Crigler v. Chemonics Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 August 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:17-cv-491-J-34MCR
• Parties: LAUREN CRIGLER, Petitioner, v. CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and ALLIED WORLD NATIONAL ASSURANCE COMPANY/BROADSPIRE, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

LAUREN CRIGLER, Petitioner, v. CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC. andALLIED WORLD NATIONAL ASSURANCE COMPANY/BROADSPIRE, Respondents.

Case No. 3:17-cv-491-J-34MCR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

August 16, 2018

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, filed on November 6, 2017. See Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 21; Petitioner's Motion) and Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 23; Respondents' Motion). On June 5, 2017, Petitioner Lauren Crigler filed the Response (Doc. 26; Petitioner's Response), and on December 9, 2017, Respondents Chemonics International, Inc. ("Chemonics") and Allied World National Assurance Company/Broadspire¹ ("Allied," and collectively, "Respondents") filed Respondents' Response in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 28; Respondents' Response). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Background²

In June 2013, Chemonics hired Petitioner to work as a Health Systems Senior Technical Advisor in Rwanda. See Order Granting Motion for Summary Decision/Compensation Order (Doc. 1-1; Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order) at 2. During that employment, Petitioner strained her back and suffered physical and psychological injuries, which she believed to have related to her employment. Id. at 3. After an exchange of e-mails with Petitioner, Chemonics' Benefits and Compensation Manager advised Petitioner to file a claim under the Longshore and Harbors Workers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et. seq., as extended by the Defense Base Act ("DBA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et. seq. (collectively, the "Act"), with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP"), United States Department of Labor. See Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order at 3.

Petitioner filed her claim under the Act on July 10, 2014. Id. In the claim, Petitioner "identified November 3, 2013, as the date of injury, and May 1, 2014, as the date her pay was stopped." Id. (citing Petitioner's claim for benefits ("Form LS-203")). As a result of her injuries, Petitioner sought compensation and medical benefits.

On November 21, 2014, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Paul C. Johnson granted Petitioner's motion for summary judgment on her claim. See generally Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order at 7. Specifically, ALJ Johnson determined that Petitioner was entitled to compensation and benefits, and ordered Respondents to pay Petitioner "compensation for temporary total disability at the maximum compensation rate, commencing on May 1,2014[,] and continuing, together with interest on the unpaid compensation at the legal rate," and to "furnish to [Petitioner] all medical, surgical, and other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches, and apparatus, for such period as the nature of [Petitioner]'s injury or the process of her recovery may require." Id. Further, ALJ Johnson ordered the District Director to "make all computations necessary to effect [its] Order." Id. Neither party appealed the Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order.³

On June 26, 2015, District Director Kristina K. Hall ordered Respondents to show cause why they failed to provide Petitioner medical care for her work related injuries and why a declaration of default should not have been made. See Order to Show Cause (Doc. 1-2). The parties dispute whether Respondents responded to the Order to Show Cause, and neither has submitted evidence in support of its position. See Application to Enforce an Order (Doc. 1; Application) ¶10; Respondents Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Petitioner's Application to Enforce an Order (Doc. 20; Answer) ¶10. Nevertheless, the record reflects that Counsel for Petitioner repeatedly submitted medical bills to Respondents for reimbursement. See Application ¶11. In response to one such request, on October 6, 2015, Counsel for Respondents asked for clarification regarding which bills Petitioner paid, and requested that Petitioner execute two medical releases in order to permit her psychiatrist to release her medical report. See October 6, 2015 Letter (Doc. 1-3).

On November 4, 2015, Petitioner requested that ALJ Johnson issue a supplemental order enforcing the Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order. See Petitioner's Motion at 4. ALJ Johnsondenied Petitioner's request because he lacked enforcement power. Id. As such, on January 13, 2016, Petitioner initiated Case No. 1:16-cv-26-CCE-JLW in the Middle District of North Carolina (the "N.C. Action") seeking to enforce the Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order. See Complaint (Doc. 23-3; N.C. Complaint). However, the court dismissed the N.C. Action without prejudice on the grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Nov. 21, 2014 SJ Order because it was not a final order. See Order and Judgment (Doc. 23-4; N.C. Order).

On January 28, 2016, a claims examiner held an informal conference to address Petitioner's request that Respondents reimburse her for medical expenses and provide authorization for a medical examination at Johns Hopkins medical center. See Memorandum of Informal Conference (Doc. 28-1; Feb. 5, 2016 MIC) at 1. Prior to giving such authorization, Respondents wanted Petitioner to obtain a second medical opinion. Id. On February 5, 2016, in an informal memorandum, the claims examiner advised Petitioner to continue submitting her bills to Respondents for reimbursement and noted that Respondents had the right to require Petitioner to obtain a second medical opinion before authorizing her to go to Johns Hopkins. Id. at 2.

The claims examiner held another informal conference on November 7, 2016. See Memorandum of Informal Conference (Doc. 1-4; Nov. 15, 2016 MIC) at 1. At that conference, Petitioner sought reimbursement for all of her out of pocket expenses, including the cost of travel to her health care providers and the cost of prescriptions she paid in the absence of a prescription card from Respondents. Id. at 2. Petitioner subsequently presented a chart detailing her bills, how much she paid, how much is outstanding, and her travel expenses. See id., Ex. A: Lauren Crigler Medical Expenses(Exhibit A).⁴ In response to Petitioner's request for reimbursement, Respondents contended that some of Petitioner's bills appeared unrelated to her work injury or had already been paid, and that Petitioner should be using the prescription card provided. See Nov. 15, 2016 MIC at 2. Respondents also requested additional time to resolve the matter. Id. In the Nov. 15, 2016 MIC, the claims examiner summarized the parties' positions and stated that all of the bills listed in Exhibit A "seem[ed] legitimate and appear[ed] to be related to medical care for the work related injury." Id. Accordingly, the claims examiner recommended that

1. The employer/carrier pay the bills listed in Exhibit A as per the Claimant's request.

2. The employer/carrier work to expedite payment of all bills that are not in question that they have the proper receipts to support the request for payment such as bills for travel expenses.

3. The employer/carrier should report back on the status of unpaid bills to the District Office within the next sixty days as requested.

Id. at 3.

On December 29, 2016, Petitioner's Counsel wrote a letter to the claims examiner advising that Respondents failed to make any payments. See December 29, 2016 Letter (Doc. 23-2). In that letter, Petitioner requested an assessment of a 20% penalty as well as attorneys' fees. Id.

On January 12, 2017, in accordance with the Nov. 15, 2016 MIC, Respondents filed their status report. See January 12, 2017 Status Report (Doc. 28-2; Status Report). In it, Respondents noted that a review of Petitioner's medical records demonstrated that some of the expenses listed in Exhibit A were unrelated to Petitioner's work injury andsome had already been paid. Id. at 2-4. They also questioned whether Petitioner received all of the treatments described. Id. Respondents acknowledged that they were responsible for $13,354.35 of the expenses, but asserted that because they were entitled to a credit due to an inadvertent double payment, and they only owed Petitioner $8,711.86. Id. at 4. Chemonics issued a check in that amount on April 27, 2017. See Check E-Mail (Doc. 28-3) at 3.

On the same day, Petitioner initiated this action by filing the Application. See generally Application. Petitioner seeks: (1) entry of an order enforcing the Nov. 14, 2014 SJ Order pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(d) (Count I); (2) entry of an order directing Respondents "to pay all past due bills for pain management, mileage and other medical treatment granted in the Order" (Count II); and (3) an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928 (Count III). Id. at 3. In Petitioner's Motion, Petitioner contends that she is entitled to entry of summary judgment in her favor because: (1) the claims examiner calculated the amount due in the Nov. 15, 2016 MIC, (2) the Nov. 15, 2016 MIC was made in accordance with the law, and (3) Respondents failed to comply with its terms. See generally Petitioner's Motion. Conversely, Respondents seek entry of summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the Nov. 15 2016 MIC was not a final compensation order which the Court would have jurisdiction to enforce. See generally Respondents' Motion; Respondents' Response.

II. Standard of Review

Although the parties seek entry of summary judgment under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the thrust of their dispute is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are ordinarily reviewed under Rule 12(b)(1). Thus, the Court will review the cross-motions under Rule 12(b)(1) despite the parties' failure to cite the appropriate rule. See Warner v. Contract Claims Servs., Inc., No. 7:17-CV-17-FL, 2017 WL 5075250, at **1-2, 4 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 3, 2017) (dismissing an LHWCA enforcement...