Critel v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society Center, 8:96CV497 (D. Neb. 1997), 8:96CV497.
| Decision Date | 01 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | 8:96CV497. |
| Parties | BETTY J. CRITEL, Plaintiff, v. THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD SAMARITAN SOCIETY CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter is before me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the consent of the parties on defendant's motion for summary judgment (filing No. 19). After carefully considering the evidence and briefs submitted by the parties, the court finds that the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII), and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1101-48-1125, alleging that she was terminated by the defendant as a result of her sex and age. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant breached a contract of employment as expressed in defendant's policy and procedures manual by terminating her employment without either two written warnings or specific cause given.
Defendant contends that plaintiff was not terminated, that defendant "worked diligently" to retain plaintiff as an employee, and that she voluntarily resigned.
The court finds that the following facts are uncontroverted and constitute the material facts upon which a resolution of these issues must be premised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue is appropriate in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Plaintiff, a female 53 years of age, resides in Ravenna, Nebraska.
Defendant, The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, owns and operates the Ravenna Good Samaritan Center (Center), a long-term health care facility.
Plaintiff worked for defendant as a licensed practical nurse from 1977 to 1982. She was an office manager from 1982 until 1988, when she was hired as administrator of the Ravenna Center.
Defendant is a nonprofit, tax-exempt health care chain headquartered in Sioux Falls, South Dakota and incorporated under the laws of the State of North Dakota. Defendant owns or operates approximately 240 nursing and/or health care facilities throughout the country.
From the time of her employment as administrator in 1988, plaintiff was responsible for all decisions regarding staffing and finances for the Ravenna facility. Plaintiff worked as an administrator for defendant from 1988 until 1995.
Plaintiff was the direct supervisor of the Director of Nursing, Teresa Coulter. Plaintiff perceived that Coulter had been a problem for a long period of time in that Coulter appeared to have favorites among the nursing staff, made poor staff scheduling decisions, left work early, and did not leave her office to inspect conditions or supervise the nursing staff. However, plaintiff did not discipline Coulter because of Coulter's ongoing personal and family problems. Plaintiff acknowledged during her deposition that when a supervisor fails to issue effective discipline, even employees loyal to the supervisor become upset.
Plaintiff was under the direct supervision of Nebraska Regional Director Pierce Hanson while she was administrator of the Ravenna Center. Mr. Hanson is 72 years old and has been a Regional Director with defendant since 1977. He served as plaintiff's supervisor from 1989 until plaintiff left her employment in 1995.
Administrators are never hired on a permanent basis for any specific location. Administrators at each location operate the facility in a manner consistent with the idea that the administrator is the "owner" of the facility. The administrator is ultimately responsible for all decisions regarding staffing and finances for his or her facility.
Defendant's "policy and procedure manual" specifically states that "The Society may request that an administrator transfer because of a personality clash within the community or the inability of the administrator to handle a facility that may be too great a responsibility."
On March 7, 1993, plaintiff wrote a letter to Pierce Hanson addressing complaints made by her staff regarding her management style and various other "trust" issues. On May 3, 1995, Mr. Hanson called plaintiff and also sent her a letter confirming that he had again received letters concerning plaintiff's "management style." Plaintiff was not told which individuals had complained and was not given the details of the various complaints. Mr. Hanson's May 3, 1995 letter instructed plaintiff to stay home from work for five days while he conducted staff interviews at the Center. As requested by the staff, Mr. Hanson met with employees of the Center and a "climate survey" was conducted.
During his deposition, Mr. Hanson was unable to recall the specific form used in completing the climate survey. He personally distributed the survey forms but could not recall how many employees were interviewed or the names of any employees who were interviewed. He "believed" he intended to survey the department heads and to "make himself available to anybody who wanted to participate." He could not recall whether he interviewed only employees who had filed complaints against the plaintiff.
Plaintiff met with defendant's Central Office representatives on May 17, 1995 to discuss generally the complaints and the climate survey results. Plaintiff did not receive specific details concerning the various complaints until she obtained them during discovery in this lawsuit. She was assured during the May 17, 1995 meeting that defendant wanted to assist her in her goal to be a successful administrator. At no time did any representative of the defendant use words stating that plaintiff would be "fired" or "terminated" from her employment.
Under the circumstances, plaintiff was instructed on May 17 not to take any disciplinary actions against the staff. When she returned to the Ravenna Center on May 18, 1997, however, plaintiff distributed, or instructed others to distribute, survey forms, asking employees to complete the form only if they had not responded to Mr. Hanson's survey. Plaintiff admits that the process she used to hand out her own survey form could be viewed by employees as an attempt to discover the identities of those completing the unfavorable surveys described by Mr. Hanson during the May 17, 1995 meeting.
By letter dated May 25, 1995, plaintiff was informed that her return to the Ravenna facility was "not possible." As a condition of her further employment with defendant, plaintiff was required to undergo additional paid training and relocation to a different facility. This decision was made by Pierce Hanson, 72 years old; Dean Mertz, 42 years old; and Bonnie Brown, 62 years old.
Plaintiff never saw her direct supervisor, Pierce Hanson, do or say anything suggesting that his employment decisions were based on age. Plaintiff can name only one employee of the defendant who was ever accused of age discrimination prior to plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory conduct on the part of the defendant. The one employee previously accused of age discrimination was the plaintiff.
Plaintiff refused a paid internship assignment of up to four months at either defendant's Omaha or Alliance, Nebraska locations for purposes of additional training. Plaintiff's salary would have been reduced by $500 per month during the proposed training period; however, defendant offered to pay costs involved with the internship, including travel mileage every weekend home to Ravenna, hotel, one meal outside the training facility per day (not to exceed five meals per week), and cost to maintain licensure. If plaintiff had accepted the paid training, she would have received an annual salary of $31,116 and full benefits.
Plaintiff was advised by letter dated June 19, 1995 that defendant's offer, summarized above, would remain open through noon, Friday, June 23, 1995. Plaintiff rejected the offer, and negotiations continued. By letter dated July 12, 1995, plaintiff was asked to reconsider her decision in light of defendant's additional offer of the right of first refusal for the Administrator position at the Gibbon, Nebraska facility upon completion of additional training. The Gibbon facility is near plaintiff's home. The July 12 letter stated: "In the event Mrs. Critel declines this offer, we will deem her separation as a voluntary resignation, effective July 14."
Plaintiff rejected defendant's final offer, which required her to work under the supervision of Mr. Hanson, did not return to work for the defendant, and was replaced by a male administrator younger than 40.
In summary, the controverted and unresolved issues remaining in this case are (1) whether plaintiff was terminated from her employment at the Ravenna Center; (2) whether defendant's actions violated plaintiff's rights under the ADEA, Title VII, or the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act; (3) whether the Administrator's Policy and Procedures Manual constitutes an employment contract; (4) if plaintiff was "terminated," whether the termination breached the alleged employment contract; and (5) whether plaintiff mitigated her damages by not accepting the paid internship and/or making reasonable efforts to obtain suitable work.
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party should prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Regardless of whether the question is one of law or fact, when considering a motion for summary judgment the determination to be made is whether any material facts are disputed, and if none are disputed summary judgment is appropriate." Hyman Freightways v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 942 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1991). "A court must enter summary judgment against `a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence...
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