather than dismissing, the petition.SeeZarvela v. Artuz,254 F.3d 374, 382(2d Cir.), cert. denied,534 U.S. 1015, 122 S.Ct. 506, 151 L.Ed.2d 415(2001).

III.Discussion

AEDPA requires a state prisoner to file a petition for federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the occurrence of several events, the only event relevant to this appeal being "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).The purpose of this requirement is to further the interest in finality of state court judgments by ensuring rapid federal review of constitutional challenges.SeeWoodford v. Garceau,538 U.S. 202, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363(2003);Duncan v. Walker,533 U.S. 167, 179, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251(2001).Since Crews' conviction became final prior to April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA, he had a one-year grace period, until April 23, 1997, to file his habeas corpus petitions.SeeNara v. Frank,264 F.3d 310, 315(3d Cir.2001).

Under AEDPA's statutory tolling provision, the limitations period is tolled for "the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending...."28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).It is undisputed...