Crim v. Dietrich
Decision Date | 02 April 2020 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 124318 |
Citation | 444 Ill.Dec. 630,164 N.E.3d 1205,2020 IL 124318 |
Parties | Collin CRIM, a Minor, BY His Parents and Next Friends, Kristopher CRIM and Teri Crim, Appellees, v. Gina DIETRICH, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
¶ 1 In this appeal, the circuit court of Adams County certified the following question for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 308 (eff. July 1, 2017)): "Whether the ruling of the appellate court, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, 409 Ill.Dec. 221, 67 N.E.3d 433, reversing the judgment and remanding this case for a new trial requires a trial de novo on all claims." The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative. 2018 IL App (4th) 170864-U, 2018 WL 5084728. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018). We also granted motions by the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendant and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA) to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 3 Because our resolution of this appeal concerns a narrow certified question, we summarize here only those facts pertinent to our disposition. The underlying litigation is more fully set forth in the appellate court's initial opinion, Crim v. Dietrich , 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, 409 Ill.Dec. 221, 67 N.E.3d 433 ( Crim I ).
¶ 4 In August 2015, plaintiffs, Kristopher Crim and Teri Crim, acting on behalf of their biological son, Collin Crim (born June 17, 2005), filed a fourth amended medical malpractice claim against defendant, Gina Dietrich, D.O., alleging two claims: (1) Defendant failed to obtain Teri's informed consent to perform a natural birth despite possible risks associated with Collin's large size, and (2) defendant negligently delivered Collin, causing him injuries. The allegations supporting the informed consent claim are found in subparagraphs (a) thru (j) of plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint, while subparagraphs (k) and (l ) concern the allegations related to professional negligence during the delivery of the child.
¶ 5 As to the informed consent claim, plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that prior to birth, defendant failed to diagnose Collin with fetal macrosomia because she failed to recognize the significance of Teri's fundal heights, failed to assess the fetal weight, and failed to order an ultrasound prior to inducing labor. As a result, plaintiffs claim that defendant failed to inform Teri of the risks and benefits of vaginal birth as opposed to Caesarean section, failed to inform her of the high risk of shoulder dystocia and brachial plexus injury in the event of a vaginal birth, and failed to offer Teri the option of delivering Collin by Caesarean section, given Collin's large size.
¶ 6 The negligence claim, under subparagraphs (k)-(l ), alleged negligent professional conduct during the birth of Collin. During Collin's June 17, 2005, natural delivery, Collin suffered shoulder dystocia, which is an obstructed labor whereby, after the delivery of the head, one or both shoulders of an infant cannot pass or requires significant manipulation. As a result, Collin suffered a broken clavicle and extensive nerve damage in his right shoulder, arm, and hand.
¶ 7 In September 2015, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Following the presentation of the plaintiffs' case, defendant moved for a partial directed verdict on the issue of informed consent, arguing that the appellate court's decision in St. Gemme v. Tomlin , 118 Ill. App. 3d 766, 74 Ill.Dec. 264, 455 N.E.2d 294 (4th Dist.1983), requires plaintiffs to present expert testimony that a reasonable patient would have pursued a different form of treatment. Defendant argued that plaintiffs failed to proffer an expert to satisfy St. Gemme 's holding. The circuit court agreed, granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of informed consent. Thereafter, following additional evidence and argument, the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor and against plaintiffs on their remaining claim of professional negligence.
¶ 8 After the circuit court entered the judgment on the jury's verdict, the plaintiffs did not file any post-trial motions. Instead, on October 15, 2015, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 9 Relevant to the appeal before this court, plaintiffs argued in Crim I that the circuit court erred by granting a directed verdict on the issue of informed consent. In the introductory paragraph of their opening brief, plaintiffs framed their appeal as a review only on whether the circuit court erred in issuing a directed verdict on the informed consent claim, expressly stating:
¶ 10 Plaintiffs asserted that expert testimony was not required to show what a reasonable patient would have done. Instead, plaintiffs contended that they sufficiently presented a claim on informed consent by offering Teri's testimony that she would have had a Caesarean section, had she known about Collin's size and the risks associated with the natural birth of a macrosomic baby. Consistent with their introductory paragraph, plaintiffs presented no argument in either their opening brief or reply brief addressing the jury's verdict regarding professional negligence. Rather, plaintiffs asked the appellate court to "reverse each and every decision and order entered in the trial court which were further steps in the procedural progression of enforcing or otherwise remaining consistent with the Court's Order granting the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict."
¶ 11 On November 7, 2016, the appellate court issued its opinion in Crim I , reversing the circuit's court's judgment and remanding the case to the circuit court. 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, ¶ 51, 409 Ill.Dec. 221, 67 N.E.3d 433. The appellate court limited its decision to an analysis of the partial directed verdict on the issue of informed consent, stating it need not address the subsequent proceedings following the directed verdict "because it is not pertinent to the resolution of this case." Id. ¶ 29. The appellate court's mandate stated, "the order on appeal from the circuit court be REVERSED and the cause be remanded to the Circuit Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit Adams County, for such other proceedings as required by order of this court."
¶ 12 Upon remand, the parties disagreed on what issues and facts could be retried. Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the presentation of any evidence relating to plaintiffs' negligent delivery claim, thereby requesting the new trial be conducted solely on the issue of informed consent. Defendant argued that the appellate court's opinion addressed only the informed consent claim and, therefore, the only issue and facts that should be retried are those related to plaintiffs' informed consent claim. Defendant further noted that plaintiffs forfeited their right to have a new trial on their professional negligence claim because they failed to file a post-trial motion as required by section 2-1202 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 2016).1 Therefore, according to defendant, the circuit court was barred from relitigating the jury's verdict.
¶ 13 In response, plaintiffs claimed that a new trial on all issues was necessary because the appellate court issued a general mandate and the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment in its entirety and did not limit the issues the new trial could address. In regard to defendant's claim of forfeiture, plaintiffs asserted they preserved all issues for review by including in their notice of appeal and appellate brief a general request for a new trial. Plaintiffs additionally argued for the first time that they were not required to file a post-trial motion challenging a directed verdict, given the directed verdict changed the "tenor" of the remaining trial, thus making a new trial on all issues appropriate.
¶ 14 Following a hearing on defendant's motion in limine , the circuit court denied the motion but invited the parties to propose a certified question pursuant to Rule 308. The circuit court certified the following question for immediate appeal: "Whether the ruling of the Appellate Court, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, 409 Ill.Dec. 221, 67 N.E.3d 433, reversing the judgment and remanding this case for a new trial requires a trial de novo on all claims."
¶ 15 The appellate court granted defendant's application for an interlocutory appeal and answered the certified question in the affirmative. 2018 IL App (4th) 170864-U, ¶ 54 ( Crim II ). Defendant filed her notice of appeal to this court, which we granted.
¶ 17 Based on the language of the certified question at issue, plaintiffs initially argue that defendant's appeal to this court is an impermissible attempt at relitigating the merits of Crim I by requesting this court to go beyond the specific question and determine whether a new trial de novo is proper. Plaintiffs argue that our review of the certified question should be limited to only the question certified by the circuit court, which, according to plaintiffs, asks the appellate court to provide "guidance as to the meaning of its ruling in Crim I ." In other words, plaintiffs consider the certified question to be a request for the appellate court to interpret its prior decision in order to clarify for ...
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