Crisitello v. Meddock (In re Crisitello)

• Decision Date: 15 August 2018
• Docket Number: D073607
• Parties: In re the Marriage of MARYANN CRISITELLO and DAVID MEDDOCK. MARYANN CRISITELLO, Respondent, v. DAVID PAUL MEDDOCK, Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

In re the Marriage of MARYANN CRISITELLO and DAVID MEDDOCK.

MARYANN CRISITELLO, Respondent, v. DAVID PAUL MEDDOCK, Appellant.

D073607

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

August 15, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. IND102209)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Otis Sterling III, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Stephen Temko and Dennis Geis Temko for Appellant.

Law Offices of Basil Chapman and Basil T. Chapman for Respondent.

Appellant David Paul Meddock appeals from a judgment following a bench trial in which the family court found he and respondent Maryann Crisitello had entered into valid marital settlement agreements (MSAs) dividing and transmuting particular marital property and retirement accounts, and rejected Meddock's undue influence claims. On appeal, Meddock challenges the court's findings and conclusions. Asking us to take judicial notice of documents evidencing transfers of two of the parties' major assets, Crisitello responds that actions Meddock took in November 2015, before the court entered its judgment, "effectively settled" the dispute and have rendered the case moot for all practical purposes. She otherwise contends the court's rulings are supported by substantial evidence. We decline to judicially notice Crisitello's documents. On the merits, we reject Meddock's contentions, and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We take much of the factual background from the family court's final statement of decision,¹ and other facts from the trial testimony, viewing it in the light most favorable to the judgment.

Meddock and Crisitello married in 1988. Since 1989, Meddock has owned and operated a retail business selling fireplace equipment to contractors, designers and homeowners. In 2008, the parties were experiencing marital problems, and for reasons related to the upcoming presidential election, Meddock left the United States for Mexico in the parties' community property boat, a 58-foot Vantare yacht. Crisitello unsuccessfully tried to get Meddock to bring the yacht back from Mexico, and began contemplating divorce. Meddock neglected his business and began to deplete its incomeand the parties' bank accounts. Concerned, Crisitello spoke with attorneys. In February 2010, she informed Meddock she had done so, and that she could freeze their accounts. They spoke in detail about the matter; Meddock then presented Crisitello with a handwritten paper (the February 2010 document) reading:

You can have the

House

Truck-Grey

1/2 Interest business

Maintain ownership of

all Investments 401—etc.

__________

I own Boat 100%

2/25/2010 [signed David Meddock]

Later that year, Crisitello petitioned for dissolution of her and Meddock's marriage. In November 2012, the trial court found the parties' date of separation was November 28, 2009.

A bench trial commenced in March 2014, and continued on various days in April, May, June, October and December 2014, through January 2015. During the course of those proceedings, Meddock argued his February 2010 handwritten note was only an offer, not a contract, and that the offer had either lapsed in 2010 or was revoked. He also argued his document was not an MSA, in part because there was no evidence either the offer remained or Crisitello had delivered a timely acceptance. Crisitello maintained in part that Meddock had written the February 2010 document to avoid the risk of losing the boat in court proceedings. She argued Meddock had breached his fiduciary duty to her in various ways.

In June 2014, the family court found the February 2010 note was a valid MSA.²

The parties submitted proposed statements of decision in September 2015. Meddock's proffered statement of decision addressed the February 2010 document as follows: "Family Code section 1500 states that the property rights of husband and wife prescribed by statute may be altered by agreement. In addition, Family Code section 850 authorizes spouses to transmute community property to the separate property of either spouse. [Crisitello] and [Meddock] testified that on 2/25/2010 and 10/2/2010, she and [Meddock] signed and executed two agreements to divide certain property. They prepared the agreements together and the agreements are reflected in [Crisitello's] exhibits. [Crisitello] confirmed that there was approximately $200,000.00 in [Meddock's] retirement accounts. . . . While at the time of trial, [Meddock] may not have agreed with the division of property, there was no evidence of undue influence, fraud or the like with regard to the making of this agreement. The court finds that thedivision of property contained in the marital agreement is valid." Meddock's statement of decision proposed that the court award Crisitello the family residence, all retirement accounts in her name, the grey truck, and one-half interest in the parties' business, and award Meddock the yacht and all retirement accounts in his name.

In November 2015, Crisitello sought ex parte relief, averring in a declaration that Meddock was attempting to sell the parties' yacht to a third party before judgment and close the sale on November 6, 2015. She asked the court in part to treat the yacht payments as an unadjudicated asset and order the net sales proceeds be retained in an escrow or her attorney's trust account. In opposition, Meddock's counsel submitted a declaration quoting the court's June 2014 ruling as to the February 2010 document being a valid MSA and pointing out that under that ruling, it was "clear . . . the boat is Mr. Meddock's separate property." The court granted the request, ordering that proceeds from any sale be held in escrow until further court order.

The family court issued a proposed statement of decision in January 2016. It reiterated that the February 2010 document was a valid MSA and represented the parties' intention relating to dividing the marital assets. Thereafter, in supplemental argument, Meddock disputed this conclusion, arguing the document was merely a marital agreement that lacked required language under Family Code³ section 852 to transmute property. Crisitello argued in response that the transmutation statutes were inapplicable; that the division or allocation of property in an MSA is not a transmutation.

In its final February 2016 statement of decision, the court found that the February 2010 document was a valid MSA. Acknowledging that section 852 required a "writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected," the court found the February 2010 document contained language that effected a transmutation: language "evidenc[ing] an express declaration to change the character and ownership of the property reference[d] in the documents." The court combined its findings as to undue influence and transmutation, stating: "Prior to his drafting the February 25, 2010[ ] agreement, [Meddock] had been told by his [financial advisor] that [Crisitello] was serious about filing for divorce. . . . It is clear that at the time of the February 25, 2010[ ] agreement, [Meddock's] primary desire was to obtain ownership of the yacht, live in Mexico, and gain access to his retirement accounts. [Crisitello's] filing for divorce would have prevented him from realizing these objectives. [¶] As such, it was [Meddock] who proposed the agreement. [The financial advisor] had no control over [Meddock's] access to his retirement accounts. Neither did he or [Crisitello] compel, advise or otherwise influence [Meddock] to sign anything. . . . [Meddock] got exactly that for which he bargained." Further, the court found "[Meddock] prepared the February 25, 2010[ ] written document in his own hand. He made the decision as to what property would be contained in the document and how such property would be divided. . . . [I]t is clear that the document was 'in writing.' Further, it is clear that because [Meddock] drafted the agreement, it was 'made, joined in, consented to or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected.' This is so notwithstanding his desire to argueagainst the same now." It found Meddock's claims of undue influence "completely without merit" and that Meddock's "testimony in this regard is devoid of any credibility."

The court entered a final judgment of dissolution on September 1, 2016. On the same day, it ordered release of funds held in escrow from the sale of the yacht.

DISCUSSION

I. Crisitello's Request for Judicial Notice and to Augment the Record

We first address Crisitello's request that this court take judicial notice, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h),⁴ of several documents that were not before the trial court, for the purpose of demonstrating that Meddock—following the bench trial on the matter—"validat[ed]" the February 2010 document and transmutation, establishing the asserted mootness of Meddock's appeal.

Specifically, Crisitello asks this court to take judicial notice of an interspousal deed of the family residence recorded in November 2015 transferring the property to Crisitello, and documents that appear to have been generated in 2017 (a Department ofHomeland Security abstract of title and certificate of documentation) showing that Crisitello in November 2015 relinquished her interest in the boat to Meddock, and that Meddock sold the boat. Crisitello states she "naturally assumed that their ownership and interests were resolved" until her counsel, who was assertedly "hampered by illness," finally discovered the documents were not filed with the trial court. According to...