Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Remson

• Decision Date: 23 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 121,121
• Citation: 282 Md. 168,384 A.2d 58
• Parties: CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD v. Betty Allen REMSON et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 168

282 Md. 168

384 A.2d 58

CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD v. Betty Allen REMSON et al.

No. 121.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 23, 1978.

Gilbert H. Robinette, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Darlene G. Perry, Riverdale (Camus & Perry and Edward P. Camus, Riverdale, on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

This case calls upon us to construe certain provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 26A, §§ 1-17 (the Act) ¹ and to ascertain the law relating thereto. We have determined:

(1) The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the Board) shall determine as a matter of fact that the act serving as the basis of a claim has been committed in Maryland and would constitute a crime as defined by Art. 27 of the Maryland Code or at common law, and, where material, shall determine as a matter of fact the persons criminally responsible for such crime.

(a) Criminal prosecution is not necessary for an award.

(b) The results of any criminal prosecution had are not conclusive as to the commission of a crime or as to the criminal

responsibility therefor, but may be of probative value.

(2) Consanguinity is relationship by blood.

(3) Affinity is relationship by marriage. It is the connection between one spouse and the blood relatives of the other spouse.

(a) An affine of one spouse is not related to an affine of the other spouse.

(4) The degree of relationship of consanguinity or affinity is to be reckoned by the civil law method.

(a) In the reckoning with respect to affinity, husband and wife are deemed to be one person. The lateral, bridging step between them is not counted as a degree.

(5) When two or more persons are criminally responsible for the crime on which the claim is based, and the relationship between any one of such persons and the claimant is such that the claimant is ineligible for an award under the Act, an award is prohibited.

Enacted by Acts 1968, ch. 455, the declared legislative policy and intent of the Act was to enable innocent victims of crime to receive compensation through government financial assistance. § 1. See Gossard v. Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd., 279 Md. 309, 310, 368 A.2d 443 (1977); Frazier v. Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 119, 277 A.2d 57 (1971). See generally, Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 495-496, 331 A.2d 55 (1975). See also Note, Criminal Victim Compensation in Maryland, 30 Md.L.Rev. 266 (1970); L. Lamborn, The Methods of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, Univ. of Ill.L.Forum 655 (1971).

Among those persons who are eligible for awards under the Act are "(a) surviving spouse or child of a victim of a crime who died as a direct result of such crime . . . ." ² § 5(a)(2). The provisions of the Act primarily involved here are those prescribed by § 5(b), as explicated by § 2(d)(1), pertaining to exceptions to eligibility for an award. Section 5(b) reads:

"A person who is criminally responsible for the crime upon which a claim is based or an accomplice of such person or a member of the family of such persons shall not be eligible to receive an award with respect to such claim."

Section 2(d)(1) defines " 'family' when used with reference to a person" to mean

"any person related to such person within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity . . . ." ³

I

Richard Elmer Remson, Sr. and Betty Allen Remson were husband and wife. Five children were born of their marriage. Mr. Remson died on 10 March 1974, leaving surviving his spouse and the five children, each of whom was a minor and dependent on him. The cause of his death was felonious homicide. Frederick Eugene McCutchan, Sr., Frederick Eugene McCutchan, Jr. and Alan Tracy McLaughlin were prosecuted for the murder of Remson. In the criminal cause, only McCutchan, Sr. and McCutchan, Jr. were found to be criminally responsible for Remson's death. A jury found McCutchan, Sr. guilty of manslaughter and not guilty of murder in the first degree and in the second degree. McCutchan, Jr. pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Maryland Rule 724 (now Rule 731 e). He was convicted of that offense by the court upon acceptance of the plea. A nolle prosequi was entered as to the two degrees of murder. Rule 711 (now Rule 782 a and b). McLaughlin was acquitted of all charges. Each of McCutchan, Sr. and McCutchan, Jr. and McLaughlin, however, were found to be civilly responsible for Remson's death. In a law action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County an award of damages was returned by a jury against all three of them in favor of Remson's surviving spouse and the five children. ⁴

The deceased victim was the brother of Mary McCutchan. Mary McCutchan was the wife of McCutchan, Sr., and McCutchan, Jr. was their son. See APPENDIX IV. McLaughlin was not related to any of the other persons.

About the middle of April 1974, Mrs. Remson filed a death benefits claim with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the Board). § 6. The claim was accepted by the Board and assigned to a Commissioner, § 8(a), for investigation, § 8(b). The Board obtained from the Prince George's County Police Department a report of the Department's investigation of the death of Mr. Remson. The report, under date of 15 March 1974, gave the status of the investigation as "CLOSED: 3 Adult Arrests." The Commissioner reviewing the claim filed his report. § 8(d), (e) and (f). He made "FINDINGS OF FACT":

"Claimant's husband was beat to death during a family altercation in Prince George's County by his brother-in-law and nephew."

He gave his "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW":

"We find after reviewing the file, the evidence submitted and after due deliberation that the claimant is ineligible to receive an award from this Board. This type of crime is specifically excluded by Sections 2(d)(3) and 5(6)(b) of Article 26A of the Annotated Code of Maryland. These sections exclude members of a family, up to the third degree of affinity and consanguinity, of those who are responsible for the crime from becoming eligible to receive an award under the statute. ⁵

He denied the claim:

"WHEREFORE, it is ordered this 25th day of June 1974 that the herein claim be disallowed."

Mrs. Remson made application for consideration of the decision by the full Board. § 9(a). She called to the Board's attention that McLaughlin, the third person charged with Mr. Remson's murder, was "in no way related to the Remsons either by consanguinity or affinity." By letter dated 12 November 1974, Mrs. Remson's attorney informed the Board of the results of the prosecution of McCutchan, Sr., McCutchan, Jr. and McLaughlin.

The Board reviewed the record and affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. § 9(b). The report of the final decision of the Board was undated but was transmitted to Mrs. Remson's attorney by letter of 23 January 1975. § 9(c). It set out verbatim the findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order as contained in the Commissioner's report of 25 June 1974. The Board report continued:

"Claimant upon reconsideration alleges that a third party was also charged with the homicide of the claimant's husband and that he was in no way related to the family. This third party has recently been tried and found not guilty of all charges pertaining to the incident.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE LAW

"The Board concludes that upon the facts of this case, the conclusions of the Commissioner below cannot be characterized as clearly erroneous. Accordingly for reasons sufficiently stated in his opinion the decision below will be affirmed."

By letter dated 6 October 1975 Mrs. Remson's attorney "formally" requested the Board to reverse its conclusions of law as set out in its decision of June 25, 1974. The basis of the request was the Memorandum Opinion of Liss, J. in the case of Alimo v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of Maryland, Superior Court of Baltimore City, 1973/824/138213, "wherein he strikes down this affinity clause for a 'brother-in-law' assailant." "Our facts," the attorney alleged, "involved a brother-in-law and appears to be on 'all fours' with this decision." In reply, the Board stated that the Alimo case was currently on appeal to the Court of Appeals. "Accordingly, your request for reconsideration is premature at this time. We suggest you diary your file ahead and contact us after the decision is rendered by the Court of Appeals." On 16 September 1976, upon inquiry by the attorney of the status of the Alimo appeal, the Board informed him that the appeal had been dismissed by the Board as not timely filed, so that the Court "never had a chance to rule on the family issue." The Board declared that its position was "that its original findings of 25 June 1974 remain the same." The report of the "Reconsideration of the Full Board Decision" read:

"On October 6, 1975 the claimant requested this Board to reconsider its Decision denying an award to the claimant in the above-captioned case.

It is hereby ordered this 22nd day of September, 1976 that the Board's decision of June 25, 1974 be re-affirmed by this Full Board."

On 21 October 1976 Mrs. Remson and the children filed a "Petition for Judicial Review of Decision of Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of Maryland" in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol., 1977 Cum.Supp.) Art. 26A, § 10; Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.) Art. 41, § 255. ⁶ The case was submitted to the court on stipulated facts, in substance as we have set them out above. The court, leaning "heavily" on the opinion of the nisi prius court in the Alimo case, held that the exception contained in § 5(b) as amplified by § 2(d)(1) was not applicable either to the wife or the children. The court said:

"Affinity is generally defined as a relationship by marriage between a husband and his wife's blood relatives or between a wife and her...