Cribbs v. State
| Decision Date | 09 May 1889 |
| Parties | CRIBBS v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from city court of Montgomery; THOMAS M. ARRINGTON, Judge.
The defendant in this case, Wesley Cribbs, was indicted for the murder of Jack Thomas "by striking or cutting him with a knife," was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 19 years. On the trial, as appears from the bill of exceptions, it was shown that the killing occurred in January, 1888, about sunrise in the morning, on a plantation on which the parties were employed and resided; that the deceased was sharpening an axe when the defendant passed through the yard, and spoke to him, saying, in substance: "You must stop telling those lies on me, or these will be trouble; and if you acknowledge now that you said that I stole Mr. Peck's eggs, I'll whip you, or you will have to whip me,"-to which the deceased replied: The defendant then went on towards the overseer, who was standing some 20 or 30 yards beyond, and, being sent back for something, the altercation between him and the deceased was resumed, and ended in the fatal difficulty. As they approached each other the deceased picked up a brick, while the defendant had a stick in his hand; but he threw down the stick, and drew his knife, and the deceased then picked up the stick, and used it in the fight, striking the defendant several blows, while the defendant cut him several times with the knife. They fought until separated, and the deceased died about three hours afterwards from the wounds he had received. The knife "was a spring-back knife, having a blade between two and three inches long." The state offered to prove that "on the night before the difficulty the defendant had said that if the deceased acknowledged he had said that defendant stole Mr. Peck's eggs there would be trouble between them, and that he would kill the deceased," but the witness further testified "that the defendant, before said conversation was ended, on being advised not to have a difficulty, retracted said threats." The defendant thereupon moved to exclude said threats as evidence, and excepted to the overruling of his motion. A witness for the state testified, also, "that several months prior to the difficulty, in speaking to the defendant about a difficulty he [witness] had with the deceased, defendant said 'that he had better not cross his path, or he would kill him."' To the admission of this evidence the defendant objected, and duly excepted to the court overruling his objection. The evidence also further showed that the defendant and the deceased had been thrown together every day for several months, and were friendly, and had never had a previous difficulty.
On this evidence the court, among others, gave the following charges to the jury, the defendant duly excepting to each First. "Malice, in law, does not necessarily mean hatred or ill will, but the intentional doing of an unlawful act." Second. "Before the jury can acquit the defendant on the ground of self-defense, three essential elements must concur: (1) the defendant must be reasonably without fault in bringing on the difficulty, and must not be disregardful of the consequences in this respect of any wrongful words or act; (2) there must have existed at the time, either really or so apparently as to lead a reasonable mind to the belief that it actually existed, a present, impending, imperious necessity to strike, in order to save his life, or to save himself from great bodily harm and (3) there must have been no other reasonable mode of escape by retreat, or by avoiding the combat with safety." (The third charge asserted the doctrine of self-defense in almost the same words, and the fourth and fifth charges defined murder in the first degree.) Sixth. ...
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...be defined, in legal phrase, as the killing of a human being, without legal justification, excuse or extenuation." (Cribbs v. State (1889) 86 Ala. 613, 616, 6 So. 109, 110.)6 "Malice aforethought ... the grand criterion which now distinguishes murder from other killing ... is not so properl......
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