Crise v. Smith

• Decision Date: 07 April 1926
• Docket Number: Nos. 28, 29.,s. 28, 29.
• Citation: 133 A. 110
• Parties: CRISE v. SMITH et al. (two cases).
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

133 A. 110

CRISE

v. SMITH et al. (two cases).

Nos. 28, 29.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 7, 1926.

Appeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Robert F. Stanton, Judge. "To be officially reported."

Separate petitions by Clarence L. Crise and Elsie R. Crise against Samuel K. Smith and John Watson, trustees. From a decree of dismissal of both petitions, petitioners appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, and PARKE, JJ.

Charles Jackson, of Baltimore (Arthur R. Padgett, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

William L. Henderson, of Baltimore (Stewart & Pearre, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

PARKE, J. This appeal brings before us for construction a postnuptial deed of settlement made by a third party to trustees under circumstances which are not fully disclosed by the record, but which are sufficient, with the concessions of fact made in the argument, to justify the inference that the unmarried nominal settlor, Elsie R. Crise, was selected for the purpose of having the real and personal property of Clarence L. Crise, together with the interest therein of his then wife, May F. Crise, conveyed to Elsie R. Crise in order that this grantee might forthwith grant and convey the real and personal property so acquired to trustees as previously agreed. Accordingly, on the same day that she so acquired her title, Elsie R. Crise granted and conveyed it to Samuel K. Smith and John Watson, Jr., as trustees for the purposes of the settlement, The deed of trust was dated February 11 1916, and the trustees united with Elsie R. Crise in its execution for the purpose of signifying their acceptance of the trust. The deed of trust was recorded and jurisdiction of the trust was assumed in equity on May 31, 1916, upon the petition of the conventional trustees.

After a conveyance of the real and personal property to the trustees, who were given ample and complete power with respect to sale, lease, conveyance, assignment, investment, reinvestment, and change of investments of the trust estate, and who were required to pay a list of creditors, aggregating $2,302.31, as soon as convenient after October 11, 1917, the deed of trust directed the trustees to apply the income collected from the estate, first, to the payment of all taxes, fixed charges, including the mortgage obligation, and a commission to the trustees, and—

"Second. Beginning with the date hereof and continuing as hereinafter recited, to pay for the support of Clarence L. Crise and May f. Crise, his wife, and their children, so long as said Clarence L. Crise and May f. Crise, and the survivor of them, shall live, and the net balance of said income, or so much thereof as said trustees shall deem right and proper; provided, however' (and not otherwise), that said sums of money payable for the support of said Clarence L. Crise and his wife and his children, may be paid into the hands of said Clarence L. Crise or May f. Crise, his wife, in proper person, and not into the hands of any other person or corporation whatsoever, whether claiming by, through or under said Clarence L. Crise or May f. Crise, his wife; and provided further (and this deed is made conditioned precedent upon this proviso), that no part of either principal or income of the property hereby intended to be conveyed, or the reinvestment of such principal and income, is or may be made liable for the debts, contracts or obligations of said Clarence L. Crise and May F. Crise, or either of them, or in any way subject to the control or disposition of them or either of them. * * *

"And for the purposes aforesaid or whenever to said trustees or their successors it may appear advantageous, said Elsie R. Crise—doth hereby empower said trustees and their successors to bargain, sell, convey, lease, transfer, grant, assign and deliver and in any and every other manner, conditionally and absolutely, to dispose of, all and any of the property and estate then held by said trustees or their successors in the trust, and upon the death of both said Clarence L. Crise and May f. Crise, his wife, and upon the payment to the persons hereinabove recited of the amounts payable to them each as aforesaid, "the trust hereby created shall cease, and the title to the property affected by this deed shall vest, free of the trusts hereby created, in those persons who, at that time, under the present laws of Maryland relating to inheritance, would be the heirs at law of said Clarence L. Crise; and for selling or otherwise disposing of any or all of said property, and for distributing it to those entitled to receive it at the expiration of the trust hereby created, the trustees hereunder, or their successors, shall receive a sum of money equal to the commissions allowable by the circuit court of Baltimore city to trustees doing similar services under its jurisdiction."

A construction of these provisions of the deed which include the provisions of a spendthrift trust, was sought as a result of the termination of the marital status of the life tenants by their subsequent full divorce. On March 10. 1921, Clarence L. Crise instituted proceedings in the circuit court of Baltimore city to obtain a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from his wife, May F. Crise; and on May 23, 1921, he obtained a decree for an absolute divorce, but there is nothing in the record to indicate upon which of the several statutory grounds the divorce was secured. The decree awarded to the mother the custody and guardianship of their only child, Dorothy May Crise, and charged the father with this infant's support and maintenance. Since the divorce the mother has married George F. King, Jr., with whom she and the daughter reside in Florida; and the trustees have continued to pay a portion of the income to the divorced wife. On April 28, 1925, Clarence L. Crise filed a petition asking that the chancellor direct the trustees to cease paying any part of the income to her, and on September 23d Elsie R. Crise filed a similar petition. The basis of relief was alike in each petition, which advanced the theory that the dissolution of the marriage bond between Clarence L. Crise and May F. Crise put an end to all her interest and estate under the deed of trust. The chancellor, however, held that the wife's status as a beneficiary under the deed of trust was not affected by the absolute divorce granted her husband, and dismissed both petitions.

The position of the appellants is that a divorce a vinculo matrimonii procured by one spouse on any ground is equivalent to the death of the spouse, who has afforded the cause for the decree of dissolution. It is true that, as a general rule and independently of statute, a divorce a vinculo ends all rights of either spouse dependent on marriage, and not actually vested, as curtesy, dower, and property rights under statutes of distribution, but as a rule transfers of property and contracts executed before divorce are not affected by the dissolution of the marital tie. Thus, if a tenancy by entirety exist, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is not equivalent in law to the natural death of the guilty spouse, but merely effects a destruction of one of the essential unities upon whose continuance the estate depended; and, so, the severance of the unity of husband and wife by a complete divorce operates to make the divorced parties hold as tenants in common, no matter whose was the marital fault. Reed v. Reed, 72 A. 414, 109 Md. 690, 693 130 Am. St. Rep. 552; Masterman v. Masterman, 98 A. 537, 129 Md. 167; Brell v. Brell, 122 A. 635, 143 Md. 443; Stelz v. Shreck, 28 N. E. 510, 128 N. Y. 263, 13 L. R. A. 325, 26 Am. St. Rep. 475. The decree of dissolution in a divorce a vinculo is a determination of the marriage contract by a method unknown to the common law (Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 447, 451, 56 Am. Dec. 723); and hence it is that all contractual or property rights of either spouse, not arising out of and dependent upon the continuance of the marriage status, survive the divorce a vinculo, and fall within the scope and operation of the rules and principles governing similar contractual or property rights. So, the general rule deducible from the great weight of Authority is that a marriage settlement, which was valid in its formation and which was not fraudulently induced in contemplation of the subsequent marital misconduct, is not abrogated by the divorce of the parties for marital misconduct arising after the marriage, unless the language of the instrument or contract contains an express provision against the conduct in question.

This rule is sound in principle, and finds support in the decisions of this court in Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239, 262 to 265, 90 Am. Dec. 106; Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553, 563, 565, 573-575, 581; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 92 A. 891, 124 Md. 330, 342-345, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 988; and also in the clear preponderance of authority. See 2 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, §§ 1654-1659; 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) § 1110; 29 A. L. R. 198 et seq.; Re Estate of Rosecrantz. 198 N. W. 728. 183 Wis. 643, 35 A. L. R. 139 and note; Blount v. Winter, 3 P. Wms. 276, 24 Eng. Reprint, 1003; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 Barn. & C. 547, 107 Eng. Reprint, 487; Fearon v. Aylesford (1884) L. R. 14 Q. B. 792; Wasteneys v. Wasteneys (1900) A. C. 446; Fitzgerald v. Chapman, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 563 (overruling Fussell v. Dowding, L. R. 14 Eq. 423 and Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R. 4 Eq. 162); Burton v. Sturgeon, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 318; Codrington v. Codrington, L. R. 7 H. L. 854; Evans v. Carrington, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 481, 45 Eng. Rep. 707; Norris v. Norris, 1 Swab. & T. 174, 164 Eng. Rep. 680; Charlesworth v. Holt, L. R. 9 Exch. 38; Sweet v. Sweet (1895) 1 Q. B. 12; Bayncn v. Batley. 8 Bing. 256,

131 Eng. Rep. 400; Goslin v. Clark, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 681; Sidney v. Sidney, 3 P. Wms. 375, 24' Eng. Rep. 1060; Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. 443, 33 Eng. Rep. 358; Buttlar v. Buttlar, ...