Crisp v. State
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-2057-MLB |
| Parties | Nathan D. Crisp, Plaintiff, v. The State of Georgia, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff has filed multiple lawsuits against Defendants and other state and federal officials complaining about his arrest and guilty plea for impersonating an officer. In each of his lawsuits-this one included- Plaintiff seeks to overturn his plea and obtain a new trial. He claims Defendants violated his constitutional rights and engaged in an “ex post facto” conspiracy to violate his state, federal, and international rights. Defendants-in four separate motions-have moved to dismiss. (Dkts. 18, 19, 23, 37.) Plaintiff-also in four separate motions-moves to amend his complaint. (Dkts. 33, 63, 78, 80.) The Court denies Plaintiff's motions and dismisses this lawsuit.
In 2019, Plaintiff pled guilty to impersonating an officer in violation of Georgia law. (Dkt. 1 at 15, 90-99.) While his allegations are difficult to unravel, it appears Plaintiff complains that various state, county, and federal officials violated a host of state, federal, and international law as part of an “ex post facto” conspiracy related to his arrest and conviction. (See generally Dkts. 1 16.) Plaintiff raised these same allegations in a prior case. (See Crisp v. State of Georgia et al., No. 1:21-cv-175.) This time, he adds new purported participants to the alleged conspiracy and drops others.
Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaint-which consist of over 200 pages-mention the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; a host of state criminal laws; federal laws including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4, 241, and 242, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871; and a slew of state laws. (See generally Dkts. 1, 16-1.) He specifically brings state law claims for abusive litigation, defamation and libel, fraud, and for violations of the Georgia RICO Act. (Dkt. 1 at 37, 59-62.)
Defendants raise various defenses in their separate motions to dismiss. (Dkts. 18, 19, 23, 37.) The Court addresses each.
Defendants State of Georgia and assistant attorney general James Champlin say Plaintiff's claims against them must be dismissed because they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and absolute immunity. They also say the Georgia Tort Claims Act bars Plaintiff's claims because it provides them immunity and because Plaintiff did not comply with the statute's procedural requirements.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or one of its agencies, departments, or officials when the state is the real party in interest or when any monetary recovery would be paid from state funds. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to both states and entities that are considered “arms of the state.” McBride v. Bd. of Corrections, 472 S.E.2d 693, 694-95 (Ga.Ct.App. 1996) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 59 (1989)). There are three exceptions to this rule:
(1) congressional override, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996); (2) waiver by the state, see College Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999); and (3) a suit against a state officer for “prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law,” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73.
Plaintiff has not shown the State Defendants waived immunity or that a congressional override strips the State Defendants of immunity.[1]Nor does he articulate any factually supported claim for prospective relief from the State Defendants.[2] Eleventh Amendment immunity thus bars his claims against them. See Fouche v Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1520-23 (11th Cir. 1983).
The State Defendants next claim Defendant Champlin is immune from suit based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. (Dkt. 37-1 at 6-8.)[3]“[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the prosecutor's function as advocate.” Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Such absolute immunity ‘extends to a prosecutor's acts . . . which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.'” Id. (quoting Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)). Numerous courts have expressly extended this protection to state assistant attorneys general. See, e.g., McConnell v. King, 42 F.3d 471, 472 (8th Cir. 1994); Pryzina v. Ley, 813 F.2d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1987); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff broadly accuses Champlin of participating in a conspiracy against him by representing several state employees or entities named as defendants in his prior lawsuits. (Dkt. 1 at 9, 27, 55.) Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with pleadings Champlin filed in opposition to his complaint and subsequent motions in those lawsuits. (Id.)[4] Champlin enjoys absolute immunity for his actions in those matters. See Culbreath v. Reeves, 2018 WL 9490973, at *6 (M.D. Ga. July 26, 2018) (collecting cases, noting “[c]ourts have found that government attorneys who are defending state government employees in civil actions are entitled to absolute immunity”).
Finally, Defendants say Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by the Georgia Tort Claims Act. (Dkt. 37-1 at 10-15.) Specifically, they argue the Act provides them with immunity and that Plaintiff failed to follow its procedural requirements. (Id.)
First, under the GTCA, “[a] state officer or employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his or her official duties or employment is not subject to lawsuit or liability therefor.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a). This part of the statute requires that a plaintiff “name as a party defendant only the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting and shall not name the state officer or employee individually.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b). “The scope of th[is] exemption has been construed broadly” and exempts such state officers regardless of whether they acted with intent or malice. Davis v. Standifer, 621 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga.Ct.App. 2005). Plaintiff sued Champlin in his official capacity for actions he took in the course of his official duties. So, the GTCA bars his state law claims against Champlin.
In addition, under the GTCA the State has expressly retained its sovereign immunity over Plaintiff's claims. Under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24, the State has retained its immunity over suits involving:
See also Tricoli v. Watts, 783 S.E.2d 475, 478 (Ga.Ct.App. 2016) (). All of Plaintiff's claims fall within one of these exemptions, so they must be dismissed.
Finally, even if Plaintiff's claims were not substantively barred by the GTCA, his failure to follow the statute's procedural requirements warrants their dismissal. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-35 requires a plaintiff to:
(1) cause process to be served upon the chief executive officer of the state government entity involved at his or her usual office address; and (2) cause process to be served upon the director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services at his or her usual office address.
“The procedural components of the GTCA, like its other terms, are strictly construed.” Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F.Supp.3d 1342, 1360 (S.D. Ga. 2015). And failure to comply with the service provision “precludes compliance with the condition precedent to waiver of sovereign immunity and renders void [the plaintiff's] action[.]” Id. Plaintiff did not serve the chief executive officer of the State or the Attorney General's Office. His claims therefore fail.[5]
Defendants Gwinnett County and Judge Laura Tate say Plaintiff's federal claims against them must be dismissed because he does not plead the required elements and because they are barred by Supreme Court precedent. (Dkt. 19-1 at 5-9.) They also argue that Plaintiff's state law claims are foreclosed by sovereign immunity. (Id.) Finally, they say Plaintiff's claims against Judge Tate are barred by judicial immunity and official immunity. (Id. at 9-11.)[6]
1. Failure to State a Claim
First Defendants say Plaintiff's federal civil rights conspiracy claim fails because Plaintiff does not plead the required elements. (Dkt. 19-1 at 5 6.) A court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). Even so, a complaint offering mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the...
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