Crichton v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 1911 |
| Citation | 81 A. 36,115 Md. 423 |
| Parties | CRICHTON v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Charles County; Fillmore Beall, Judge.
Macpherson Crichton was charged in justice court with a violation of the motor vehicles law, and sued out a writ of certiorari from the circuit court. From a judgment quashing the writ of certiorari, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
L Allison Wilmer, for appellant.
Walter D. Eiseman, and Isaac Lobe Straus, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, PATTISON, and URNER JJ.
This is an appeal from the action of the lower court in quashing a writ of certiorari previously issued by its order at the instance of the appellant. The writ was directed to Henry G Robertson, a justice of the peace for Charles county, who had issued three warrants against the appellant under which he had been apprehended and taken before said justice. Two of the warrants were intended to charge violations of section 140b of article 56 of the Code, title "Licenses," subtitle "Motor Vehicles," as amended by chapter 207, Acts 1910, and the third was for an alleged violation of section 140c of that article, as so amended. The appellant through his attorney demanded a trial by jury, which was denied by the justice, on the ground that justices of the peace had summary jurisdiction to try such cases, and the accused only had the right of trial by jury on appeal from the judgment of the justice in case of conviction. He gave bail for his appearance before the justice on September 14, 1910, for which time the cases were set for trial, but on September 13th the writ of certiorari was ordered and issued.
The grounds relied on by the appellant in this court are that the said justice of the peace was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the cases upon the three warrants for the following reasons, as set out in his brief:
1. Before proceeding with the discussion of those reasons, it is proper to say that the motion of the state's attorney for Charles county to dismiss the petition for the writ of certiorari on the ground that there had been no final adjudication of the matters depending before the justice of the peace was properly denied. "Ordinarily, where the writ will lie at all, it should be applied for and be issued before the proceedings have culminated in a judgment, for the chief object of the writ is to stay the exercise of authority by the inferior tribunal until its jurisdiction in the premises can be determined by the superior court," although it will also lie after judgment and even after judgment executed under some circumstances. 2 Poe on Pl. & Pr. § 725. 2. It may also be well to remark before considering the particular grounds relied on by the appellant that in the brief filed on his behalf it is said: "It is undisputed, upon the authority of leading Maryland cases, to go no further, that the Legislature may constitutionally 'confer summary jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace to try and convict a party for an offense' of a certain 'minor character"'--citing State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572; Kane v. State, 70 Md. 546, 17 A. 557; Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 42 A. 965; Lancaster v. State, 90 Md. 211, 44 A. 1039; State v. Ward, 95 Md. 118, 51 A. 848. As those decisions and others which might be cited conclusively establish the power of the Legislature of this state to confer jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to hear and determine cases similar to these, especially when the right of appeal is given to courts where jury trials can be had, as is done by this statute, and as that power is not denied, it will be unnecessary for us to further discuss the constitutionality of such a law.
3. The real question in this connection, which was urged by the appellant, is whether the act of 1910 limited him to an appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace, if against him, or whether he was not entitled to at once demand a jury trial under the provisions of section 12 of article 52 of the Code, as amended by Acts 1906, c. 475. The language of that section, as amended, is undoubtedly very broad, and, if it stood alone, would have given the appellant the right to at once demand a jury trial, without first having a trial before the justice of the peace. But it must not be forgotten that that section expressly excepts from its operation the justices of the peace in the city of Baltimore and in four of the counties of the state, while the act of 1910 is intended to be, and is, applicable to the whole state. The latter in terms includes Baltimore city, providing that, if any one is taken in custody for violation of any of the provisions of the subtitle of the act in that city, he shall be taken "before the nearest police justice," and then authorizing an appeal to the criminal court of Baltimore in case of conviction. It would seem to be clear that the Legislature did not intend by the act of 1910 that any one arrested in Baltimore city, or in either of the four counties excepted from the operation of section 12 of article 52, should be required to be tried before a justice of the peace, but that any one arrested in any of the other counties could at once demand a jury trial, and thereby avoid a trial before the justice. If it had so intended, it would have been much simpler to have provided that any person arrested in Baltimore city, or in either of the four counties, should be tried as therein provided, and that any one arrested in one of the counties to which section 12 of article 52 is applicable should be tried in accordance with the provisions of that section.
But, in addition to that, section 140p of the act of 1910 provides that, "in case any person shall be taken into custody because of a violation of any of the provisions of this subtitle, he shall forthwith be taken in the counties of this state before the nearest justice of the peace, committing magistrate or police justice, or, if in Baltimore city, before the nearest police justice, and be entitled to an immediate hearing"; and then, after providing for bail in case such hearing cannot then be had, the section continues: "In all complaints of the violation of any of the provisions of this subtitle the justice of the peace, committing magistrate or police justice before whom the alleged offender is taken as aforesaid shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such complaint and impose the fine or sentence herein provided; but any person so convicted of any offense under this subtitle shall have the right to appeal from the judgment of such justice of the peace, committing magistrate or police justice to the criminal court of Baltimore, if convicted in Baltimore city, or court of criminal jurisdiction of any county in which he may be so convicted, and such court on such appeal shall hear the case de novo." That section only gives the person convicted the right of appeal, while section 12 of article 52 gives either party such right, and also the right to demand a jury trial. There are other provisions which we might refer to, but those already mentioned, together with section 2 of this act of 1910, which says, "That all acts and parts of acts and laws and parts of laws inconsistent herewith or contrary hereto, be and the same are hereby repealed to the extent of such inconsistency," seem to us to show conclusively that it was intended by the Legislature that the provisions of section 140p should be applicable to the entire state, and a person accused of violating the provisions of that act has no right to demand a jury trial, excepting upon appeal from the judgment of the justice. It is difficult to see how the Legislature could have been more explicit in declaring its intention, unless, perhaps, it had said in so many words that section 12 of article 52 should not be deemed applicable to prosecutions for violations of these provisions, which would not only have been unusual, but, as it seems to us, useless. The act of 1910 is the latest expression of the Legislature on the subject, and it is manifest that it intended to embody the entire statutory law on the subject of motor vehicles in that act.
When it devoted a section, which covers a page of the printed volume of the laws passed at that session, to the arrest, bail, trial, and appeal of violators of its provisions, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended what we think is sufficiently expressed--that the procedure for the violation of these provisions should be in accordance with what it there specially enacted, and not under a statute which was not in force in Baltimore and four counties. The appellant was therefore not entitled to the writ of certiorari by reason of the refusal of the justice to grant his demand for a jury trial.
4. We will next consider the third and fourth reasons given by the appellant, quoted above. It is contended that the warrants do not sufficiently describe the offenses intended to be charged, but if it be conceded that they are not very accurately charged, or even not...
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