Crispin–taveras v. Municipality of Carolina

• Citation: 647 F.3d 1,79 Fed.R.Serv.3d 918
• Decision Date: 25 May 2011
• Docket Number: 09–2626.,Nos. 09–2625,s. 09–2625
• Parties: Yonatta CRISPIN–TAVERAS, Plaintiff, Appellee,v.MUNICIPALITY OF CAROLINA; Karimar Peraza Delgado; Captain Ruben Moyeno, Director of the Special Unit; Lieutenant John Cruz–Gonzalez; Sergeant Luis Diaz–Ruiz, Defendants, Appellants,Jose C. Aponte–Dalmau, as Mayor of the Municipality of Carolina; Colonel Carlos Haddock, individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Municipality of Carolina Police Department; Vannesa Carmona; Alfredo Rivera–Suarez; John Doe 1–10; Insurance Company D, E, F, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

647 F.3d 1

79 Fed.R.Serv.3d 918

Yonatta CRISPIN–TAVERAS, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF CAROLINA; Karimar Peraza Delgado; Captain Ruben Moyeno, Director of the Special Unit; Lieutenant John Cruz–Gonzalez; Sergeant Luis Diaz–Ruiz, Defendants, Appellants,Jose C. Aponte–Dalmau, as Mayor of the Municipality of Carolina; Colonel Carlos Haddock, individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Municipality of Carolina Police Department; Vannesa Carmona; Alfredo Rivera–Suarez; John Doe 1–10; Insurance Company D, E, F, Defendants.

Nos. 09–2625

09–2626.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2011.Decided May 25, 2011.

Johanna M. Emmanuelli Huertas and Jorge Martinez–Luciano on brief for appellant, Municipality of Carolina.Angel E. Rotger–Sabat on brief for appellants, Karimar Peraza–Delgado, Captain Rubén Moyeno, Lieutenant John Cruz–González, and Sergeant Luis Díaz–Ruiz.Mauricio Hernandez Arroyo on brief for appellee.Before LIPEZ, SILER,^* and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.SILER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff–Appellee Yonatta Crispin–Taveras (“Crispin”) brought a civil rights action against Defendants–Appellants Municipality of Carolina (the “Municipality”) and various Municipality police officers. The district court defaulted the defendants for discovery violations. After a jury trial on damages, the district court entered a judgment in favor of Crispin in the amount of $75,000. The Municipality and the individual officers now appeal, challenging the default sanction, the admission of psychological treatment evidence, the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of service of process. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

During a baseball game between the Puerto Rico national team and the Dominican Republic national team held at the Roberto Clemente Stadium in Carolina, Puerto Rico, in 2007, a spectator known as “Oscar” was celebrating in the aisles with a Dominican flag. The Carolina Municipal Police Department intervened in order to eject Oscar from the stadium.

Crispin, a U.S. Marine from the Dominican Republic, was at the game wearing a hat with the insignia of the Dominican flag. He became involved in the confrontation and alleged that the police officers violently grabbed and removed him from the stands, struck him in the head with a metal baton, and then handcuffed and detained him in the stadium detention center. He was eventually transported to a hospital where he received stitches to close a wound to his head.

Both sides faced criminal charges. Crispin was charged with aggravated assault and destruction of property, but the charges were dismissed. Three of the officers, Lieutenant John Cruz–González (“Cruz”), Sergeant Luis Díaz–Ruiz (“Díaz”), and Officer Karimar Peraza–Delgado (“Peraza”) were indicted on federal civil rights violations, but were acquitted.

B. Procedural Background

On October 25, 2007, Crispin filed a civil rights action in the District of Puerto Rico against the Municipality, the mayor of the Municipality, an association of Municipality police officers, two Commonwealth of Puerto Rico police officers, and three insurance companies. He also named as defendants various individual Municipality police officers, including Captain Rubén Moyeno (“Moyeno”), Cruz, Peraza, and Díaz (collectively the “individual defendants”).

1. Service of Process

On April 3, 2008, Moyeno filed a motion to dismiss, and Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza filed a motion to join it. They alleged they were served with the summons and complaint on February 28 and 29, 2008, which was more than 120 days after the filing of the complaint in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Crispin responded that dismissal was not required because there was no prejudice and Rule 4(m) allows the district court to direct service by a specified time, which was now unnecessary because the defendants were served. The district court denied the motions.

The Municipality filed an answer on September 4, 2008, and the individual defendants filed an answer on September 26, 2008. The individual defendants later filed a motion to withdraw their answer because they alleged that Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza were included in the answer by “human error.” The district court granted the motion and allowed the withdrawal of their answer.

In February 2009, Peraza and Cruz filed a motion to dismiss for improper service. They alleged that Crispin failed to effectuate personal service and failed to do so within the time afforded by Rule 4(m). In opposition, Crispin argued that the defendants did not challenge the method of service in their April 2008 motion to dismiss. He further argued that service was properly executed upon an attorney in the Municipality's legal department. The district court denied the motion.

2. Discovery Disputes

In December 2008, Crispin filed a motion to compel, alleging that the individual defendants had failed to produce Rule 26 disclosures or answer Crispin's interrogatories or requests for production. The individual defendants opposed the motion, arguing that they were not aware of any unproduced documents. The district court denied Crispin's motion without prejudice.

After a stay of the case during the pendency of the federal criminal proceedings, the district court conducted a scheduling conference. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. During the conference, the district court ordered the defendants to answer all pending written discovery requests within ten days and ordered discovery to be completed by June 30, 2009. Moyeno sent his Rule 26 initial disclosures to Crispin the day after the conference.

On June 11, 2009, Crispin filed a motion for sanctions against the Municipality, Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza, alleging they had failed to provide Rule 26 disclosures or respond to discovery requests. The district court conducted a telephone conference on June 24, 2009, and decided to hold the motion for sanctions in abeyance. Following the conference, the court issued the following ruling:

Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 7/3/2009. I have noted the content of [Crispin's motion for sanctions] and make reference to the directions given by me during the telephone conference held today. If any of the mentioned parties have failed to fully comply with Rule 26 disclosures, then their last clear chance for compliance is the date set herein. Otherwise, sanctions will be imposed including striking evidence not included in Rule 26 disclosures. Be guided accordingly.

On June 24, 2009, Crispin moved for entry of default against Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza for their failure to file a responsive pleading.

Crispin also filed a motion on June 30, 2009, seeking additional time for his expert report because Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza never answered his interrogatories or requests for production of documents. Another reason he sought additional time was because the Municipality allegedly failed to comply with its continuing Rule 34 obligations. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 & 34. During the depositions of the officers, Crispin learned that the Municipality's Internal Affairs Department was conducting an investigation. Crispin alleged that, besides a two-page sworn statement by Díaz, the Municipality did not produce any documents arising out of this investigation. The district court gave Crispin an extension to produce the expert report.

On July 4, 2009, Crispin filed a motion “in compliance with” the district court's order holding Crispin's June 11, 2009 motion for sanctions in abeyance. Crispin requested numerous sanctions, including the imposition of a default judgment.

The defendants never filed an opposition to Crispin's June 11, 2009 motion for sanctions. On July 8, 2009, the district court found the Municipality, Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza in default, concluding:

Having examined Defendants' track record of non-compliance with discovery obligations, and considering the averments contained in [Crispin's motions], the court ORDERS as follows:

Defendants Municipality of Carolina, Karimar Peraza–Delgado, John Cruz–González, and Luis Díaz–Ruiz will face sanctions for their failure to comply with discovery obligations. Plaintiff's factual allegations are deemed admitted, Defendants' defenses and pleadings are stricken, and a liability default finding is made.

The Municipality filed a motion for reconsideration. It alleged it sent initial Rule 26 disclosures and produced all documents in its possession. In support, it attached a list of the exhibits it produced and a copy of its initial Rule 26 disclosures. Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza joined and supplemented the Municipality's motion. They alleged that their default was not willful because their DOJ attorney withdrew, leaving them without counsel and unable to respond to the motion for sanctions.

Crispin filed a “second motion for sanctions” against Moyeno, Puerto Rico Police Officers Vanessa Carmona and Alfredo Rivera–Suárez, and Carolina Police Commander, Colonel Carlos Haddock. He alleged they had not complied with outstanding discovery requests or produced Rule 26 disclosures. Moyeno never filed a response.

The district court ordered Crispin's counsel to file a list of outstanding discovery owed to Crispin by each defendant, and Crispin did so two days later.

The district court then granted Crispin's second motion for sanctions as to the other defendants, including Moyeno. It struck their pleadings and entered a default for their failure to provide timely discovery. The district court also denied the Municipality's motion for reconsideration of the default sanction.

3. Trial

A jury trial on damages commenced in October 2009. Before and during trial, the Municipality objected to the introduction of evidence concerning Crispin's psychological treatment on the grounds that Crispin failed to provide all of his medical records during discovery. Despite Crispin's failure to provide all of his medical records, the Municipality was able to acquire Crispin's medical records by...