Crews v. Tahsin Indus. Corp. USA
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CV 5:18-078 |
| Parties | PAUL CREWS, Plaintiff, v. TAHSIN INDUSTRIAL CORP. USA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Before the Court are two motions: Defendant Tahsin Industrial Corp. USA's Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 42; and Plaintiff Paul Crews's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 44. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an October 16, 2016 incident when Plaintiff was injured after falling from a tree stand (the "Stand") while hunting with his 14-year-old son. See Dkt. No. 42-2 ¶¶ 1, 2; Dkt. No. 63-4 ¶¶ 1, 2. On October 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed the present action against several entities allegedly involved in the manufacture and design of the Stand. See Dkt. No. 1. The parties later jointly moved to dismiss all defendants except for Defendant Tahsin, stipulating that Defendant Tahsin was the sole manufacturer of the Stand and its component parts. See Dkt. No. 37. This Court granted the parties' motion, and now only Defendant Tahsin remains. See Dkt. No. 38.
When fully constructed, the Stand (also known as a "ladder stand") is a fifteen-foot ladder connected to a two-person seat; it can be mounted to a tree to hunt from an elevated position. See Dkt. No. 42-2 ¶¶ 4, 5; Dkt. No. 63-4 ¶¶ 4, 5; Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 40. Plaintiff says he purchased the Stand in August or September of 2015 from a Walmart Store in Waycross, Georgia. Dkt. No. 42-4 at 16. The Stand came in a sealed cardboard box that appeared to be in its original state from the manufacturer. Id. at 17.
Plaintiff first installed the Stand before the 2015 hunting season on private property that belonged to an acquaintance. See id. at 20. The product included a manual with written warnings and instructions, which Plaintiff reviewed entirely. Id. at 17-18, 20. Plaintiff testified that he had no problems assembling the Stand and estimated that he hunted in the Stand about two dozen times from September to late December 2015, after which he took the Stand down, accounted for all of its parts, and stored it in his barn. Id. at 20-21.
In late September or early October of 2016, Plaintiff retrieved the Stand from his barn and installed it on a different tree on the same property. See id. at 22, 27; Dkt. No. 63-1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff described his installation process as "put[ting] the brace that goes from the ladder to the tree, ratchet[ing] it," and then "go[ing] up the tree to do the top ratchet to secure it." Id. at 24. Plaintiff confirmed that the strap connecting the support bar to the tree and the strap connecting the top of the Stand to the tree were the only straps he used to install the Stand. See id. at 26. After installing the Stand in 2016, Plaintiff left it attached to the tree until he used it on the day of the accident. See id. at 27.
On October 16, 2016, Plaintiff and his son returned to the Stand to hunt. See id. Before ascending the ladder, Plaintiff inspected the Stand to ensure it was stable and the ratchet straps were secured. See Dkt. No. 42-4 at 28. Plaintiff testified that aside from a "little surface rust," the Stand was structurally sound. See id. at 27. Following his inspection, Plaintiff climbed the ladder to the seating platform. Id. at 28. Plaintiff testified that when he climbed up, the Stand "never squeaked" and "felt stable." Id. His son then climbed up and sat down beside him. Id. Plaintiff handed his son a rifle, and as his son was putting the rifle down, the Stand suddenly collapsed, and they both fell to the ground. Id. at 27, 28, 30. Plaintiff allegesthe Stand collapsed because the legs on the ladder broke or bent, which caused the ratchet strap at the top of the Stand to break. Id. at 24, 27, 29; Dkt. No. 63-4 ¶ 2. Plaintiff's son was largely uninjured by the fall, but Plaintiff landed in a seated position, severely injuring his back. See Dkt. No. 42-4 at 29; Dkt. No. 42-13 at 7.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff contends the Stand was not intended to collapse or break at weights less than 500 pounds—a weight limit that Plaintiff and his son did not meet or exceed on the day of the accident. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 49, 54; see also Dkt. No. 42-4 at 27, 28 (). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that the Stand was "not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended" and Defendant is strictly liable to Plaintiff under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11, a Georgia state law concerning product liability. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 57-58.1 Plaintiff also appears to assert claims for failure to warn and breach of warranty. See id. ¶¶ 52-55; Dkt. No. 63 at 23.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 11, 2019. See Dkt. No. 42. In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish either that the Stand wasdefective or that any such defect proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. See Dkt. No. 42-3 at 1. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's action is barred by the doctrines of misuse and assumption of risk. See id. at 16-20.
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on October 12, 2019. See Dkt. No. 44. In his Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor on fifteen separate issues that mostly address Defendant's claimed defenses. See Dkt. No. 44-1; Dkt. No. 11.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment "shall" be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" where the evidence would allow "a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Factual disputes that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" are insufficient to survive summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp.v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant must show the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in one of two ways. First, the nonmovant "may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which was 'overlooked or ignored' by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Second, the nonmovant "may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1117. Where the nonmovant attempts to carry this burden with nothing more "than a repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for the [movant is] not only proper but required." Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
DISCUSSION
Under Georgia law, a plaintiff claiming a product defect under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 must establish three fundamental elements: "(1) the defendant was the manufacturer of the product; (2) the product, when sold, was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and (3) the product's defective condition proximately caused plaintiff[']s injury." Brazil v. Janssen Rsch. Dev. LLC, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (citing Chicago Hardware & Furniture Co. v. Letterman, 510 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)). In setting forth the last two elements, a plaintiff need not "specify precisely the nature of the defect," but he must at least show that the product "did not operate as intended" and such operational failure "was the proximate cause of his injuries." Williams v. Am. Med. Sys., 548 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
The parties do not dispute the first element: Defendant was the manufacturer of the Stand at issue in this case. See Dkt. No. 37 at 1. However, the parties do dispute the last two elements: that the Stand had a defect and that the defect proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. As explained below, Plaintiff is unable to provide sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on either of these two elements.
In his initial pleading, Plaintiff does not identify any particular defect that caused the Stand to collapse; he simply alleges that the Stand was defective because it collapsed under aweight of less than 300 pounds, which was less than the product's listed 500-pound weight capacity. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 51-55. Defendant argues in its Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff has not provided evidence other than speculation and conjecture as to a defect. See Dkt. No. 42-3 at 10-11. Although product defects can sometimes "be inferred from circumstantial evidence," including the product's failure itself, see, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. King, 244 S.E.2d 905, 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978), these cases tend to be those where "the product failure destroys evidence so that it is impossible . . . to determine if the product had a manufacturing defect." Justice v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:07-CV-928, 2012 WL 2513495, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2012)...
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