Crippen v. Fletcher

• Decision Date: 15 April 1885
• Citation: 23 N.W. 56,56 Mich. 386
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: CRIPPEN v. FLETCHER.

23 N.W. 56

56 Mich. 386

CRIPPEN v. FLETCHER.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 15, 1885

Error to Kent.

G.A. Wolf and T.J. O'Brien, for plaintiff.

Geo. P Wanty, for defendant.

CAMPBELL J.

Plaintiff sued Jacobson in assumpsit, and established a claim against him on four demands: one of $75, belonging to himself as original owner, and three derived by assignment; one of $50 from Charles W. Grenlick, and two of $50 each from Louis Hammerschlag. All of these were for money lent on the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth of May, 1884. The demands of Grenlick and Hammerschlag were absolutely assigned to plaintiff, but he holds them for their ultimate benefit. Suit being brought against Jacobson, defendant Fletcher was garnished, and is found to have had possession of Jacobson's stock in trade under a chattel mortgage dated May 9, 1884, for $5,000, given to secure three previously existing notes not yet matured. This mortgage was purposely kept from record until May 15, 1884, when Fletcher filed it and took possession of the property, which was sold before the disclosure, and on the day after service of writ of garnishment. The court below found that Fletcher's mortgage was void as against debts created during the interval between its making and filing, and held Fletcher liable to that extent for the goods and their proceeds. Fletcher brings error, and the record contains several assignments. No exceptions were taken, and none but those depending on faults in the record can be regarded. The only two which are claimed to have such a basis are the alleged insufficiency of the finding to support the judgment and the premature trial of the garnishee suit. The trial was had October 11, 1884, upon the same day on which judgment was rendered against Jacobson.

The statute provides that if the principal defendant shall not within two days after judgment, serve upon the garnishee notice of motion for a new trial, or of his intention to remove the case to the supreme court, the issue against the garnishee shall stand for trial at the same term. It is now claimed that a previous trial would be void. It is questionable whether this notice was not meant to be given to the plaintiff; but the statute, as printed, provides as stated. It is of no consequence who is to receive it. The only question now is whether it affects the jurisdiction to proceed earlier where no one objects? It is clear enough that the garnishee defendant could not be compelled to go to trial within the two days; and further, that, if appellate proceedings should be had by the principal debtor, the garnishee judgment, if rendered, could be stayed by the circuit court until the other was disposed of. But there seems to be no reason why the garnishee defendant may not consent to have the issue as to him tried at any time, and in the present case it is found expressly that both parties came into court ready for trial, and no objection was made below at all. It cannot now be insisted the trial was improperly brought on.

The garnishee also claims that the plaintiff could not unite the various claims, and so bring them within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. One of the assignors--Hammerschlag--had a cause of action beyond the sum necessary to give jurisdiction. But the statute in regard to the rights of assignors of legal causes of action is express that any non-negotiable cause of action may be assigned so as to convey all the rights of the assignor. Section 7344. It is held that this covers every cause of action which would...