Crisano v. Grimes

• Decision Date: 20 April 2020
• Docket Number: 1:19cv1612 (CMH/TCB)
• Citation: Crisano v. Grimes, 1:19cv1612 (CMH/TCB) (E.D. Va. Apr 20, 2020)
• Parties: Cassie C. Crisano, Plaintiff, v. Phil Grimes, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Cassie C. Crisano, Plaintiff, v. Phil Grimes, et al., Defendants.

1:19cv1612 (CMH/TCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

April 20, 2020

MEMORADUM OPIONION

Cassie C. Crisano, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, Virginia (Civil Case No.19-2219) on July 19, 2019. [Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3]. In her complaint she names the following defendants: Rappahannock Regional Jail (RRJ), Phil J. Grimes, Captain Norris, Sgt. Branson, Cpl. Jacobs, and Thomas Foley. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated her right of access to the courts by restricting her use of the phone to communicate with her attorney, violated her attorney client privacy, denied her DC-311 forms (district court criminal complaint forms), restricted her mail and facility access, searched her legal documents and mail outside of her presence, limited her access to the law library, and improperly placed her in segregation.

Defendant Grimes, by counsel, filed a removal notice in the circuit court [Dkt. No. 1-3], and Defendants Grimes and Foley have moved this Court to Dismiss the complaint. [Dkt. Nos. 4 and 11]. Plaintiff was advised of her rights under Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), and has responded, seeking leave to amend her complaint. [Dkt. Nos. 9, 13-17]. Defendants Grimes and Foley have each objected to plaintiff's motion to amend. [Dkt. Nos. 19 and 20]. In her piecemeal motion for leave to amend, plaintiff seeks to add numerous defendants and has failed to provide a coherent single document to advise defendants and the Court of what claims she alleges, the specific acts she alleges that make a defendant liable to her, when acts were done or not done, and the specific harm plaintiff alleges befell her as a result of a defendants actions or inaction. Consequently, her motion to amend will be denied.

I. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). Generalized, unsupported assertions are insufficient to state a claim. While the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint are presumed to be true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, legal conclusions unsupported by allegations of specific facts are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). Legal conclusions in the guise of factual allegations are similarly insufficient. See, e.g., District 28, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1979).

A court should dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. A claim will lack "facial plausibility" unless the plaintiff "plead[s] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).

Determining "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief," is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679 (citations omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if the well-pleaded facts"do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. Even under a notice pleading regime, a complaint must contain sufficient evidentiary facts to raise a plausible - as opposed to just conceivable - inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. Under Twombly, a plaintiff must allege enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570).

In addition, a court may dismiss claims based upon dispositive issues of law. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court presumes that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and accords all reasonable inferences to the non-moving party. 2A Moore's Federal Practice P 12.07[2.5] (2d ed. 1994). See also Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978). The Court is mindful of its duty to construe liberally the complaints of pro se litigants. See Bracey v. Buchanan, 55 F.Supp.2d 416, 421 (E.D. Va. 1999). However, such duty does not require district courts "to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them [as] [d]istrict judges are not mind readers." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Even pro se plaintiffs are required to allege facts that state a cause of action. Id. However, a pro se complaint must not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted).

II. The Complaint

Plaintiff, Cassie C. Crisano, ("Plaintiff" or "Crisano") is an inmate at Rappahannock Regional Jail (RRJ).¹ Defendant Grimes is the Superintendent of RRJ, and Thomas Foley is the Stafford County Administrator. The complaint states that on or about November 26, 2018, she was placed on phone restrictions and administrative segregation for "Security Reasons." [Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3].² Specifically, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation because she tried "to hire someone to" commit a murder while she was detained at RRJ. [Dkt. No. 1-2 at 13].

Regarding her communications with counsel, plaintiff alleges that RRJ officers stood near her during conversations with her attorney, standing "either directly in front of the phone or on the side of it while Plaintiff talked to her attorneys." [Id. at 4]. The Complaint further claims that plaintiff had to "talk over telephone lines which [Plaintiff] reasonably believe[d]" were being monitored. Id. Plaintiff claims that the alleged phone monitoring impinged upon her attorney-client confidentiality and effective assistance of counsel, and that other inmates were not subject to such conditions. [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff asserts that the phone restrictions wereimplemented with defendant Grimes' "knowledge, permission, consent, and participation." [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff also asserts that between May 1, 2019 and June 1, 2019, she made requests to receive "criminal complaint forms" as well as "assistance in allowing her access to Stafford County Circuit Court and U.S. Supreme Court" where she had pending cases.

Regarding being placed in administrative segregation, plaintiff complains that she is on "no phone and no mail status and 2-man full restraint to Court," and about being on administrative segregation status "for over 210 days." Captain Norris responded to the complaints by reminding plaintiff that she had been placed in administrative segregation due to her attempted murder-for-hire plot while incarcerated at RRJ. [Id. at 13]. Plaintiff also alleges defendant Grimes did not address her complaints about being in administrative segregation. [Id. at 14].

Plaintiff also alleges Sgt. Branson and Cpl. Jacobs entered her cell on July 10, 2019 and conducted a cell inspection. [Id. at 16-17]. Plaintiff claims that Sgt. Branson and Cpl. Jacobs spilled water on her "Federal Legal Docs" and after the search, half of her "Legal Documents" were missing. [Id. at 16]. The Complaint asserts that the search was done out of retaliation and resulted in plaintiff not having her "paperwork for her trial set for August 6, 2019." [Id.].

The Complaint asserts that the phone monitoring violated plaintiff's First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. [Id. at 4-5]. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for the phone restrictions to cease, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. [Id. at 5-9].

Regarding defendant Foley, Crisano complains that he did not respond to her complaints about being denied forms to allow her access to Stafford Circuit Court, interreference with her access to the courts/attorney communications, the search of her cell and loss of legal documents,being placed in segregation, and the other restrictions that accompanied segregation. [Id. at 15-16].

III. Analysis

Defendant Grimes seeks to have the complaint dismissed because plaintiff has failed to allege facts that support a finding that he had any involvement in the phone monitoring, the search of her cell, the denial of the criminal complaint forms or her placement in administrative segregation; that plaintiff has failed to set forth a denial of access to the courts/interference with counsel claim; her placement in administrative segregation and the accompanying restrictions were justified by security concerns; plaintiff has not stated an equal protection claim; she has no constitutional right to file grievances; and she has not established a claim of retaliation.

In a separate motion to dismiss, defendant Foley, the Stafford County Administrator, seeks dismissal because he does not work for or control RRJ and RRJ is not owned or operated by Stafford County, because plaintiff's claims are inadequately supported by factual allegations, and because he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Defendant Grimes

Plaintiff's claims rely upon the assumption of unconstitutional actions on the part of RRJ. Since defendant Grimes is the Superintendent of RRJ, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, ...