Cripps v. State

• Decision Date: 20 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 43477.,43477.
• Citation: 137 P.3d 1187
• Parties: Michael W. CRIPPS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

137 P.3d 1187

Michael W. CRIPPS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 43477.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

July 20, 2006.

Affirmed.

Matthew J. Stermitz, Elko, for Appellant.

George Chanos, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard W. Sears, District Attorney, and Kevin R. Briggs, Deputy District Attorney, White Pine County, for Respondent.

Before the Court En Banc.

OPINION

HARDESTY, J.

In this appeal, we revisit our decision in Standley v. Warden, addressing judicial participation in plea negotiations.¹ Because of the potential coercive effect of such participation, we overrule Standley and adopt new standards governing the district courts' participation in the plea negotiation process. We conclude that these new standards shall apply prospectively only to all future criminal cases to be commenced in the courts below. Applying the holding in Standley to the facts before us, we affirm the judgment of conviction at issue in this appeal.

FACTS

In June 2003, appellant Michael W. Cripps was charged with one felony count of failing to pay over $18,000 in court-ordered support for his two minor children. On the first day of the scheduled jury trial, Cripps agreed to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to recommend that Cripps be sentenced for a gross misdemeanor provided that he sought treatment for his depression, regularly took his medication, and obtained employment. After a thorough canvass, the district court accepted Cripps' plea and stayed imposition of the sentence so that he could obtain employment and mental health counseling.

Cripps failed to satisfy the conditions of the plea agreement. Subsequently, he filed a proper person presentence motion seeking: (1) to withdraw his-plea; (2) the appointment of new counsel or, alternatively, self-representation; and (3) the disqualification of Judge Pavlikowski. In the motion, Cripps alleged that Judge Pavlikowski coerced his plea of nolo contendere in a four-hour, off-the-record "secret meeting." Cripps alleged that the judge told him that he had reviewed the evidence and that, if Cripps went to trial, he would surely be convicted and go to prison. Also, Cripps alleged that the judge recommended that he plead guilty, explaining that Cripps would receive probation, avoid a felony conviction, and get to see his children again.

The State opposed the motion, disputing Cripps' account of Judge Pavlikowski's involvement in the plea negotiations. After hearing argument from Cripps, the district court denied his motion and subsequently sentenced him under the felony charge to serve a term of 12 to 32 months in the Nevada State Prison. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Cripps argues that the district court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere because his plea was improperly coerced by the district judge.² Cripps alleges that the judge abandoned his role as a neutral arbiter by offering his personal opinion of the evidence and encouraging Cripps to enter a guilty plea.

This court has not hesitated to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary where it plainly appears from the record that the plea was improperly coerced by the district court.³ In Standley, for example, we noted:

Here, the judge did more than facilitate the plea negotiations or make an isolated comment about the plea offer. Rather, the judge effectively convinced appellant to accept the plea offer through lengthy exposition. In commenting on the offer, the judge evinced an unmistakable desire that appellant accept the offer. Appellant had good reason to fear offending the judge if he declined because the same judge would have presided over the trial and, if the trial resulted in a conviction, the judge would have determined the appropriate sentence.⁴

Standley also observed: "`When a judge suggests to a defendant . . . that he should plead guilty, the coercive effect of this suggestion is likely to be overwhelming.'"⁵ In invalidating the plea, however, Standley cautioned "against an expansive interpretation" of its holding, noting that "[t]he constitution does not forbid all participation by the judge in the plea negotiation process" and that "[o]nly where the judge's conduct is improperly coercive will we consider affording a defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea."⁶ Although in Standley, we relied extensively on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Bruce,⁷ we stopped short of adopting the absolute prohibition of any judicial involvement in the plea discussions applied in the federal courts.

Some states, like Nevada, permit a limited judicial role in the plea negotiation process.⁸ But even states that permit some judicial involvement do so cautiously with awareness of the negative potential effect it can have on both the voluntariness of the plea and the appearance of fairness.⁹ Other jurisdictions follow the federal approach and expressly prohibit judicial involvement of any form in the plea negotiations.¹⁰ The federal cases apply Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), which provides that "[t]he court must not participate in [plea] discussions."¹¹ Rule 11 has been interpreted as an absolute, bright-line rule commanding that the district court shall not participate in, and shall remove itself from, "any discussion of a plea agreement that has not yet been agreed to by the parties in open court."¹² Bruce listed three primary concerns underlying this absolute, bright-line approach.¹³

First, "judicial involvement in plea negotiations inevitably carries with it the high and unacceptable risk of coercing a defendant to accept the proposed agreement and plead guilty."¹⁴ As Bruce explained, judicial involvement "`may coerce the defendant into an involuntary plea that he would not otherwise enter'" and cause the defendant to accept a plea only out of fear of offending the judge and incurring unfavorable rulings at trial or a more severe sentence after trial.¹⁵ No matter how motivated a judge may be to avoid any potential coercive effects, the judge's participation in the formulation of a plea agreement necessarily "brings to bear the full force and majesty of [the judicial] office."¹⁶

Second, Bruce explained that "Rule 11 protects the integrity of the judicial process."¹⁷ "The Rule is based on the sound principle that the interests of justice are best served if the judge remains aloof from all discussions preliminary to the determination of guilt or innocence so that his impartiality and objectivity shall not be open to any questions or suspicion when it becomes his duty to impose sentence."¹⁸

Third, Bruce emphasized that the federal bright-line approach preserves "the judge's impartiality after the negotiations are completed."¹⁹ A judge's involvement in the plea process detracts from the judge's objectivity by making it difficult for a judge to subsequently assess the voluntariness of the plea objectively, by posing an inherent risk that, if the negotiations ultimately fail, the judge's impartiality during trial will be diminished, and by detracting from "the judge's objectivity in post-trial matters such as sentencing and motions for a judgment of acquittal."²⁰ Additionally, in the course of plea negotiations, the judge may obtain information about the accused's guilt or innocence that, even if well intentioned, may diminish judicial objectivity.²¹ But, "if the judge remains aloof from all [plea] discussions preliminary to the determination of guilt or innocence," judicial impartiality and objectivity cannot be questioned.²²

Despite these policy concerns, neither party in this case advocates adopting an outright prohibition on judicial involvement in the plea negotiations. Cripps argues that Standley should not be modified and that judges should be permitted to participate at their discretion in the plea discussions, provided their conduct is not coercive. The State argues that this court should set forth specific guidelines for judicial participation by authorizing judges to advise an accused, before entry of the plea, whether the sentencing recommendation of the parties will be followed. The State suggests that knowing the potential sentence would be beneficial because it would give a reluctant defendant more information to aid in the decision of whether to enter a guilty plea.

From our perspective, the holding of Standley has proven to be difficult to apply on appeal in actual practice. First, this court is often unable to objectively analyze the extent of any judicial participation because an insufficient record was preserved below. This is particularly true, where as here, a defendant enters a plea following an off-the-record, in-chambers discussion with the judge. Second, the actual coercive impact of any judicial participation in the plea process is not easily discernable, even where a complete record has been compiled and presented on appeal. Third, although Standley discusses the inherent and unacceptable risks involved in judicial participation in the plea process, it provides less than satisfactory guidance regarding the permissible boundaries of such participation.

Thus, under these circumstances, we have concluded that a bright-line rule prohibiting judicial involvement in the plea negotiation process will not only provide the most practical and expedient approach, but also the most equitable and prudent one. Nonetheless, we conclude that a single exception to this bright-line prohibition is warranted. We agree with the State that the process will benefit from permitting a district court to indicate, on the record, whether it would be inclined to follow a sentencing recommendation proposed by the parties.²³ Accordingly, we hereby adopt the following standards, applicable only to future cases to be commenced in the courts below, governing judicial participation in the plea negotiation process.

First, because of the inherent risks...